Jill Cameron

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on the Crown's failure to make proper and timely disclosure of relevant video surveillance evidence, and the loss of some of that evidence.

The court found that the police were unacceptably negligent in failing to preserve all relevant video footage, resulting in a breach of the accused's rights under section 7 of the Charter.

However, the court concluded that the prejudice to the accused was minimal and could be adequately addressed by alternative remedies, including adjournments and a specific jury instruction regarding the lost evidence.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by jury of aggravated assault and three firearm offences arising from an incident at an after-hours restaurant where the appellant allegedly fired a gun twice inside the establishment and then shot the victim in the stomach and hand upon exit.

The central issue at trial was identification.

Three witnesses recanted prior statements to police in which they had identified the appellant, but the trial judge admitted the prior statements as hearsay evidence based on procedural reliability.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the verdict was not unreasonable and the trial judge properly instructed the jury on identification evidence and post-offence conduct.

The appellant's sentence of 12 years global (8 years for aggravated assault, 4 years concurrent for careless use of firearm, 4 years consecutive for pointing firearm, 4 years concurrent for possession of weapon, less 32 months pre-sentence custody credit) was upheld as fit.

The appellant was convicted on 42 counts of possession of stolen property and fraud following a trial before a judge alone.

The trial judge used evidence from multiple counts as similar fact evidence to support findings of knowledge and intent, without any request from the Crown to do so.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying similar fact evidence without a Crown request and without conducting a proper admissibility inquiry.

The court held that such evidence is presumptively inadmissible and requires an onus on the Crown to satisfy the trial judge that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing that the sentencing judge erred by rejecting a joint sentencing submission for a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting four children in 2004 and received a determinate sentence.

While on probation, he sexually assaulted two of his own children and breached a prohibition order.

The sentencing judge imposed an indeterminate sentence based on psychiatric evidence that the appellant's pedophilia could not be managed in the community and that he posed a danger to children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the indeterminate sentence, finding that the sentencing judge properly applied the legal test and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant could not be managed in the community.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving his stepdaughter between the ages of 6 and 11.

On appeal, the appellant raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred in relying on the consistency of the complainant's allegations to address credibility concerns; and second, that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge properly considered the complainant's consistent reporting to multiple authorities over a three-year period as context for assessing the defence's attack on reliability, and that the trial judge's credibility findings were based on corroborating evidence and were open to him on the record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the complainant's testimony reliable by framing the legal test for collusion too narrowly and failing to consider the possibility of inadvertent collusion between the complainant and his mother.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's description of collusion may have been narrow, she carefully reviewed communications between the parties and found they were limited to discussing timing of events and did not influence the complainant's recollection of the substance of the allegations.

The trial judge's findings regarding credibility and reliability were upheld as open to her on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge's instructions to the jury on planning and deliberation were flawed.

The appellant conceded guilt for second degree murder but contended there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation for first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the jury could reasonably infer planning and deliberation based on evidence of the appellant's contact with a witness approximately one week before the murder to facilitate fraudulent use of the victim's debit cards, combined with evidence of the nature and circumstances of the killing.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 12 years imposed following conviction on 25 of 34 counts of sexual offences against four complainants.

The trial judge had determined a fit sentence of 13 years and reduced it by one year to account for the appellant's advanced age and health challenges.

The appellant argued that age should be more substantially factored into the sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, and that a shorter sentence could achieve these objectives for an elderly offender.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentence fell comfortably within the appropriate range and that the weight assigned to age did not reflect error.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm and driving offences arising from discharging a handgun on a residential street and leading police on a high-speed chase.

He also appealed his sentence of 10 years.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in her approach to evidence, misapprehended evidence, engaged in improper speculation, and improperly used disbelief of his statement as circumstantial evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the trial judge conducted a meticulous review of all evidence and that the verdict was reasonable based on substantial circumstantial evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge misapprehended evidence regarding a jammed gun and gang involvement, and that consecutive sentences for firearm possession offences were inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the overall sentence clearly fit given the serious nature of the offences and the appellant's criminal record.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated February 21, 2018, seeking an absolute discharge or a new hearing.

The appellant argued that he no longer posed a significant danger to public safety due to improved insight into his mental illness, medication compliance, and stable employment and housing.

However, the court found the Board's concerns about recent cocaine use were reasonable given the appellant's history of manic episodes preceded by cocaine use and associated medication non-compliance.

The court allowed the appeal on the basis of transcription errors in the Board's reasons, which confused the appellant with another hospital patient and relied on irrelevant material.

