Sawyer v. Rama Police Service, 2026 ONSC 2188

CITATION: Sawyer v. Rama Police Service, 2026 ONSC 2188

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 24-1599-00JR

DATE: 20260427

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

D.L. Corbett, S. Shore and M. McArthur JJ.

B E T W E E N:

BENJAMIN SAWYER

L. Kinahan, for the Applicant

Applicant

• and -

POLICE SERVICES BOARD, RAMA

A. James, for Rama Police Services Board

Police Service, JEREL SWAMP,

CHIEF OF POLICE and MORRIS ELBERS

I. Johnstone, for Police Chief Jerel Swamp

Respondents

Heard at Oshawa: June 25, 2025

REASONS FOR DECISION

M. McArthur J.

Overview:

1The Applicant, Benjamin Sawyer, was a constable with the Rama Police Services (“RPS”). He was placed on paid leave on March 31, 2020, following his arrest and charges on March 28, 2020. The charges related to events between Mr Sawyer and his spouse between April 2016 and March 2020, alleged to have been offences under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46. The charges, and a non-criminal allegation,¹ were the basis of allegations of discreditable conduct pursuant to the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 (“PSA”).

2On September 7, 2022, Mr. Sawyer pled guilty to one count of failure to comply with an undertaking under the Criminal Code. He was granted an absolute discharge and was ordered into a common law recognizance to keep the peace for six months. The rest of the criminal charges were withdrawn by the Crown.

3As of the hearing before this court, in June 2025, police misconduct charges against the Applicant under the PSA were still outstanding, the Applicant had been suspended from his job, initially with pay, and, since January 15, 2024, without pay.

4The Applicant challenges six decisions relating to these matters, arguing that an extension should not have been granted to permit charges under the PSA to be prosecuted against him. Alternatively, the Applicant argues (a) that it was unfair to suspend him without pay, in the circumstances, and (b) this court ought to remove the Hearing Officer, Morris Elbers, and direct any process that may be permitted to go forward.²

5For the reasons below, I would allow the application in part.

6I would find that an extension in the time to bring PSA charges was properly granted in light of the criminal prosecution. I would find that the Rama Police Services Board (the “Board”) may amend its suspension provisions, and in particular, may adopt a model including suspension without pay, but I would also find that applying the amended provisions to the Applicant was improper and unfair in all the circumstances of this case: I would reinstate the Applicant’s pay, effective to the date that his pay was suspended. Finally, although the Hearing Officer did not display actual bias, his involvement in a deeply flawed disciplinary process to date, though not his fault, nonetheless leads me to conclude that a fresh Hearing Officer should be appointed.

Background

7The Applicant has been a constable with the RPS since May 2010. He was suspended from active duty on March 31, 2020, with pay, three days after he was arrested and charged with domestic related offences under the Criminal Code.

8On July 27, 2021, the Chief of the RPS, Jerel Swamp, filed submissions with the Board, requesting an extension of time to serve a Notice of Hearing pursuant to s. 83(17) of the PSA. On August 17, 2022, the Board approved the extension request.

9In the Extension Decision, the Board concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the request for an extension, and that the extension should be granted. The Board concluded that the request was reasonable in the circumstances because the Applicant was aware of the misconduct charges he could face under the PSA, and because the Assistant Crown Attorney with carriage of the criminal prosecution had asked that the PSA process be stood down until the criminal charges were dealt with.

10On August 17, 2022, the Board approved Chief Swamp’s extension request. On September 16, 2022, the Applicant filed a request for review of the Extension Decision. Morris Elbers was appointed as Hearing Officer by the Board on January 9, 2023. Proceedings ensued with various teleconference calls between the Hearing Officer and the parties.

11In November and December 2023, Counsel for the Board wrote to the Applicant’s counsel informing them that the review process before a Hearing Officer was not in effect, and that any review of the Extension Decision could only be by way of judicial review to the Divisional Court.

12In 2023, the Board passed a motion, updating their suspension procedures, to allow for suspension of an officer without pay where they are charged with misconduct and the RPS seeks the offer’s termination.

13On January 15, 2024, the RPS informed the Applicant that, in accordance with the 2023 Motion Decision of the Board, the Applicant would be suspended without pay, effective February 15, 2024.

