A. OVERVIEW

[1] The Applicant Dellen Millard and his co-accused Mark Smich (hereinafter, Millard and Smich) are jointly charged in an Indictment alleging that they committed first degree murder on the person of Laura Babcock. Beginning on March 27, 2017, their trial has been proceeding before me on various dates with the hearing of pre-trial Motions, pursuant to the powers set out in s. 645(5) of the Criminal Code. It is anticipated that the pre-trial Motions will be completed in late September or early October 2017 and that jury selection will commence in mid-October 2017.

[2] On July 17, 2017, Millard advised that he wished to bring a Motion seeking an adjournment. I scheduled it to be heard a week later, on July 24, 2017. At the end of oral argument I denied Millard’s request for an adjournment. It was strenuously opposed by counsel for the Crown and counsel for the co-accused Smich. These are my reasons for dismissing the adjournment Motion.

B. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

[3] The long and complex history of these proceedings has already been summarized in my Reasons for Judgment in relation to two earlier pre-trial Motions, alleging a s. 11(b) Charter of Rights violation and seeking severance of co-accused. I denied both Motions. See: R. v. Millard and Smich, 2017 ONSC 4030. I will not repeat that previous summary of the proceedings in the same detail.

[4] For purposes of the present adjournment Motion, the salient aspects of the procedural history are as follows:

• on March 10, 2014, Millard and Smich were charged in Toronto with the first degree murder of Laura Babcock. At that time, they were already jointly charged with a separate murder in Hamilton relating to death of Tim Bosma. The Hamilton murder case had been proceeding since May 22, 2013. It went to trial in the fall of 2015, with pre-trial Motions heard by A. Goodman J., and then before a jury in early 2016. On June 17, 2016, the jury convicted both Millard and Smich of the first degree murder of Bosma. They are presently serving life sentences in relation to that matter;

• the Toronto proceedings relating to Laura Babcock had to await completion of the Hamilton trial. On the first appearance in this Court (on September 10, 2015), a “target” date of September 2016 was set by McMahon J. for the Toronto trial. However, that initial “target” date was revised on the second appearance in this Court (on December 11, 2015) and a new trial date of February 13, 2017 was set by McMahon J. The main reason for this revised trial date was to allow sufficient time to prepare, between the conclusion of the Bosma trial and the commencement of the Babcock trial. Smich was represented by the same counsel who acted for him in the Hamilton trial. Millard had counsel on the Hamilton trial but he advised McMahon J. that he would “likely be self-represented” on the Babcock trial. He agreed that setting the trial date for February 2017 “makes a lot of sense to me.” On subsequent appearances before McMahon J., Millard confirmed that his intention was to be self-represented at the Babcock trial. McMahon J. “strongly” urged Millard “to get a lawyer”;

• a significant development occurred on the fifth appearance in this Court, on September 14, 2016. This was three months after the guilty verdict on the Hamilton trial. Millard advised McMahon J. that he had changed his mind about being self-represented at the Toronto trial and that he was now in the process of choosing and retaining counsel. McMahon J. gave Millard a further week to decide on his counsel. On September 20, 2016, Millard identified Mr. Bernstein as his counsel of choice for the Babcock trial. This was a new lawyer, who had not acted for Millard on the Hamilton trial and who had not previously appeared. Mr. Pillay had acted for Millard in the Hamilton trial and he had been appearing at judicial pre-trials and remand appearances in Toronto, in order to informally assist Millard while he was self-represented. It also became clear on this September 20, 2016 appearance that Millard had not yet retained Mr. Bernstein and, in any event, that Mr. Bernstein was not available to conduct Millard’s defence on the scheduled February 2017 trial date as he had other commitments. McMahon J. gave Millard just under a month to determine whether he would retain Mr. Bernstein, or some other counsel who was available for the trial in February 2017. Counsel for the Crown and counsel for Smich expressed concern about any potential adjournment request by Millard and the resulting delays, if Mr. Bernstein were to be retained;

• the seventh appearance in this Court, on October 14, 2016, was a significant one as both Mr. Bernstein and Mr. Pillay appeared and applied for an adjournment of the February 13, 2017 trial date. Mr. Bernstein advised that he was not retained but, if retained at some point in the future, he could act for Millard on the Babcock murder case but only if the trial were adjourned until January 2018. Mr. Pillay advised that he anticipated being retained by Millard within a few months and would act for him in relation to a third murder that Millard was charged with (relating to the death of Millard’s father Wayne) that was also pending in Toronto. Mr. Pillay advised that he was available to conduct the defence in relation to the Wayne Millard murder in September 2017. The Crown and counsel for Smich opposed the lengthy requested adjournment of the Babcock case. By this point, in October 2016, the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Jordan (2016), 2016 SCC 27, 335 C.C.C. (3d) 403 (S.C.C.) had been released. McMahon J. made a finding that “Millard has not been diligent in retaining counsel” and denied his request to adjourn the trial for almost a year until January 2018. However, McMahon J. granted a shorter adjournment until September 11, 2017, while making this new trial date “peremptory on Mr. Millard … with or without counsel.” He reasoned as follows:

In essence, if I accede to Mr. Millard's request he will de facto dictate the order of prosecution of the indictments contrary to the wishes of the Crown Attorney. Further, he will add a year's delay to Mr. Smich's indictment, and the only other option proffered by Mr. Bernstein is simply we could sever Mr. Smich and have his trial proceed. In essence, again, acceding to this would have Mr. Millard dictate to this court what order and when the trials should proceed.

I must, of course, balance the rights of counsel and right of choice of counsel for Mr. Millard to be represented. It is not the only right I must balance. I must balance the rights of Mr. Smich to have a trial in a timely fashion. I must also balance the rights of the Crown Attorney to have the trial within a reasonable time in the interest of the community as directed in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, to have the case done in a timely fashion for the confidence of the public.

