COURT FILE NO.: CR-18-40000008-00AP
DATE: 20190205
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
CHINEDU OKORO
Defendant/Appellant
Ken Lockhart, for the Crown/Respondent
Mark Halfyard, for the Defendant/Appellant
HEARD: November 20, 2018
MOLLOY J.:
REASONS FOR DECISION
A. INTRODUCTION
[1] In 2015, Chinedu Okoro was a part-time high school teacher in Toronto. He was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving three of his female students. In a decision dated June 23, 2017, Justice S. Bacchus of the Ontario Court of Justice found Mr. Okoro: guilty on four counts of sexual exploitation in respect of one complainant B.H. (who was 17 years old at the time); guilty on four counts of sexual assault in respect of the complainant E.S.O. (who was 19 years old at the time); and not guilty of the charges involving the third complainant (S.J.). Mr. Okoro appeals to this Court from the findings of guilt, submitting that the trial judge fundamentally misapprehended the evidence in two material respects and applied a stricter standard of scrutiny to defence evidence compared to that of the Crown.
[2] The trial judge delivered detailed reasons for her verdict, comprising 16 single-spaced pages. It is clear from those reasons that the trial judge correctly applied R. v. W.D. in considering the burden on the Crown and standard of proof. She carefully reviewed all of the evidence and provided detailed reasons for why she did not believe the testimony of Mr. Okoro. In addition, in her analysis of the testimony of the complainant S.J., the trial judge pointed to a number of inconsistencies and held that she could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the assaults described by S.J. had occurred, which was the basis for the dismissal of those charges involving that complainant.
[3] In separate Reasons also issued on June 23, 2017, the trial judge ruled on the Crown’s motion to have the evidence of each complainant considered as similar fact evidence in relation to all counts, including the allegations made by other complainants, both with respect to the actus reus of the offences and the credibility of the complainants. Again after a careful analysis, the trial judge concluded that, as between B.H. and S.J. (who were good friends), the Crown had failed to establish an absence of tainting. She therefore ruled that the evidence of B.H. and S.J. could not be used as similar fact with respect to the counts involving them. However, E.S.O. did not know either of the other complainants and, at the time she came forward to the police, had no information as to the substance of their allegations against Mr. Okoro. E.S.O. went to a different school and was older than the other two complainants. The trial judge found that there was a degree of similarity in the nature of the conduct described by E.S.O. and the conduct reported by the other complainants, sufficient to be relevant to the credibility of the complainants and relevant to whether the conduct in question was accidental or innocent. She applied the correct legal test. She then ruled that the evidence of E.S.O. was admissible in relation to the counts involving S.J. and B.H. on the issue of credibility and the nature of the conduct. There is no appeal from that decision.
[4] The focus of the arguments advanced before me on this appeal is the factual analysis of the trial judge in relation to the counts involving B.H. However, because of the adverse findings of credibility with respect to Mr. Okoro and the similar fact evidence ruling, the defence argues that the trial judge’s conclusions with respect to the charges involving E.S.O. also cannot stand.
[5] For the reasons that follow, I do not agree. I see no flaw whatsoever in the reasoning of the trial judge in respect of her analysis of the evidence of E.S.O. or her analysis of the defence evidence. Her credibility findings are unassailable. The trial judge rejected the defence argument that B.H.’s allegations about Mr. Okoro rubbing up against her back with his penis were physically impossible. I do not agree that she misapprehended any material aspect of the evidence in that regard. I also do not agree that she failed to be even-handed in the manner in which she assessed the defence evidence as compared to the Crown evidence. I agree with the defence that in one small detail the trial judge may have misunderstood one aspect of Mr. Okoro’s testimony. However, I do not see this as sufficiently material to interfere with the verdict.
B. MISAPPREHENSION OF EVIDENCE
[6] The appellant argues that the trial judge misapprehended some aspects of the evidence before her, and failed to take into account other evidence, which errors played an essential part in her reasoning process. He submits that the convictions must therefore be set aside.