14During an appearance on January 19, 2024, Mr. Elbers confirmed that the Board had not informed him that he was not the Hearing Officer, or that the review process did not exist. A hearing was set for April 15, 2024.

15On April 8, 2024, counsel for the Board wrote to Mr. Elbers and copied counsel for the Applicant and counsel for the RPS, indicating the Board’s position that Mr. Elbers should decline to hear the requested review, and instead should refer the Applicant to the Divisional Court.

16The hearing took place on April 15, 2024. On April 26, 2024, Mr. Elbers released the Jurisdiction Decision, in which he found that he lacked the jurisdiction to hear the review request, and stated that any review of the Extension Decision should be before the Divisional Court.

17Following release of the Jurisdiction Decision, the Applicant brought a motion to remove the Hearing Officer due to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The motion was heard on September 23, 2024. Among other allegations, counsel for the Applicant argued that the Hearing Officer used the word “ingenious” to describe the Board’s actions prior to the Jurisdiction Decision. On this application for judicial review, the Applicant seeks to supplement the record of proceeding with email correspondence with the Hearing Officer, which is said to corroborate this allegation.

18On October 7, 2024, the Hearing Officer released the Recusal Decision and declined to recuse himself for bias. He held that the allegation of bias was based on supposition and conjecture and did not meet the test for a recusal of an adjudicator.

19The Applicant filed his Notice of Application for judicial review on November 12, 2024.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review:

20This court has jurisdiction over this application for judicial review pursuant to ss. 2(1) and 6(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1.

21The presumptive standard of review on judicial review is reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653. The reviewing court asks, “whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness – justification, transparency and intelligibility – and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision” (Vavilov, at para. 99). The reviewing court should not engage in a “treasure hunt for error” (Vavilov, at para. 102).

22In assessing questions of procedural fairness, including allegations of bias, the court must determine the requisite level of procedural fairness with reference to the circumstances of the case and the factors set out in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Aggarwal v. Sheridan College, 2021 ONSC 1399 (Div. Ct.), at para. 44. Where there has been a denial of procedural fairness, the decision must be quashed or set aside: Saeed v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 6485 (Div. Ct.), at para. 29.

Issues:

23The applicant raises the following issues for judicial review:

I. Was the Extension Decision reasonable and procedurally fair?

II. Did the Board violate principles of procedural fairness when it terminated the review process?

III. Was the Jurisdiction Decision reasonable?

IV. Should the Hearing Officer be removed because of reasonable apprehension of bias?

V. Was the Board entitled to amend its suspension provisions?

VI. Could the Board apply the amended suspension provisions to suspend the Applicant without pay?

Analysis:

The Extension Decision Was Reasonable

(a) Position of the parties

24The Applicant submits that the Extension Decision was unreasonable and that the Board denied him procedural fairness because the Board misconstrued ss. 83(14) and (15) of the PSA, and unreasonably found that he was aware of the misconduct charges and proceedings he would ultimately face.

25With respect to the legislative framework, the Applicant submits that the Board misconstrued ss. 83(14) and (15) of the PSA, because those sections only apply when an internal investigation is complete, a Notice of Hearing has been served, and the matter is before the Board. At that point, the hearing may be subject to a stay of proceedings, pending the completion of a criminal prosecution. There is no basis for the conclusion that a Notice of Hearing may not be served until the completion of criminal proceedings. He also argues that the RPS misrepresented these provisions to the Crown, who subsequently asked that the RPS stand down the investigation, and subsequent proceedings until the criminal matter was complete.

26The RPS submits that an application for an extension to serve a Notice of Hearing before a police board does not require more than minimal rights of procedural fairness. The Board’s decision provides sufficient reasoning to support its decision to grant the extension application. The respondent also submits that the inspector and Chief of Police did not misrepresent ss. 83(14) and (15) to the Crown. The Applicant’s strict interpretation of ss. 83(14) and (15) has not been applied in other cases, where the Crown requested a police force to stand down an investigation, and the proceedings were stayed before a Notice of Hearing was served. Further, while the Applicant may not have been aware of the specific misconduct charges, he was properly notified of the substance of the complaints against him, and that those complaints were being investigated.