At the same time though I find that Mr. Millard has not been diligent in retaining counsel, nevertheless, his right to a fair trial is best met if he has counsel to represent him on the Babcock indictment. Sending Mr. Millard to trial unrepresented in February on a charge of first degree murder, despite the wishes of the Crown Attorney and despite the wishes of Mr. Smich through counsel Mr. Dungey, would neither be in Mr. Millard's interest or the interest of justice. I must, of course, in balancing these rights come up with a fair resolution of the competing interests. For these reasons, I am prepared to adjourn the Babcock matter that is presently scheduled for February. I would be prepared, subject to comments of counsel, to set that down peremptory on Mr. Millard for September 11, 2017 to proceed with or without counsel. Also, that we would case-manage that in a fashion to ensure he can retain any other counsel he wishes including Mr. Pillay. As I note, Mr. Pillay, who he has confidence in in relation to dealing with the Wayne Millard indictment, is in fact available in September. He also has the right to have anyone else retained he wishes as long as they are available for trial in September of 2017.

• Millard had advised McMahon J., on the appearance on September 20, 2016, that he had tried to obtain Legal Aid without success and that he was now trying to retain counsel privately. After McMahon J. had denied the lengthy adjournment requested by Millard on October 14, 2016, Millard again advised the Court that he had been denied Legal Aid and that gaining access to his private assets involved “a complicated procedure with other courts, civil courts, to get funding from third parties.” McMahon J. inquired about a Rowbotham Application and offered to help with “the civil matters” and to “see if we can expedite that.” Mr. Pillay agreed to assist Millard in this regard;

• on the next two appearances, on October 21 and 28, 2016, there were further developments. Mr. Pillay advised that he could act for Millard, and that he would be retained, but only in relation to two pre-trial Motions that Millard wanted him to bring (seeking severance from the co-accused Smich and quashing the direct Indictment). McMahon J. scheduled these two Motions to be heard in the week of March 27, 2017 and stated that he would appoint a trial judge. Counsel for the Receiver, who had control of Millard’s assets, also appeared and advised the Court that there was presently “no money in my client’s hands” to fund a private retainer. He made no reference to money in the hands of third parties. McMahon J. then assisted Millard in expediting the Legal Aid process;

• on the tenth appearance in this Court, on December 14, 2016, Mr. Pillay’s co-counsel on the Hamilton trial, Mr. Sachak, appeared for the first time in relation to the Babcock case. Mr. Sachak advised that he was assisting Millard with a Rowbotham Application and with the Legal Aid appeal process. Mr. Sachak was not yet retained for the three or four month Babcock trial, now scheduled to commence on September 11, 2017, but he advised McMahon J. that he was willing and available to act for Millard at that time, if retained. McMahon J. continued to assist in expediting the Legal Aid appeal process at the last two case management appearances in this Court in January 2017;

• I was appointed as the trial judge and all three parties filed and perfected the first two pre-trial Motions, returnable in the week of March 27, 2017. Mr. Pillay acted for Millard and Mr. Dungey and Ms. Trehearne acted for Smich. After reading the thorough materials filed by the parties, I was of the view that the Motion to quash the direct Indictment had no merit. Upon further reflection, Ms. Trehearne and Mr. Pillay had come to the same conclusion and it was abandoned. The second pre-trial Motion, jointly brought by both accused, sought severance from their co-accused. Ms. Trehearne raised issues relating to s. 11(b) of the Charter and delay on behalf of Smich, as a basis for severance. Mr. Pillay did not raise any s. 11(b) issues on behalf of Millard. Counsel for Smich advised that they would be bringing a s. 11(b) Motion and that it could be perfected within the next two months. I directed that the severance Motion should be heard together with the s. 11(b) Motion and scheduled the week of June 12, 2017 for hearing these two Motions. I also scheduled Millard’s Rowbotham Application to be heard on May 2, 2017. I asked the parties, who were all represented by counsel on these initial Motions, to prepare a list of all remaining pre-trial Motions. Some of these Motions were then scheduled or tentative target dates were discussed. For example, Smich’s s. 8 Charter Motion was set for the week of June 12, 2017 and the Crown’s similar fact Motion and extrinsic misconduct Motion were targeted for the week of August 28, 2017;

• on May 2, 2017, I heard Millard’s Rowbotham Application. Mr. Sachak appeared for Millard. He filed an Application Record and called four viva voce witnesses, including the Receiver who I urged him to call. The Crown filed a Respondent’s Record and cross-examined the viva voce witnesses. It was apparent to me that Millard had access to significant corporate assets that could be used to retain counsel, provided an Application for access to the assets was brought before a judge of the Commercial List. Indeed, Millard had used this very procedure on June 16, 2016, at the end of the Bosma trial, when his mother (his appointed Attorney for Property) applied to Hainey J. who ordered that $75,000 be released, “to be used solely to fund Millard’s ongoing legal fees incurred in defending the criminal charges.” There was evidence before me on the Rowbotham Application that approximately $200,000 cash was available in the Millard Properties Inc. corporate bank account and that a $1.6 million asset was also available in the form of $18,000 mortgage payments that were being received by Millard Properties Inc. each month. Millard was owed a substantial amount of money by Millard Properties Inc. as a result of shareholder loans he had made to the company. As noted above, counsel for the Receiver had made no mention of these corporate assets when he advised McMahon J. on October 28, 2016 that there were insufficient funds in the Receiver’s possession to pay Millard’s legal fees. When I questioned the Receiver, as to whether he would be willing to apply to a judge of the Commercial List for access to these monies in order to fund Millard’s defence, he consulted with counsel and advised that he would. I released an Endorsement on May 9, 2017 stating that the Receiver should bring an Application to a Judge of the Commercial List for the release of these funds. See: R. v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 2836;

• on June 2, 2017, the Receiver brought the Commercial List Application that I had requested in the course of the Rowbotham Application. I had made arrangements with Hainey J. to convene the Commercial List here at the Court House, so that Millard could appear before the Court while in custody. Hainey J. heard the Receiver’s Application and made an immediate interim Order, on the consent of all parties, “requiring Millard Properties Inc. to pay the Receiver $90,000 as a partial repayment of Millard’s shareholder loans for the purpose of funding Millard’s defence.” See: Millard v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 4305 at para. 10. There were ongoing issues in relation to this Commercial List litigation, as further funds in the hands of third parties were potentially available for release to the Receiver and to Millard. Hainey J.’s initial June 2, 2017 Order was only an interim Order. He ordered the balance of the Motion was to “be brought back on before me prior to June 25, 2017.” In his submissions before me on the adjournment Motion, Millard agreed that by this point in early June 2017, he was now positive and hopeful about receiving further monies through the Commercial List process (that is, further monies beyond the $90,000);