[7] It is only a misapprehension with respect to material parts of the evidence that constitutes a reversible error. As stated by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Morrissey:
When will a misapprehension of the evidence render a trial unfair and result in a miscarriage of justice? The nature and extent of the misapprehension and its significance to the trial judge's verdict must be considered in light of the fundamental requirement that a verdict must be based exclusively on the evidence adduced at trial. Where a trial judge is mistaken as to the substance of material parts of the evidence and those errors play an essential part in the reasoning process resulting in a conviction then, in my view, the accused's conviction is not based exclusively on the evidence and is not a "true" verdict. Convictions resting on a misapprehension of the substance of the evidence adduced at trial sit on no firmer foundation than those based on information derived from sources extraneous to the trial. If an appellant can demonstrate that the conviction depends on a misapprehension of the evidence then, in my view, it must follow that the appellant has not received a fair trial, and was the victim of a miscarriage of justice. This is so even if the evidence, as actually adduced at trial, was capable of supporting a conviction.[^1]
[8] In this case, the appellant alleges two instances where the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and one instance where she failed to take into account relevant evidence. The defence had argued at trial that one of the assaults alleged by B.H. (that the accused had brushed his penis against her upper back while she was seated on a stool at her desk) was physically impossible. The trial judge rejected that argument. The appellant submits that in doing so the trial judge failed to consider the relative heights of the accused and B.H. and also misapprehended the evidence with respect to the height of the stool on which B.H. was seated. The other misapprehension of fact alleged is with respect to the accused’s testimony about the distance between the back row of seats (where B.H.’s desk was) and the back wall of the classroom. This evidence relates to the same assault alleged by B.H., but was also used by the trial judge as part of her assessment of Mr. Okoro’s credibility.
The Assaults Alleged by B.H.
[9] The trial judge found Mr. Okoro had committed four sexual assaults in relation to B.H., specifically that he: (1) rubbed his penis along the back of B.H.’s shoulders on numerous occasions; (2) pressed his forearm onto her breast; (3) stroked her upper thigh on one occasion; and (4) pushed her vagina with the back of his hand on another occasion.[^2]
[10] B.H. testified that she sat in the back row of the classroom, which was configured more as a science lab than a typical classroom. She sat behind a long workbench, rather than at a regular individual desk. The workbench was higher than a regular desk, as testified to by the witnesses and shown on photographs filed as exhibits at trial. However, the exact measurements were not known. B.H. sat on a stool, which had no back. The stool was higher than a regular chair. However, again, there were no measurements, or even estimates, of the height. B.H. testified that there were two types of stools, one of was higher than the other. She said that she sometimes sat on the higher stool, but most of the time sat on the shorter stool.[^3] Photographs of the classroom depict two types of stools at the back of the room, one being higher than the other.