27The Board submits that the Extension Decision reflects the careful consideration undertaken by the Board, after receiving the information provided to it over the course of multiple rounds of submissions. While the Board did not specifically address every argument raised, it submits that it was not required to do so. Further, the procedural rights of each party were respected throughout the process.

(b) Analysis

28I find that the Extension Decision was reasonable. It lays out the reasons for granting the extension and justifies those reasons in light of the applicable legal and factual constraints.

29Pursuant to s. 83(17) of the PSA, a notice of hearing shall not be served after 6 months has elapsed since a complaint was initiated against that officer, unless the Board concludes that it was reasonable under the circumstances to delay serving the Notice of Hearing.

30The Board’s reasons did not need to be extensive. The Board only needed to explain why it concluded that the RPS’ explanation for the extension was reasonable. The Board is not “required to make an explicit finding on each constitute element, however subordinate, leading to its final conclusion”: Schiller v. Goodlife Fitness Centres Inc., 2026 ONSC 1306 (Div. Ct.), at para. 61, citing Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, at para. 16.

31It was reasonable for the Board to grant the extension in light of the Crown Attorney’s request, in conjunction with the RPS’s submission that often an internal investigation and subsequent Notice of Hearing should not be served until the completion of the criminal proceedings.

32The Board did not breach procedural fairness in granting the extension. As this court concluded in 2007, an extension request pursuant to the PSA entitles the officer to “minimal rights of procedural fairness… including notice, appropriate disclosure and an opportunity to respond”: Forestall v. Toronto Police Services Board, (2007), 2007 31785 (ON SCDC), 228 OAC 202 (Div. Ct.), at para. 53.

33The Applicant knew that his misconduct charges related to his criminal prosecution. He was aware of potential delay in the investigation and subsequent prosecution under the PSA as of March 31, 2020, when he was served the Notice of Suspension/Chief’s Complaints, which states, “[t]he internal investigation in relation to the misconduct allegations stemming from your criminal charges will commence once all of your criminal proceedings have been dealt with and concluded” [emphasis added].

34In oral argument, the court asked Applicant’s counsel if it was not inevitable that the Applicant would have sought a stay of the misconduct proceedings if a Notice of Hearing had been served while the criminal charges were still outstanding: compelled participation in the misconduct proceedings at such a stage could have implicated the Applicant’s right to remain silent respecting the criminal proceedings. While Applicant’s counsel was not prepared to concede that anything was “inevitable”, they did agree that a police officer in the Applicant’s position would ordinarily seek a stay of prosecution of PSA charges pending completion of criminal charges if the Crown did not do so. I conclude that the applicant’s objection to the Extension Decision – in substance – is a technical argument based on the order in which the paperwork was processed, and not truly a substantive objection to the extension – which should have been sought and granted, as it was.

35Accordingly, I would find that the Extension Decision is reasonable.

2023 Board Motion & Pay Decision

(a) Position of the parties

36The Applicant submits that the Board was not entitled to amend its suspension provisions in a way that deviates from Part V of the PSA, which the RPS, adopted in 2008. Section 89(6) of the PSA stipulates that an officer may only be suspended without pay where they have been convicted of an offence and sentenced to a period of incarceration. In the 2023 Motion Decision, the Board amended this provision to allow the RPS to suspend an officer without pay where they are charged with misconduct and the RPS seeks the officer’s termination.

37The Applicant also submits that the decision to change the terms of his suspension, to suspend his pay, in the middle of the disciplinary proceedings, after most of the criminal charges had been disposed of substantially in his favour, denied him procedural fairness.

38The RPS submits that the Board was entitled to deviate from Part V of the PSA. With respect to the Chief’s decision to suspend the Applicant without pay, the Respondent submits that the application for judicial review was brought approximately 400 days after the Chief’s decision, which significantly exceeds the statutory 30-day period for filing an application for judicial review.

39The Board submits that it has the authority to set its own rules and modify them accordingly, as a non-legislated First Nations police board. The adoption of the PSA suspension procedures did not mean that those procedures were binding on the Board. Rather, the Board retained the authority to amend their suspension procedures as they saw fit. Further, the amendments to the suspension procedure are comparable to the conditions set out in the new policing statute, the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c.1, Sched. 1 (“CSPA”).