• during the week of June 12, 2017, I heard the joint severance Motion brought by both Millard and Smich. Mr. Pillay acted for Millard on the Motion. I also heard Smich’s s. 11(b) Charter Motion. Finally, I heard a Third Party Records Motion brought by Smich. Millard joined this latter Motion but did not join the s. 11(b) Motion. Counsel for Smich abandoned his s. 8 Charter Motion, which had also been scheduled to be heard this same week. The Third Party Records Motion proceeded and was essentially resolved on a consent basis, which I endorsed on June 16, 2017. I reserved judgment on the severance Motion and the s. 11(b) Motion. I also ordered the Crown to perfect its two main pre-trial Motions — seeking the admission of similar fact evidence and extrinsic misconduct evidence — by June 30, 2017. I asked Millard to discuss a retainer with his counsel, Mr. Pillay and Mr. Sachak, in relation to these two Motions and in relation to trial, and I asked the Crown to serve Millard’s counsel with the two Crown Motions. They were tentatively scheduled for August 28, 2017;

• on June 23, 2017, Millard appeared before me to discuss the status of his retainer of counsel. The Commercial List proceedings had not yet resumed in court but I advised Millard, based on communications to me from Hainey J., that sufficient funds had already been released to him to retain counsel to respond to the two Crown Motions. I also advised that he could be “optimistic” that additional money would be released and “there should be plenty there to properly retain counsel for this trial.” Millard responded that he wished to know the total amount of funds he would have available in the end, from the Commercial List process, before retaining counsel. I urged him not to lose time and to, at least, arrange a limited retainer of counsel to respond to the two Crown Motions. Millard agreed to confer with Mr. Pillay, in this regard, as Mr. Pillay was already familiar with the evidence that is at issue on these two Motions;

• on June 29, 2017, I released Reasons dismissing the joint severance Motion and the s. 11(b) Charter Motion. See: R. v. Millard and Smich, 2017 ONSC 4030. The parties appeared before me and I inquired again about the status of Millard’s retainer of counsel. Once again, I strongly urged Millard “to get moving” in retaining counsel. Some four weeks had now passed since Hainey J.’s interim Order, releasing $90,000 to the Receiver to be used to pay any amounts owing to the Receiver and to pay “the net amount to criminal counsel for Dellen Millard.” I advised Millard that about $75,000 of these monies was already available, or would be available shortly, and that the Commercial List proceedings were now scheduled to resume on July 7, 2017. Mr. Sachak appeared for Millard. He advised that he had not yet received these monies and, in any event, they would be insufficient for a trial of three or four months’ length. I agreed with this latter point but pointed out that the Commercial List proceedings were ongoing and that the monies already released were sufficient to retain counsel (such as Mr. Pillay, who was already familiar with the case) in order to respond to the Crown’s two Motions and to allow Mr. Sachak to begin preparing for trial, subject to eventually receiving further funds when the Commercial List proceedings were concluded, hopefully next week. Mr. Sachak expressed concern as to whether he personally could be ready to start the trial on September 11, 2017. I reminded him that there were a number of discrete and relatively straightforward Motions to be heard in September and that the trial would not start until mid-October. I urged him to accept a limited contingent retainer and to get started with trial preparation, if he personally was to be retained by Millard as counsel for the trial. I also reminded Mr. Sachak (and Millard) that the trial date had been set on a “peremptory, with or without counsel” basis. I advised Millard that I had not previously made any findings of a lack of good faith, concerning his efforts to retain counsel, but that I was “starting to get worried” and “concerned,” given his failure to retain counsel when money was now available. Millard advised that he had asked Mr. Pillay to accept a limited retainer, to respond to the two Crown Motions. Mr. Sachak agreed with my view that the “ideal” arrangement would be to divide up the work, as between himself and Mr. Pillay (as they had done on the Bosma trial in Hamilton), although he had doubts as to whether this was “realistic.” He stated, “I’ve been continuing to help him [Millard], and will continue to help him over the summer months.” Millard expressed concern about his access to disclosure at the jail and various steps were taken by the Court and the Crown in this regard;

• on July 7, 2017, the Commercial List litigation came back on before Hainey J. and full argument was heard as to Millard’s entitlement to the release of further funds. Once again, Millard was present in court. A significant additional asset, totaling some $800,000 to $900,000 in cash had come to light, as I had advised Millard on the previous two appearances. It was held by Millard’s mother, in her capacity as Estate Trustee of Wayne Millard’s Estate. It was the direct proceeds of the sale of the major Millard Properties Inc. asset, namely, a large modern airport hangar at the Waterloo Airport. Counsel for the Receiver submitted that Millard had a claim to these additional monies, above and beyond the assets that I had previously identified on the Rowbotham Application. Hainey J. reserved judgment on the Receiver’s Application. Millard then appeared before me on the criminal Indictment. I again urged him to get on with the process of retaining counsel for trial, even if the full retainer was contingent on the eventual release of further funds by Hainey J. Millard advised that he had now retained Mr. Pillay but only to respond to the Crown’s similar fact Motion. Millard stated initially that he had insufficient funds to retain counsel for both Motions. He then stated that he was also reluctant to retain counsel for the other Motions in September and for the trial in October, until he knew the final results of the Commercial List proceedings. Finally, he stated that the position taken by Mr. Sachak on the previous appearance meant that an adjournment Motion would be necessary, even if additional funds were released by Hainey J. Once again, I urged Millard to “get moving” and “start taking steps now” to discuss a retainer with counsel, contingent on receiving a favourable result from Hainey J. Once again, Millard stated that he anticipated bringing an adjournment Motion. I stated that it appeared Millard was “trying to engineer another adjournment,” rather than “making [his] best efforts to get counsel” at a time when there is “still enough time to prepare” for trial. I warned Millard to “become focused on getting counsel for the balance of the case while you still have three months,” instead of focusing on an adjournment Motion. Mr. Pillay was in court for this appearance and he confirmed that he was retained but only to respond to the Crown’s similar fact Motion. He agreed with me, that the two Crown Motions were interrelated and that he could probably act for Millard on both Motions, subject to having further discussions with his client. He also agreed to speak to his client and discuss his availability in the fall, to take on further aspects of the case, as well as the possibility of retaining co-counsel to divide up the trial work. Mr. Pillay’s calendar was presently booked fairly tightly in the fall but he acknowledged that his other commitments could change, as some things were moving around, and he agreed to continue to re-assess his schedule for the fall;