[11] B.H. estimated that there was about one to two meters between where she was sitting and the window at the back of the classroom.[^4] She acknowledged that sometimes she would sit with the stool pushed away from the bench and would be leaning back.[^5] She testified that on a number of occasions, Mr. Okoro would come to the back of the classroom and pass behind where she was sitting, with his back to the window. She said that when he did that, he would pass his hard penis across her upper back between her shoulder blades. [^6]
Testimony of the Accused as to the Space at the Back of the Classroom
[12] Mr. Okoro denied all of the allegations against him. He testified that if B.H. was sitting the way she normally sat, it would be impossible to pass behind her. In order to do so, he would have to ask her to pull her chair forward. He said he avoided going to the back of the room. In examination in chief, when asked to describe the table at which B.H. was sitting, he stated:
So the lab table is a very long, and it’s by the way, it’s immovable table, it’s fixed. It’s a very long bench, so the space at the back is, I would say, about 30 centimeters, all right, so if they sit the way they sit, I couldn’t, there’s no way I could pass.[^7]
The Findings of the Trial Judge
[13] The trial judge cited R. v. W.(D.),[^8] and stated that she was applying the principles set out therein. Her analysis started with her assessment of the evidence given by Mr. Okoro at trial, covering paragraphs 13-49 of her Reasons. She found his evidence to be “replete with material inconsistencies,” “illogical,” and not in “accord with common sense.”[^9] On the issue of the space at the back of the classroom where B.H. was seated, the trial judge noted that Mr. Okoro testified that “the distance between the back row and the back wall was 30 centimeters and there was no way he could pass.” The trial judge also noted that Mr. Okoro said that the students would have to be seated properly for him to get through acknowledged that notwithstanding the narrow passageway he continued to go to the back row to assist B.H. and other students. The trial judge contrasted Mr. Okoro’s evidence to the testimony of B.H. that the distance was one to two meters and the appearance of the room from the photographs filed as exhibits. She then held (at para. 19):
I find the defendant’s characterization of the width of this passage as extremely narrow to be embellished evidence and inconsistent with the placement of the lab bench vis a vis the wall as depicted in the photos.
[14] At the conclusion of the trial, defence counsel[^10] argued that it would have been physically impossible for Mr. Okoro’s penis to come in contact with B.H.’s upper back when she was seated on a stool at the back of the classroom. In the course of oral submissions, the trial judge pointed out that there was no evidence before her with respect to the height of the table or stools and also no evidence as to the height of Mr. Okoro. Both defence counsel and Crown counsel[^11] agreed that it was appropriate to take into account the relative heights of the stool and table from the photographs, as well as the evidence that both were higher than a normal desk and desk chair. Both counsel also argued that the trial judge could take into account the height of Mr. Okoro and B.H. based on her own observations in the courtroom.[^12]
[15] The trial judge dealt with the defence submission of impossibility at paras. 76-79 of her Reasons, as follows:
B.H. was cross-examined extensively on whether it was logistically even possible for the defendant to rub his penis across her shoulder given the apparent height of the lab bench and stool.
There is no evidence as to the defendant’s height or B.H.’s at the time, and there is no direct evidence regarding the heights or dimensions of the relevant furniture in the classroom. However, the photographs show stools of varying heights. Although B.H. could not be sure, she testified that she believed that she sat on the shorter stool.
I do not find that the defendant’s opportunity to commit these offences is negated by these logistics.
B.H.’s evidence was consistent that the defendant’s penis made frequent contact with her upper back as she described. She testified that many people were able to navigate the passage way behind her row without making contact with her including a larger sized student. Her evidence in this regard has remained consistent.
[16] E.S.O. also testified that two to three times a week, Mr. Okoro would stand behind her while she was seated at her desk and use his penis to rub across the back of her shoulders. E.S.O. and B.H. were complete strangers and had no opportunity whatsoever to compare stories. The trial judge took into account the similar fact evidence of E.S.O. in assessing B.H.’s credibility as well as the actus reus of the various assaults reported.[^13]
Analysis: Misapprehension Regarding the Impossibility Defence
[17] The appellant submits that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence as to the height of the stools and erred by failing to take into account the height of the accused, which she could observe in the courtroom. He further submits that this error is material as the impossibility of B.H.’s evidence in this regard was the mainstay of the defence attack on her credibility.
