Daniel Lester

The Severance Plaintiffs brought a motion, supported by the O’Brien Plaintiffs and other defendants, to compel the Ministry of Transportation (HMK) to answer refusals and reattend examination for discovery in a highway negligence action.

HMK resisted, arguing it was not compellable for discovery under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act (PTHIA) and that the questions were improper.

The court, following the precedent set by Longo v. The Queen and Stegenga v. Jans, found that HMK is not compellable for discovery in claims brought under the PTHIA, as the Act does not expressly provide for such rights.

The court also rejected the argument that HMK had attorned to the court's jurisdiction by voluntarily participating in discovery, noting that voluntary participation does not create a right to compel reattendance if no statutory right exists.

Consequently, the motion was dismissed.

An employee of a daycare facility operated by the appellant municipality sustained a workplace injury from a slip and fall on a wet floor.

The municipality leased the daycare space from the respondent school board.

The school board was sued and brought a third party claim against the municipality, seeking a declaration that the municipality must defend and indemnify it under the terms of their commercial lease.

The motion judge ordered the municipality to defend and indemnify the school board.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the interpretation of the lease provisions governing insurance obligations and indemnification.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the municipality's obligation to maintain comprehensive general liability insurance constituted an assumption of the relevant risk of loss, and that the lease provisions, read together, clearly allocated the risk to the municipality.

The appellant, a police officer who pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death in a 2008 collision that killed an 18-year-old, posted comments on Facebook in 2015 after completing his sentence.

The respondents, relatives of the deceased, commenced a defamation action.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action, arguing his posts related to matters of public interest.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the posts did not relate to public interest but rather constituted an attempt to shift blame to the deceased and her family.

The motion judge awarded costs to the respondents despite the statutory presumption against such awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the dismissal of the s. 137.1 motion and the costs award.

The defendant brought a motion during a jury trial for a ruling that the plaintiff's claims for future care costs and non-pecuniary damages were barred by the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and subsequently developed chronic pain.

The defendant argued the plaintiff was malingering and exaggerating her symptoms for financial gain.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff credible and concluding she suffered a serious permanent impairment due to chronic pain caused by the accident, despite the jury ultimately awarding only $10,000 for general damages and $14,521.21 for past loss of income.

Following a jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant brought a threshold motion arguing the plaintiff's claims for non-pecuniary damages and future care costs were barred under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act.

The court reviewed extensive expert medical evidence regarding the plaintiff's chronic pain.

Despite the lack of objective findings and the jury's low damage award, the trial judge found the plaintiff credible and concluded she suffered from chronic pain caused by the accident, meeting the threshold of a serious permanent impairment.

The defendant's motion was dismissed, and judgment was entered in accordance with the jury's verdict.