• on July 13, 2017, Hainey J. released his Reasons granting the Receiver’s Application for the release of further funds to Millard, in order to retain counsel. See: Millard v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 4305. The Millard Properties Inc. assets identified by Hainey J. were the same two identified in my Endorsement on the Rowbotham Application, namely, about $200,000 in the corporate bank account and $1.6 million in mortgage proceeds (being paid to the company at a rate of $18,000 per month). In addition, Millard’s mother (in her capacity as Estate Trustee for Wayne Millard) was still holding some $800,000 to $900,000 in cash proceeds from the sale of Millard Properties Inc.’s main corporate asset (the original payment of these proceeds to the estate had been almost $1.2 million but it had been dissipated). Millard, in turn, was owed over $5.2 million in shareholder loans that he had made to Millard Properties Inc. and that had been used to pay off corporate debt and facilitate the sale of the large modern airport hangar. Hainey J. ordered the Estate to pay the Receiver almost $1 million in proceeds of the sale of Millard Properties Inc.’s main asset on the basis that Millard had an “equitable interest” in these proceeds. In this regard, Hainey J. accepted the Receiver’s submission as follows (at para. 18):

The Receiver submits that Millard’s personal funds were used to repay the amounts owing by Millard Properties to RBC. This in turn allowed Millard Properties to sell the Waterloo Hangar for a total purchase price of $4,800,000. Therefore, Millard should have access to those funds to enable him to fund his defence to the murder charge.

Hainey J. ordered the Receiver to use these monies “to pay Millard’s reasonable defence costs in connection with his current murder charge”;

• on July 17, 2017, Millard appeared before me. I asked whether he had now retained counsel for trial, in light of Hainey J.’s favourable Order. He advised that he had not. He acknowledged that he had sufficient money to retain counsel but that now the issue was preparedness for trial, “whether with or without counsel,” as Millard put it. He advised me of the difficulties he was having getting access to disclosure, and preparing for trial, while in custody at the East Detention Centre. He stated that he intended to bring an adjournment Motion, after the Crown’s two main pre-trial Motions were heard in the week of August 28, 2017. Mr. Pillay, who was present in court, advised that he was now retained to act for Millard in relation to both of the scheduled Crown pre-trial Motions and that he would file responding materials on August 23 and then appear on the two Motions on August 28, 2017. He also agreed to assist Millard in filing the Applicant’s Record, in support of Millard’s adjournment Motion, but he was not acting for Millard in seeking the adjournment and he would not be appearing on that Motion. His calendar in the fall remained as before, that is, he had commitments to other clients at present but he again agreed to monitor his calendar to see if his existing commitments change. He agreed to continue to have discussions with his client Millard, as to his (Mr. Pillay’s) availability for trial, if circumstances were to change. I advised Mr. Pillay that the Court would be available to assist, in this regard, if he needed help re-scheduling any of his other commitments. I then scheduled Millard’s adjournment Motion for July 24, 2017. I also took a number of steps to try to assist Millard with access to disclosure at the Toronto East Detention Centre.

C. THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD ON THE ADJOURNMENT MOTION

[5] Aside from the above procedural history, which was already before me, Millard filed an Application Record in support of his adjournment Motion. It contained only the Transcript of the June 29, 2017 proceedings, already summarized above.

[6] There was no evidence from Millard, either in affidavit form or viva voce, as to any efforts he has made to retain counsel nor was there evidence or submissions from counsel as to their availability to conduct the trial and the time that they would need to prepare. Millard advised me during his submissions that he had put certain limited contingent retainers in place, depending on the results of the adjournment Motion. He did not tell me who the lawyer or lawyers were who he had retained, on this limited contingent basis, nor did he tell me the scope of their retainers. He submitted that six months was the length of adjournment that he was seeking, that is, to postpone the trial until late March 2018. He based this six month length of the proposed adjournment on his understanding of the dates when Mr. Pillay and Mr. Sachak would be available next year and on certain findings that he submitted I had made in my Reasons on the s. 11(b) Motion. I will discuss this latter submission below.

D. ANALYSIS

[7] The power of a trial judge to adjourn a jury trial is set out in s. 645(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code. The statutory power is broad and unqualified, simply stating that “the judge may adjourn the trial from time to time.” Given the lack of any statutory criteria, a number of common law principles relating to the power to adjourn have developed.

[8] A long line of authority has held that the power to grant or refuse an adjournment is discretionary. However, the trial judge must exercise the discretion judicially, that is, in accordance with proper legal principles and after considering and weighing the relevant circumstances of the particular case. See: R. v. Darville (1956), 1956 CanLII 463 (SCC), 116 C.C.C. 113 at 115 (S.C.C.); R. v. Barrette (1976), 1976 CanLII 180 (SCC), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 189 at 193 (S.C.C.); R. v. Manhas (1980), 17 C.R. (3d) 348 (S.C.C.), affirming (1978), 1980 CanLII 172 (SCC), 17 C.R. (3d) 331 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Olbey (1977), 38 C.C.C.( 2d) 390 at 398 (Ont. C.A.), affirmed on other grounds, (1979), 1979 CanLII 61 (SCC), 50 C.C.C. (2d) 257 (S.C.C.); R. v. J.C.G. (2004), 2004 CanLII 66281 (QC CA), 189 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at paras. 8-9 (Que. C.A.); R. v. White (2010), 2010 ABCA 66, 252 C.C.C. (3d) 248 at paras. 14-15 (Alta. C.A.).