A new hearing was ordered to take place as the appellant's annual review hearing in February 2019.

The appellant appealed his sentence for manslaughter following a guilty plea in the death of his 53-day-old son.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: that the sentencing judge unfairly minimized the mitigating effect of the guilty plea; that the judge unduly relied on the appellant's failure to disclose a head injury to medical personnel; that the judge misapprehended the agreed statement of facts regarding the force used; and that the judge erred in declining to award pre-sentence credit beyond the 1.5:1 ratio for harsh detention conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and that the sentence was fit.

During a trial for first degree murder, the accused brought two motions seeking further instructions to the jury at the end of the jury charge.

The first motion sought an instruction to disregard evidence elicited in re-examination regarding the accused's prior interest in firearms.

The second motion sought an instruction that the Crown's failure to call the accused's girlfriend as a witness constituted a gap in the evidence providing a basis for reasonable doubt.

The trial judge dismissed both motions, finding that the re-examination evidence was necessary to correct a false impression left during cross-examination, and that the failure to call the witness did not leave a gap in the Crown's case as she was an unnecessary and unreliable witness.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion to override the Attorney General's refusal to consent to a judge alone trial under s. 473(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that extensive adverse pre-trial publicity from a prior murder conviction rendered a fair jury trial impossible.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the demanding standard for Charter relief was not met and that traditional safeguards, including challenge for cause, should be attempted first.

The court granted the alternative motion to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity and approved a set of six questions for the jury selection process.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the defence sought to limit the scope and terminology of expert opinion evidence from two forensic anthropologists regarding photographs of objects burning in an incinerator.

The court granted the request to prohibit the experts from using potentially misleading terminology such as 'consistent with' or 'cannot exclude'.

However, the court dismissed the defence's challenge to one expert's qualifications to opine on the differences between human and deer bones, finding she met the threshold for expertise, subject to a brief voir dire at trial.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit various pieces of circumstantial evidence, including firearms purchases, text messages, and statements made by the accused.

The court applied the test of balancing probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court ruled that evidence of a handgun purchase shortly before the victim's disappearance was highly probative of intent and planning and thus admissible.

However, evidence of other firearms purchases and certain highly prejudicial text messages referring to other criminal activities were excluded or ordered to be edited.

Evidence of the financial relationship between the co-accused was deemed admissible to show the nature of their relationship.

The Crown and one of the co-accused brought a joint pre-trial motion to admit numerous out-of-court statements made by the alleged murder victim prior to her disappearance.

The statements were tendered either for their truth under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and the state of mind exception, or as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence.

The court admitted most of the statements, finding them substantively reliable or relevant to the declarant's state of mind, but excluded certain statements alleging prior assaults as unreliable and irrelevant.

The Crown brought pre-trial motions to admit similar fact evidence and discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior murder conviction involving the disposal of remains in an incinerator, as well as prior criminal acts, text messages, and rap lyrics.

The court dismissed the similar fact motion, finding the moral prejudice of introducing a prior murder outweighed its probative value.

The court also excluded most of the discreditable conduct evidence, but allowed an edited calendar entry and the first verse of a rap song that had a strong circumstantial link to the alleged disposal of the victim's body.

The applicants, jointly charged with first degree murder, brought pre-trial motions for severance and for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the severance motion, finding that the interests of justice favoured a joint trial and that any prejudice from out-of-court statements could be managed with limiting instructions.

The court also dismissed the s. 11(b) motion, calculating the net delay at 29 months after deducting 15 months for the discrete event of a concurrent murder trial involving the same accused.

Alternatively, the court found the delay justified by the case's exceptional complexity and transitional provisions.

The applicant sought a bail review based on a claimed material change in circumstances, proposing new sureties and electronic monitoring.

The applicant faces serious firearms trafficking and drug charges, with trials scheduled imminently.

The court found the proposed supervision plan inadequate, noting the reluctance of a former surety and the new surety's reservations about bail conditions.

The court concluded that detention was necessary on both secondary (protection of the public due to substantial likelihood of committing further offences) and tertiary (maintain confidence in the administration of justice) grounds, considering the gravity of the offences, the apparent strength of the Crown's case, and the potential for a lengthy term of imprisonment.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 523(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, proposing the use of an electronic monitoring device as a material change in circumstances.

The applicant had previously been detained on the secondary ground due to a history of re-offending while on bail under the supervision of his parents.

The court dismissed the application, finding that electronic monitoring only establishes location and does not displace the need for capable sureties, especially given the family's past failure to prevent breaches.