[18] I do not take from the reasons of the trial judge that she rejected the defence of impossibility because of the absence of specific evidence as to Mr. Okoro’s height. Both counsel agreed during submissions that it was open to the trial judge to take into account her observation of Mr. Okoro in the courtroom. The trial judge did not specifically reject that submission. Further, it would appear that she accepted she was entitled to take such evidence into account as she did so in respect of a finding that E.S.O. was ample-chested (which was relevant to another aspect of the evidence). The trial judge is presumed to know the law, and she has demonstrated that she knows this by actual findings with respect to the other evidence. The trial judge took into account the photographs showing the workbench and the two types of stools. There is nothing in the reasons to indicate that she failed to appreciate that the stools were higher than a typical desk chair. This was obvious from the photographs as well as the evidence. She correctly noted that B.H. usually sat on the shorter of the two stools. Having taken all of the evidence into account, she was simply unable to say that it was physically impossible for Mr. Okoro to have accomplished the assault alleged. I note that both counsel at trial urged the trial judge to take into account her observations of Mr. Okoro’s height and yet one counsel argued that it would have been physically impossible, and the other argued that it was not. I therefore do not find it surprising that the trial judge, after considering the whole of the evidence including her in court observations, was unable to say it was logistically impossible.
[19] I note as well the very similar observation made by E.S.O., about which B.H. could not possibly have known.
[20] I do not find that the trial judge ignored relevant evidence, nor did she misapprehend any evidence in concluding that she could not rule out this allegation based on its being physically impossible.
Analysis: Misapprehension Regarding Mr. Okoro’s Evidence on Distance
[21] The trial judge accurately stated that Mr. Okoro estimated the distance at the back as being 30 centimeters. In fairness to the defence, what Mr. Okoro may have meant by the 30 centimeter description was the distance from where B.H. was usually sitting with her stool tipped back and the back wall. Mr. Okoro was not cross-examined about this measurement, nor were there any submissions on the point during argument. B.H. and S.J. both testified that the space behind them was narrow. B.H. said that anyone passing behind would have to move sideways to get past; S.J. described it as people having to “shimmy” to get behind them. Seen in this context, I believe the trial judge may have misapprehended what space Mr. Okoro was referring to when he said 30 centimeters, and that his evidence on this point might not have been as much of an “embellishment” as to trial judge concluded.
[22] However, this was only one small point in a very long list of problems the trial judge had with Mr. Okoro’s testimony. She gave very detailed and specific reasons for all of the reasons she rejected his evidence as untrue and why it did not cause her to have a reasonable doubt. Even if she had some misapprehension about this detail, it would not have affected the outcome.
C. DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF SCRUTINY
[23] The appellant argues that the trial judge applied a stricter level of scrutiny when assessing Mr. Okoro’s evidence than she applied in assessing the evidence presented by the Crown. The appellant acknowledges that this is a high bar, as noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Gravesande. In that case, Pardu J.A. held:
This court has repeatedly stated that it is an error of law for a trial judge to apply a higher or stricter level of scrutiny to the evidence of the defence than to the evidence of the Crown: R. v. Owen (2001), 2001 CanLII 3367 (ON CA), 150 O.A.C. 378, at para. 3; R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, 241 C.C.C. (3d) 45, at para. 62; R. v. Phan, 2013 ONCA 787, 313 O.A.C. 352 at para. 30. However, as noted by Laskin J.A. in R. v. Aird, 2013 ONCA 447, 307 O.A.C. 183, at para. 39:
The "different standards of scrutiny" argument is a difficult argument to succeed on in an appellate court. It is difficult for two related reasons: credibility findings are the province of the trial judge and attract a very high degree of deference on appeal; and appellate courts invariably view this argument with skepticism, seeing it as a veiled invitation to reassess the trial judge's credibility determinations.
For an appellant to successfully advance this ground of appeal, she must identify something clear in the trial judge’s reasons or the record indicating that a different standard of scrutiny was applied and something sufficiently significant to displace the deference due to a trial judge’s credibility assessments: R. v. Howe (2005), 2005 CanLII 253 (ON CA), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 480 at para. 59 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Rhayel, 2015 ONCA 377, 324 C.C.C. (3d) 362, at para. 98.[^14]
[24] In the case before me, the appellant submits that I should consider the totality of the trial judge’s reasons for decision in determining whether she applied a different level of scrutiny. In addition, the appellant provided a number of examples, which he says illustrates the higher standard applied to the credibility assessment of the accused as compared to the leeway given to difficulties in the evidence of the complainants.