[9] The applicable legal principles and relevant considerations that have emerged from the cases, when dealing specifically with adjournments to retain counsel and prepare for trial, include the following six points:

• where the effect of denying an adjournment is to deprive the accused of counsel, this significant consequence is an important consideration. In this regard, representation by counsel is generally essential to trial fairness where the accused is facing long, complex and serious proceedings, as in the present case. See: R. v. Barrette, supra; R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 1988 CanLII 147 (ON CA), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at pp. 61-70 (Ont. C.A.);

• the gravity of the offence charged, whether there have been any previous adjournments, the consequences of any adjournment for the Crown, for the accused, and for any co-accused, are all relevant considerations. For example, where the accused makes a “bona fide and reasonable” request for an adjournment, for the first time, and where the accused has made “reasonable efforts” to retain counsel, and where it is a serious case, an adjournment should generally be granted. However, where a prior adjournment has already been granted and the accused has been warned that the new trial date is peremptory, “with or without counsel,” a further adjournment is less likely due to “the public interest in the orderly and expeditious administration of justice.” See: R. v. Smith (1989), 1989 CanLII 7222 (ON CA), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 90 at 92-3 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. White, supra at paras. 16-17; R. v. Beals (1993), 1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA), 126 N.S.R. (2d) 130 at paras. 18 and 27 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. J.C.G., supra at paras. 12 and 26; R. v. Manhas, supra; R. v. Richard and Sassano (1992), 55 O.A.C. 43 at para. 7 (C.A.);

• where the accused has had “ample opportunity to obtain counsel to represent him at his trial” and where “his efforts were directed to causing a further delay of his trial,” an adjournment can properly be refused. The same is true where the accused has “deliberately failed to retain counsel or has discharged counsel with the intent of delaying the process of the court” or where the accused “was manipulating the system, or otherwise seeking to delay for tactical advantage” or was not acting “diligently and honestly in exercising his right to counsel.” See: R. v. Manhas, supra at pp. 336 and 346; R. v. Smith, supra at p. 93; R. v. White, supra at para. 26; R. v. Wood (2005), 2005 CanLII 13779 (ON CA), 196 C.C.C. (3d) 155 at para. 7 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. McGibbon (1988), 1988 CanLII 149 (ON CA), 45 C.C.C. (3d) 334 at p. 346 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Beals, supra at paras. 24, 29 and 33;

• the length of the requested adjournment and its impact on the fair trial rights of the other parties is a relevant consideration. See: R. v. Smith (2001), 2001 CanLII 20968 (ON CA), 161 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at paras. 48-52 (Ont. C.A.). Similarly, the need for an adjournment and whether counsel will have sufficient time to prepare for trial without any further adjournment is a relevant consideration. For example, in R. v. Olbey, supra at p. 398, Martin J.A. (Dubin J.A., as he then was, concurring) held that five days’ notice of the date when a murder trial would proceed gave counsel “ample opportunity to prepare for trial.” Counsel’s request for an adjournment was properly denied in the above circumstances in a murder case that was “not complicated” and where counsel had acted at the preliminary hearing. Standards of trial preparation were somewhat more robust in the era of Olbey’s Case, some 40 years ago. Nevertheless, the point remains that the court must assess the reasonable time required for trial preparation, when asked to adjourn a scheduled trial date for this purpose;

• when assessing the bona fides of a request to adjourn, in order to retain counsel and prepare for trial, there are a number of relevant considerations, including the following: the accused’s “personality and skills”; his “degree of familiarity with the criminal justice system”; the context of any unfavourable rulings on pre-trial Motions; the accused’s “means to pay the costs of his or her defence”; and the time that the accused has already had to retain counsel and prepare for trial. For example, in R. v. Spataro (1972), 1972 CanLII 25 (SCC), 7 C.C.C. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.), the accused brought two motions seeking severance and a change of venue which, if successful, would have resulted in an adjournment. Both motions were dismissed by the trial judge. The accused then purported to “discharge” counsel and seek a “postponement” of the trial. The Court found that the request “was not made in good faith but for the purpose of delay.” In R. v. Rowbotham, supra at pp. 63-4, the Court held that the accused “has the right to defend himself and no one has the right to force counsel on him” and that an accused who “has the means to pay the costs of his or her defence but refuses to retain counsel may properly be considered to have chosen to defend himself or herself.” See also: R. v. Vescio (1948), 1948 CanLII 53 (SCC), 92 C.C.C. 161 at pp. 164-5 (S.C.C.); R. v. McGibbon, supra at pp. 345-6; R. v. Beals, supra at paras. 29 and 33; R. v. White, supra at pp. 256-7; R. v. Richard and Sassano, supra at para. 7; R. v. Manhas, supra at p. 336;

• finally, in a case where “a joint trial was required,” one co-accused’s need for a further adjournment in order to retain counsel of choice “cannot be exercised to dictate the date of trial so as to inconvenience other parties and prevent issues being dealt with fairly and efficiently.” Rather, that co-accused’s “right to counsel must be balanced against [the other co-accused’s] right to be tried within a reasonable time,” particularly in a case where the other co-accused’s s. 11(b) Charter right would “have been jeopardized had there been a further adjournment.” Accordingly, in R. v. Richard and Sassano, supra at paras. 5-7, it was held in the above circumstances that the trial could properly proceed with one co-accused unrepresented. Also see: R. v. Chimienti (1980), 1980 CanLII 4500 (ON SC), 17 C.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. H.C.J.), aff’d October 23, 1980 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Sixto R. and Simon C., January 16, 1990 (Ont. H.C.J.), aff’d June 18, 1990 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Ross and Leclair (1989), 1989 CanLII 134 (SCC), 46 C.C.C. (3d) 129 at p. 135 (S.C.C.); R. v. Speid (1984), 1983 CanLII 1704 (ON CA), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 18 at p. 20 (Ont. C.A.) R. v. McCallen (1999), 1999 CanLII 3685 (ON CA), 131 C.C.C. (3d) 518 at paras. 31-40 and 45-51 (Ont. C.A.); R. Pomerance, “Counsel of Choice v. Early Trial Dates: a post-Askov Analysis of Competing Constitutional Interests” (1991), 25 M.V.R. (2d) 175.

[10] Applying the above principles and considerations to the particular facts of the present case, I am satisfied that the adjournment Motion brought by Millard ought to be dismissed. There are a number of circumstances that lead cumulatively to this conclusion.

