Ian Johnstone

The applicant, a police constable, sought judicial review of decisions extending the time to bring disciplinary charges against him, suspending him without pay, and refusing to recuse the Hearing Officer.

The Divisional Court found the extension decision reasonable but held that applying amended suspension provisions mid-proceeding was unfair, reinstating his pay.

The court also removed the Hearing Officer due to a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the protracted procedural history.

The Durham Regional Police Service (Applicant) sought to prohibit the Ontario Civilian Police Commission (Commission) from disclosing two workplace investigation reports (Shearer Reports), claiming they were privileged.

The Commission, along with the Durham Regional Police Service Association (Intervenor), opposed these restrictions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Shearer Report 1 was not privileged, and while Shearer Report 2's privilege was uncertain (as it was not produced for review), any privilege over either report had been waived or lost due to prior disclosures.

The court ordered the reports to be produced to the Commission without restriction, emphasizing the public interest in disclosure to protect employees from harassment and a toxic workplace, and noting the Commission's statutory obligations of confidentiality.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) upholding a Hearing Officer's finding of discreditable conduct and a penalty of demotion.

The misconduct arose from an off-duty physical altercation with his estranged wife.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding that the OCPC reasonably concluded the Hearing Officer properly admitted hearsay evidence, correctly applied the test for discreditable conduct, and imposed a penalty within the appropriate range.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission directing the Chief of Police to withdraw disciplinary charges against a police officer.

The Commission found that the Chief failed to comply with the mandatory investigation and reporting requirements under section 76 of the Police Services Act before initiating a disciplinary hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission did not breach procedural fairness, there was no reasonable apprehension of bias, and the Commission's decision was reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing a grievance regarding vacation deductions for a police officer on a gradual return to work program.

The officer worked half-shifts and received WSIB benefits for the remainder.

When taking vacation, the employer deducted full days from his vacation bank.

The arbitrator found this did not violate the collective agreement, as the officer received his full vacation entitlement and WSIB benefits without losing any benefits.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard from Vavilov and dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's reasons were justified, transparent, and intelligible.

The applicant police service sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission, which had reduced a disciplinary penalty imposed on a police officer from an 18-month demotion to a 40-hour forfeiture.

The Commission had found that the Hearing Officer erred by punishing the officer twice for the same actions (insubordination and discreditable conduct) and by failing to ensure consistency of disposition with a comparator case.

The Divisional Court held that the Commission's decision was unreasonable, as it misapplied the Kienapple principle by failing to consider the lack of legal nexus between the offences, and misapprehended the facts of the comparator case.

The Commission's decision was set aside and the Hearing Officer's penalty was restored.

A sentencing appeal concerning whether a justice of the peace has jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil and hold a sole shareholder and directing mind personally liable for corporate fines.

The defendant corporation pleaded guilty to three charges under the Electricity Act arising from unsafe electrical work that resulted in a death.

The trial judge imposed fines of $430,000 but declined to pierce the corporate veil, finding she lacked jurisdiction.

The Crown appealed, arguing the defendant had improperly transferred corporate assets to himself and a new corporation to shield them from liability.

The appellate court found that justices of the peace do possess implied jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil in appropriate circumstances and that the test was satisfied on these facts.

The applicant police officer sought judicial review of an Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) decision that ordered a new discipline hearing.

The OCPC had found that the Hearing Officer breached procedural fairness by failing to provide minimum assistance to the unrepresented public complainant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, upholding the OCPC's refusal to admit fresh affidavit evidence about off-the-record events.

The Court also rejected the applicant's argument that the complainant needed to prove actual prejudice, affirming that a breach of procedural fairness carries inherent prejudice and denies a meaningful role in the proceeding.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Police Governing Authority granting an extension of time to serve a Notice of Hearing for disciplinary action.

The applicant was not given notice of the request for an extension and had no opportunity to make submissions.

The Divisional Court held that this failure breached minimal requirements of procedural fairness, rendering the decision fundamentally flawed and justifying intervention despite the interlocutory nature of the ruling.

The court quashed the decision and ordered the applicant's salary to be paid for the period of his suspension.