[25] One example cited by the appellant overlaps with the submission on misapprehension of the evidence. The appellant points to the trial judge’s refusal to consider the height of Mr. Okoro based on her observations of him in the courtroom, as contrasted to her willingness to consider her own observations of E.S.O. having an ample bosom based on her appearance in court. I have already dealt with this point above. However, within the context of the level of scrutiny applied, I also disagree with the appellant’s submission. As I have stated, I do not take the trial judge as having refused to consider her courtroom observations of Mr. Okoro’s height. She merely ruled that she was unable to conclude from all of the evidence that it was impossible for Mr. Okoro to accomplish the assault B.H. alleged. The trial judge was fully entitled to take into account her physical observations of E.S.O. in assessing the credibility of Mr. Okoro’s evasiveness on the issue of her chest size and the manner in which he responded to questions about it. She committed no error in doing so, nor does it demonstrate that she favoured one side more than the other.
[26] A second example cited by the appellant was the failure of the trial judge to make a finding about the height of the workbench and stool used by B.H. based on the photographs, whereas she rejected the evidence of Mr. Okoro about the width of the workbench based on those same photographs. The width of the workbench was of importance to the defence because Mr. Okoro had testified that he sometimes had to go behind B.H. to assist her because the workbench was too wide for him to stretch across it and assist her from the front.
[27] The appellant also submitted that the trial judge rejected Mr. Okoro’s evidence about the width of the desk even though that point had been accepted by the complainant on cross-examination. The appellant relies on the following excerpt from the complainant’s evidence:
Q. Would you agree with me, though that it’s very awkward for him again in reference to picture 3-G [a photograph of the workbench] for him to stand on the other side of the lab bench to help you, right? There would be a lot of distance between him and you if he’s standing in front of the lab bench and you’re seated there at the lab bench, there’s quite a bit of distance there, right?
A. I guess as much, yeah.
Q. And we don’t know the exact distance but I’m suggesting to you it made sense that if you called the teacher back to help with a problem that he’d come around to the side of you. He wouldn’t, he wouldn’t teach from that side of the desk he wouldn’t even be able to really see the problem that you were pointing at and certainly not in an upright direction, right?
A. Okay.
Q. Do you know what I’m saying?
A. Yes, but what I am saying is yes he can come to the back of the class to help me but that don’t mean he has to touch me …
[28] The trial judge dealt with this issue in paragraphs 28-32 as follows:
When questioned about why he could not assist B.H. from the front of the desk, the defendant provided a number of excuses. He testified that doing so would disrupt students seated at the desks in the row in front of B.H. He also testified that he would have to stretch to try to see the problem she needed help with as the lab desk was very wide.
I am mindful that B.H. did agree to a limited degree during cross examination that it may have been problematic for the defendant to assist her from the front of the desk. She agreed in cross examination that she “guessed” that there would be a lot of distance between the defendant and her if he stood in front of the lab bench and she was seated.
However, I do not equate her “guess” with a concession, nor does it give rise to reliable evidence that it would have been more problematic for the defendant to help B.H. from the front of the desk.
B.H. testified that there was more space between the desk and the lab bench row than shown in the pictures during summer school. Items on the lab bench depicted in the photographs, such as a juice box and a piece of paper also assist with an assessment of its dimension and contradict the defendant’s assertions regarding the impossibility of helping B.H. from the front of the lab desk because of its width.
The defendant’s evidence regarding the impracticality and impossibility of assisting B.H. from the front of her desk without disrupting other students is not borne out by the photos which show there would have been space.