[11] The first relevant consideration is that Millard is an intelligent, educated, and wealthy young man who has the means to retain counsel privately, when and if he chooses to retain counsel. He has wavered back and forth as to whether he wants to represent himself, which would be his right, or whether he wants to retain counsel. His main preoccupation recently has been his own access to disclosure at the jail, so that he can prepare for trial, rather than focusing on retaining counsel. He has also been reading legal texts and he made detailed submissions to the Court on the adjournment Motion, based on considerable preparation and research of the record. From time to time, I have been unsure as to whether he really wants to be represented by counsel. What is important, however, for purposes of the present Motion, is that whenever there has been a significant step in the various murder proceedings that he has faced and continues to face, either in Hamilton or in Toronto, he has always been represented by privately retained counsel. Although his private resources were undoubtedly depleted to some extent by the Bosma trial in Hamilton, I am satisfied that he remains a relatively wealthy individual who is able to retain counsel privately, if that is his true wish.

[12] In this regard, Millard liquidated his substantial personal real estate holdings, after his May 2013 arrest in Hamilton. These sales of five residential properties in and around Toronto yielded a large amount of money. The exact net proceeds of these sales is somewhat unclear, from the record on the Rowbotham Application, but it was millions of dollars. He used this money, in part, to pay his legal fees in Hamilton. He also advanced substantial amounts, in the form of shareholder loans, to Millard Properties Inc. (Millard owns 50% of the shares of the company and he is the sole heir to the other 50% of the shares which are held by the Estate of Wayne Millard). That privately held company used these funds loaned by Millard to pay off its substantial debt to the Royal Bank, which then allowed the company to sell its main asset, a large modern airport hangar, unencumbered, for $4.8 million in April 2015. In essence, what Millard did between 2013 and 2015, after he was charged with the Bosma murder, was convert his substantial personal real estate holdings into debt, owed to him by Millard Properties Inc., and into cash that he used for legal fees. I was satisfied, on the Rowbotham Application, that Millard had an available means of accessing substantial proceeds from the sale of the airport hangar that were still being held by Millard Properties Inc. (I identified $1.6 million in mortgage proceeds and somewhere between $200,000 and $450,000 in cash in the company bank account). Counsel for the Attorney General took the position, on the Rowbotham Application, that Millard had not accounted for all of the proceeds of his various asset sales, both personal and corporate. As it turned out, the subsequent Commercial List proceedings before Hainey J. concluded that significant additional proceeds of the airport hangar sale were also available, although depleted somewhat in the two years since the asset sale (some $800,000 to $900,000 were being held by Millard’s mother, his Attorney for Property, in her capacity as Estate Trustee for Wayne Millard’s estate, of which Millard is the sole beneficiary). In other words, the total assets that Millard still has access to through Commercial List proceedings are apparently somewhere between $2 million and $3 million. As noted previously, Millard is owed approximately $5.2 million by Millard Properties Inc. as a result of his shareholder loans to the company and he has an equitable interest in the proceeds of the sale of the airport hangar, which he facilitated through his shareholder loans. See: R. v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 2836; Millard v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 4305.

[13] Millard has always known how to access these monies. He is close to his mother, his Attorney for Property, and she remains supportive of her son. She took steps, on his instructions, to have a Receiver of Millard’s property appointed in November 2015. In June 2016, she successfully applied to Hainey J. for release of $75,000 in shareholder loans, owed to Millard by Millard Properties Inc., in order “to fund Millard’s ongoing legal fees incurred in defending the criminal charges” (the actual structure of the Order was an assignment of $75,000 in Millard’s shareholder loans, to the Estate of Wayne Millard, in return for a $75,000 cash payment to Millard from the estate). As noted above, at Millard’s October 14, 2016 appearance before McMahon J., Millard referred to “a complicated procedure with other courts, civil courts, to get funding from third parties.” He did not advise McMahon J. that he had a valid claim to these monies in the hands of “third parties” (Millard Properties Inc. and the Estate of Wayne Millard were presumably the “third parties” Millard was referring to). He also did not advise McMahon J. that the “complicated procedure” in the civil courts had recently succeeded in releasing $75,000 to him, in order to pay counsel’s fees in the criminal proceedings, without any apparent opposition from the other parties.

[14] In my view, it is now apparent that the Rowbotham Application brought before me in early May 2017 was, at a minimum, misconceived and unnecessary. Millard was not indigent and he was not entitled to state funding of his defence. He should simply have instructed his mother to bring another Application before Hainey J. for the release of further funds being held by the “third parties,” which is the step that I directed the Receiver to take in my Endorsement on the Rowbotham Application. That process has now been successfully completed and Millard has more than enough money to fund his defence. See: R. v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 2836; Millard v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 4305.

[15] I appreciate that counsel for the Estate Trustee of Wayne Millard’s estate may have advised Millard and his mother that the approximately $1 million in proceeds of the hangar sale that was being held by the Estate Trustee, was not available to Millard due to the “forfeiture rule” and the outstanding allegation that Millard had murdered his father. However, the Receiver and the Receiver’s counsel did not take this view on the Application they brought before Hainey J. and, in any event, Millard Properties Inc. was still holding a large amount of other money and assets that were proceeds of the hangar sale (the $1.6 million mortgage proceeds and the large amount of cash in the corporate bank account). What is significant is that Millard never tried to gain access to these monies that he had deliberately placed in the hands of third parties when he converted his personal assets into shareholder loans. I had to urge Mr. Sachak to call the Receiver as a witness on the Rowbotham Application, and I had to then ask the Receiver whether he would apply to Hainey J. for access to these monies, given Millard and his mother’s failure to renew their successful June 2016 Application for access to these funds. The Receiver sought advice from his counsel and then said that he would bring such an Application, if I requested it. Millard never instructed his mother to take these simple steps, as he had done previously in June 2016. In effect, I had to order the Receiver to bring the Commercial List Application. Millard submitted that he and his mother had received legal advice to the effect that he could not access the corporate assets in the hands of Millard Properties Inc. There is no evidence in the record to that effect, other than some brief hearsay from Millard’s mother on the Rowbotham Application. It is clear that Millard did have access to the Millard Properties Inc. assets, as Hainey J. immediately made an interim Order on June 2, 2017, on the consent of all parties, releasing $90,000 of these monies to Millard. It is also clear that Millard knew about this process and that he successfully resorted to it in June 2016. In all the circumstances, I cannot accept that Millard was unaware of his right to apply to a judge of the Commercial List for access to the very large sums of money that he was owed by Millard Properties Inc.

[16] Even more telling is that once the Commercial List process began to bear fruit, and substantial funds were made available to Millard, he became increasingly resistant to my strong advice to him to get counsel retained as soon as possible, even on a limited or contingent basis. Instead, he began to refer to the need for an adjournment. This was immediately after I had dismissed his severance Motion. In conclusion on this point, it is my view that he has always had access to sufficient funds to retain counsel and he has chosen not to access those funds.

[17] The second relevant consideration is that Millard has had an abundant amount of time to retain counsel and he has repeatedly delayed and failed to take this step. He spent a full year appearing before McMahon J. in this Court, from September 10, 2015 until September 14, 2016, taking the position that he wished to be self-represented and agreeing to the February 13, 2017 trial date, in spite of McMahon J. “strongly” urging him “to get a lawyer.” As noted previously, Millard is an intelligent man and he had access to advice throughout from counsel. I am satisfied that he made a considered decision not to retain counsel during this one year period, in spite of his considerable wealth. When he changed his mind, and decided that he wanted to retain counsel, he did not take the necessary steps to complete a retainer of counsel for another ten months (from September 14, 2016 until the present mid-July 2017 date of this adjournment Motion). Instead, he provided Mr. Pillay and Mr. Sachak with limited retainers and instructed them to bring three Motions on his behalf (a Rowbotham Motion, a severance Motion, and a Motion to quash the direct Indictment). He went on to provide Mr. Pillay with a further limited retainer to respond to two Crown Motions (seeking admission of similar fact and extrinsic misconduct evidence). He wasted a great deal of time in a misconceived attempt to obtain state funding of his defence through Legal Aid Ontario. Even after Hainey J. made an interim Order releasing $90,000 on June 2, 2017, with the realistic prospect of additional funds in the near future when the Receiver’s Application was to resume, Millard still failed to put a plan in place to retain counsel for trial, in disregard of my strong advice to take those steps. In short, Millard has consistently and repeatedly failed to retain counsel for trial, in spite of having the time and the means to do so. I am satisfied that, at a minimum, he has had a year and ten months to retain counsel, from mid-September 2015 until mid-July 2017, and he has not done so. As noted above, the airport hangar sale took place in April 2015, yielding $4.8 million in proceeds to which Millard had an equitable claim as a result of his shareholder loans. Accordingly, Millard has had access to a very substantial amount of money for the entire time that the Indictment has been pending in this Court and he has not yet retained counsel for trial. At a minimum, he has not been diligent in retaining counsel.

[18] The third relevant consideration is that there has been a past history of seeking an adjournment of the trial and seeking severance from Millard’s co-accused Smich. When Millard first indicated that he wished to retain counsel in relation to the Babcock murder trial, in September 2016, he chose a lawyer (Mr. Bernstein) who was not available on the already scheduled trial date in February 2017. Mr. Bernstein, although not yet retained, was then instructed by Millard to apply for an adjournment of the trial until January 2018. The Crown and Smich opposed this lengthy adjournment. Mr. Bernstein suggested severance as the remedy for any delays and stated that, in any event, Millard would be applying for severance. McMahon J. denied the lengthy adjournment in his October 14, 2016 Ruling. However, McMahon J. granted Millard a shorter adjournment of the trial, until September 11, 2017, but made it “peremptory on Mr. Millard … to proceed with or without counsel.” McMahon J. also found as a fact that Millard “has not been diligent in retaining counsel.” I agree with this finding. The present adjournment Motion is, therefore, brought in the face of McMahon J.’s previous Order, allowing a seven month adjournment of the trial but making the new trial date “peremptory … with or without counsel.” Needless to say, a prior endorsement that a trial date is “peremptory, with or without counsel” is not binding on the trial judge, especially where the accused has made reasonable efforts to retain counsel. It is simply one factor to be taken into consideration. See: R. v. Moore (1999), 1999 CanLII 1366 (ON CA), 135 C.C.C. (3d) 348 (Ont. C.A.). The present adjournment Motion is also brought nine months after McMahon J. found as a fact that Millard “has not been diligent in retaining counsel,” and yet Millard has still not retained counsel for trial in this ensuing period since McMahon J.’s Ruling. In other words, there has been a further nine month long lack of diligence.

[19] In addition to this past adjournment Motion in October 2016, combined with a suggestion of severance, the recent severance Motion in June 2017 provides further context. Immediately after McMahon J. denied the Motion seeking a lengthy adjournment, Millard retained and instructed counsel to bring a severance Motion. As summarized above, it was eventually scheduled to be heard in the week of June 12, 2017. I dismissed the severance Motion on June 29, 2017. I held that there is a “strong presumption in favour of a joint trial” in this particular case, relying on Doherty J.A.’s analysis in R. v. Suzack and Pennett (2000), 2000 CanLII 5630 (ON CA), 141 C.C.C. (3d) 449 at paras. 87-91 (Ont. C.A.), concerning the importance of joinder of accused in those cases where two joint perpetrators may seek to blame each other for the alleged crime. See: R. v. Millard and Smich, 2017 ONSC 4030 at paras. 39-43. Millard’s present renewed adjournment Motion, if successful, may have the effect of causing the severance that he sought and that was denied. I will address this issue below, when discussing Smich’s s. 11(b) Charter interests. I simply note, at this stage of the analysis, that Millard delayed taking any steps to retain counsel for trial, and delayed applying for a further adjournment, until immediately after he had the results of the severance Motion.

[20] The fourth relevant consideration is that there remains sufficient time to prepare for trial, if Millard now decides to act expeditiously and retain counsel. Mr. Pillay, who is knowledgeable about the case, is already retained by Millard to respond to the Crown’s two most significant pre-trial Motions, scheduled to be heard in the week of August 28, 2017. The list of anticipated pre-trial Motions that all counsel (including counsel assisting Millard at the time) provided to me on March 28, 2017, indicates that there are four remaining Motions that, in my view, may take about a week in total to argue. They have been tentatively targeted to be heard during the last two weeks of September 2017. Only one of these Motions would have to be brought by Millard, concerning the admissibility of evidence about his efforts to obtain a firearm in July 2012. Mr. Pillay is already familiar with the evidence relating to this issue as he advised me about it on the severance Motion. Aside from these four September 2017 Motions, there are a number of minor additional Motions. Counsel advised me that these further Motions could be heard shortly before jury selection in October 2017. Jury selection is tentatively scheduled to begin on October 12, 2017. What is significant to note about the pre-trial Motions in this case is that nine of them have already been heard, have been resolved, have become academic, or have been perfected and scheduled to be heard next month. These nine Motions, which have already been completed or are in hand, include the most complex Motions that required the greatest preparation. In other words, a great deal of the preparation has already been undertaken or it is well in hand.