[29] Again, I do not accept that this example demonstrates an application by the trial judge of two levels of scrutiny. I agree with the trial judge that it is not possible to determine the actual height of the workbench and stool based on the photographs alone and there was no evidence whatsoever at trial estimating their height. However, in considering the width of the workbench, the trial judge took into account items that were shown on the desktop, such as a juice box and a sheet of paper, from which she was able to assess the table’s full width. Obviously, the presence of such commonplace objects would be of assistance in determining the overall width of the desk. There is nothing wrong with the trial judge doing so. There was nothing of that nature available to assist in judging the height of the stools, and so it was not possible to apply the same analysis. Thus, the appellant is comparing apples to oranges.
[30] Further, it was open to the trial judge to determine what weight to give the complainant’s half-hearted acquiescence to a suggestion made by defence counsel in cross examination. The manner in which B.H. answered that question may well have cast that evidence in a different light than is the case merely reading the words from a page of the transcript. Nuance is subtle and often cannot be appreciated from a written transcript, which is one of the reasons that appellate courts give so much deference to the trial judge’s assessments on credibility. The trial judge gave thorough reasons explaining why she believed that Mr. Okoro was simply making up excuses to explain why it was necessary for him to go to the back of the classroom to assist B.H., which was part of her overall assessment of Mr. Okoro’s credibility. I do not agree with the submission that in doing so she was applying a closer level of scrutiny to the defence evidence. On the contrary, she looked closely at all of the evidence and made findings of fact that are entitled to deference.
[31] The appellant submitted that the trial judge excused the failure of the complainants to report Mr. Okoro’s conduct to school authorities, but then was critical of Mr. Okoro for failing to report what he described to be disruptive conduct of B.H. in the classroom. First of all, these two concepts are completely unrelated and cannot really be compared. It is well known that victims of abuse frequently delay reporting. The trial judge was alive to this reality and took into account the reasons given by the complainants for not immediately reporting.[^15] The trial judge’s observations about Mr. Okoro’s description of B.H.’s misbehavior in class were part of her assessment of Mr. Okoro’s credibility. The trial judge accepted that B.H. had not been a model student, as indeed was admitted by B.h. in cross examination. However, the trial judge found that Mr. Okoro’s version of the events “had an embellished air, inconsistent with a forthright account.” She then stated:
The defendant’s evidence does not accord with common sense. If B.H. was as disruptive as he describes, why would be move her to another remote part of the classroom? Why not report B.H.’s behavior to the office if she was indeed so disruptive?
[32] This is a common sense inference which is entirely within the purview of the trial judge. I see no error in that regard, nor do I consider it to be an example of uneven treatment.
[33] Finally, the appellant points to the fact that E.S.O. was found to have given inconsistent evidence in one material aspect of her evidence and yet her evidence was found by the trial judge to be credible. The appellant contrasts that to the trial judge’s treatment of inconsistencies in his evidence, which caused her not only to reject it outright, but to find that his testimony did not give rise to a reasonable doubt. The answer to this is a simple on: it was a question of degree. The issue with respect to E.S.O.’s evidence related to her allegation that Mr. Okoro had reached into her cleavage with his right hand and pulled out a cross that was hanging by a chain around her neck and made a suggestive comment about it. Initially in her examination in chief, E.S.O. testified that Mr. Okoro used only one hand to reach into her cleavage. Later, but still in chief, she was asked if it was possible Mr. Okoro had simply made a mistake, to which she responded, “Putting your two hands to pick a cross inside it’s not like it’s on the top inside my cleavage that is not by mistake. That is intentionally.”[^16] On cross-examination, E.S.O. stood by her earlier evidence that Mr. Okoro had used only one hand.
[34] The trial judge found that this one reference to two hands was “an exaggeration,” but found that it did not detract from the “overall credibility and reliability of her account.”[^17] She noted that E.S.O. had, with this one exception, consistently maintained that Mr. Okoro used one hand. She therefore, rejected the evidence about his using two hands, but nevertheless held that she was “satisfied otherwise that E.S.O.’s account of the events and the manner the defendant touched her is credible, reliable, and truthful.”[^18] It is trite law that the trier of fact may accept some, none or all of a witness’ testimony. The trial judge was not required to reject the whole of E.S.O.’s evidence because of one inconsistency and she provided careful reasons as to why she considered that this one discrepancy did not undermine the whole of E.S.O.’s testimony.