[21] Given the very significant private funds that are available to Millard, and given the above schedule and nature of the remaining Motions, I am satisfied that there are any number of skilled defence counsel in Toronto who would be able to take on the preparation of the remaining September and October 2017 pre-trial Motions. There are at least two months still available, before the four September 2017 Motions are likely to be argued, and I have been flexible with Millard’s counsel about filing dates and about hearing dates. In addition, I am satisfied that there are any number of skilled defence counsel in Toronto who would be able to prepare for trial in this case in the three months available prior to jury selection. The significant amount of private funding that Millard has available, and the profile and challenge involved in this case, will make it attractive to skilled and experienced counsel. When faced with an opportunity like this, defence counsel will take steps to clear their calendars, in order to be able to take on this kind of retainer. The amount of private funding available to Millard will also permit the retaining of a number of lawyers, in order to divide up the preparation and to work as a team. For example, it would be normal and effective practice to have one lawyer prepare the Motions and one lawyer prepare the trial. As noted above, the Court has offered to assist counsel with any conflicts in their calendars. In short, I am satisfied that there is still sufficient time to retain counsel and to prepare the case.

[22] I should note, in this regard, that Millard relied on certain references to my Reasons on the s. 11(b) Motion, concerning the need for six months to prepare the defence in the Babcock murder case. See: R. v. Millard and Smich, 2017 ONSC 4030 at paras. 73-75 and 80. What these passages in my Reasons refer to is counsel for Smich’s estimate, that they required about four months to prepare the Babcock pre-trial Motions and another two months approximately to prepare for trial. Assuming the accuracy of counsel’s estimates, the most complex pre-trial Motions are already complete or are in hand, as explained above. Counsel still have two months to prepare the few remaining Motions, which is more than enough time, and three months to prepare for trial. In other words, there is nothing inconsistent between my assumptions on the s. 11(b) Motion and my assumptions on the present adjournment Motion.

[23] The fifth group of relevant considerations is the three competing interests, namely, the strong public interest in a joint trial in this case, the strong public interest in a reasonably expeditious trial in this case, and the co-accused Smich’s s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time. I do not have to definitively decide, at this stage, whether a further adjournment would result in severance because of an anticipated breach of Smich’s s. 11(b) Charter rights. However, I am satisfied that a further adjournment raises the threat of such a result. There has already been a total delay of 44 months in this case, assuming the present trial schedule is maintained. I found that the relevant net delay in this case was 29 months. In other words, any further delay would push the case over the 30 month Jordan presumptive ceiling for s. 11(b) delay. I also found, in the alternative, that if the net delay were 35 months (as counsel for Smich submitted), then a delay of that length could be justified by the complexity of the case. Any further delay above 35 months would, therefore, also have to be justified by the complexity of the case. See: R. v. Millard and Smich, 2017 ONSC 4030 at paras. 76 and 92. In terms of the Jordan “exceptional circumstance” for transitional cases, any further delay in this case would be occurring long after the release of Jordan in July 2016. It is, therefore, doubtful whether a transitional analysis would apply to this further delay. In addition to these concerns about Smich’s s. 11(b) interests, a de facto severance and separate trials in this case, caused by a threatened s. 11(b) violation, would raise the risk of inconsistent verdicts, would be damaging to the truth-seeking function of the justice system, and would require two duplicate trials at considerable cost to the administration of justice in a busy jurisdiction. Finally, further delays of either Millard’s trial or Smich’s trial would be damaging to the public interest in reasonably expeditious justice in this case and it would also cause an adjournment of the Wayne Millard indictment, which is presently scheduled for trial in March 2018. These are all important considerations. See: R. v. Vassell (2016), 2016 SCC 26, 337 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jordan, supra at paras. 22-28; R. v. Suzack and Pennett, supra; R. v. Richard and Sassano, supra.

[24] I should note one final consideration and that is the absence of any evidence before me, either from Millard or from counsel, as to the efforts made by Millard to retain counsel, any agreement by counsel to accept a retainer for trial, and the length of time required by counsel to be ready for trial. I was told by Millard, in the course of submissions, that he has contingent retainers in place with unspecified counsel, depending on the results of this adjournment Motion. I have been told nothing about these contingent retainer agreements or about counsel’s preparation plans, in light of the current Motion and trial schedules. In other words, I am being asked to decide this Motion substantially in an evidentiary vacuum. I should note, in this regard, that Millard understands the distinction between evidence and submissions.

E. CONCLUSION

[25] In all the above circumstances, I am satisfied that Millard’s request for a further adjournment is without merit. He is a relatively wealthy intelligent young man who has converted his personal assets into debts owed to him by a private company, and he has not been diligent in seeking access to those assets in order to retain counsel. Even once he had that money in hand, he continued to exhibit a lack of diligence in retaining counsel. In addition, the request for further delay is unjustified and unnecessary and it arises in suspicious circumstances. It comes after previous failed attempts to obtain a lengthy adjournment and to obtain severance. It also comes at a point when Millard still has time to retain counsel and to be prepared for the presently scheduled trial in mid-October 2017. Furthermore, it is based on a record that contains no evidence from Millard or from counsel as to what retainer arrangements have been put in place and as to counsel’s preparation plans. Finally, any further adjournment would put three competing interests at risk, that is, Smich’s s. 11(b) Charter interests, the public’s interest in timely justice, and the justice system’s interest in a joint trial that gets to the truth.

[26] For all these reasons, the adjournment Motion is dismissed.

M.A. Code J.

Released: July 27, 2017

CITATION: R. v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 4548

COURT FILE NO.: CR-15-50000474-0000

DATE: 20170727

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

DELLEN MILLARD and MARK SMICH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

on MILLARD’S ADJOURNMENT MOTION

M.A. Code J.

Released: July 27, 2017

R. v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 4548

Case Summary

A. OVERVIEW

B. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

C. THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD ON THE ADJOURNMENT MOTION

D. ANALYSIS

E. CONCLUSION

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 2

Legal Tests 1

Legislation 3