[35] There can be no comparison between the credibility issues arising from E.S.O.’s one inconsistency and the numerous difficulties the trial judge found arising from Mr. Okoro’s evidence. The trial judge was well aware that Mr. Okoro’s credibility was a key factor in this case and paid considerable attention to her findings in that regard. Her reasons are thorough and detailed and include many specific examples for why she found his evidence to be lacking in credibility.[^19]
[36] It is also important not to overlook the totality of the trial judge’s reasons. Paragraphs 106 to 126 of those reasons are devoted to the evidence of S.J., and the numerous difficulties the trial judge had with her evidence. Just as she did for the evidence of Mr. Okoro, the trial judge gave details examples of inconsistencies she found in S.J.’s testimony. In the result, she found that she was unable to fully rely upon S.J.’s account of what had happened and that she had a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Okoro’s guilt on that count. In my view, this underscores how even-handed the trial judge was in her assessment of all of the evidence, both for the Crown and for the defence.
D. CONCLUSIONS
[37] The trial judge’s reasons are meticulous. She made findings of fact and findings of credibility rooted in the evidence before her and carefully explained her rationale for every finding made. The one area where she may have misapprehended the evidence of Mr. Okoro related to the distance at the back of the classroom. Although Mr. Okoro certainly did say the distance was 30 centimeters, which is clearly not correct, seen in context, he may well have been talking about the distance between B.H. and the back of the classroom if B.H. was leaning back on her stool. Although this may have been a misunderstanding of the evidence, it is not material in all of the circumstances, and is not a basis for interfering with the verdict. There was no other misapprehension of evidence and no failure to take into account relevant evidence. Further, the trial judge was even-handed in her analysis and did not apply a different level of scrutiny to the evidence of Mr. Okoro. She simply did not believe Mr. Okoro and she gave ample reasons to support that conclusion. She also found the evidence of B.H. and E.S.O. to be both compelling and credible, and she gave ample reasons to support that conclusion. In short, there is no basis for this court to intervene.
[38] The appeal is dismissed.
MOLLOY J.
Released: February 5, 2019
COURT FILE NO.: CR-18-40000008-00AP
DATE: 20190205
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
CHINEDU OKORO
Defendant/Appellant
REASONS FOR decision
Molloy J.
Released: February 5, 2019
[^1]: R. v. Morrissey (1995), 1995 CanLII 3498 (ON CA), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (C.A.) at 221 [^2]: Reasons for Decision dated June 23, 2017 at para.123. [^3]: Transcript, February 6, 2017 at p.17 [^4]: Ibid, p. 13 [^5]: Ibid, p. 47 [^6]: Ibid, p. 49 [^7]: Transcript, February 8, 2017, p. 17, line15 [^8]: R. v. W.(D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, cited by the trial judge at para. 12 of her Reasons. [^9]: Reasons of the Trial Judge, para. 13 [^10]: Defence counsel at trial was a different lawyer from Mr. Okoro’s counsel on this appeal. [^11]: Crown counsel was also a different lawyer at trial. [^12]: Transcript, February 8, 2017, pp. 79, 97, 117 [^13]: Reasons of the Trial Judge, paras. 99-100 [^14]: R. v. Gravesande, 2015 ONCA 774 at paras. 18-19 [^15]: Reasons of the trial judge, at paras. 53 and 72 [^16]: Transcript, February 7, 2017, p. 103, lines 1-5 [^17]: Reasons, para. 62 [^18]: Reasons, paras. 63-66 [^19]: Reasons, paras.13, 14,15-19, 20-21, 24, 25, 26-30, 31-35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, and 46.