(b) Analysis

40The Board was entitled to amend its suspension provisions to allow for suspension without pay where an officer is charged with misconduct under the PSA and the RPS is seeking the officer’s termination.

41The RPS has a unique legal status as a non-legislated police service. The RPS is not bound by the provisions of the PSA nor the current CSPA. RPS officers are not police officers under the PSA: See Pitawanakwat v. Wikwemikong Tribal Police Service, 2010 ONCPC 1 at p. 6-7. Since officers serving with First Nation police services are not ‘officers’ within the meaning of the PSA, they are also not covered by the labour provisions set out in Ontario’s policing legislation: See Kyle Bembeneck v. Treaty Three Police Services Board, 2023 105558 (ON LRB).

42Accordingly, even though the Board adopted Part V of the PSA into its own disciplinary policies, it was entitled to amend or change the provisions it adopted as the Board saw fit.

43However, it was unfair to apply the amended procedure to the Applicant in this case: legislative or regulatory amendments are presumed to have prospective effect, that is, in this case, the suspension provisions in effect at the outset are presumed to govern the Applicant’s case. Changing the suspension provisions after the impugned conduct, after the commencement of proceedings against the Applicant, and after those proceedings have been in-process for years, changes the “rules of the game” mid-game: see Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 289, at paras. 43-50.

44As submitted by the Board, the update to the suspension provisions was intended to bring them in line with the CPSA. However, the CPSA provides safeguards where a complaint is made under the PSA. The prosecution continues under the Act, even after the Act has been repealed. Section 216(1) provides:

216 (1) Complaints made under the Police Services Act and hearings under section 25 of that Act shall continue to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that Act as they read immediately before the Act’s repeal with necessary modifications, subject to subsections (3) to (6) and to such other modifications as may be set out in the regulations. 2019, c. 1, Sched. 1, s. 216 (1).

This provision codifies the common law presumption against retrospective changes to the “rules of the game” mid-game.

45Further, in its submission to the Board on the Extension Decision, the RPS submitted that the Board had jurisdiction under the PSA because the Board adopted Part V. In support of this submission the RPS noted that Chief Swamp issued a directive to the officers in 2018 to ensure that they knew that Part V had been adopted and would apply. The RPS argued that should the Board now deviate from this process and expectation, it would violate procedural fairness.

46The same argument applies to the Pay Decision. The Applicant had an expectation that the suspension provisions would not be altered mid-stream. The 2023 Board Motion does not indicate that the amendment is to apply retrospectively to ongoing matters.

47Although I do not consider it necessary, I would note that the amended suspension provision calls for an exercise of discretion – both as to the penalty sought and to the decision to suspend without pay where termination is sought as a remedy. I would say nothing about how this discretion ought to be exercised where charges are related to outstanding criminal charges. In this case, by the time the Chief exercised their discretion to suspend without pay, the criminal charges had been resolved almost entirely in favour of the Applicant, the one charge to which a plea of guilty was entered resulted in an absolute discharge, and so consideration ought to have been given to the likelihood that a remedy of termination would actually be ordered.

48Finally, resolution of the disciplinary charges has been delayed unduly because of respondents’ procedural misdirections respecting the availability of the review process. The Applicant sought review of the Extension Decision on September 2022. This issue was not disposed of by the Hearing Officer until April 2024, and on a basis where the Applicant was told to bring his review request to this court. This had the effect of delaying the hearing for eighteen months, during which the suspension without pay was imposed³ with further additional delay resulting from the proceedings in this court.

49I would find that the Board was entitled to amend the suspension provisions. However, the amended suspension provisions should not have been applied in this case. Therefore, I would quash the Pay Decision, reinstating the Applicant’s pay effective to the date it was suspended.

Challenges Related to the Review Process Are Moot

(a) Position of the Parties

50The Applicant submits that his procedural fairness rights were violated by the Board when it terminated the review process in the middle of the proceeding. The Applicant argues that the Board must be held to its representation that the review process was in effect.

51The Applicant also submits that the Jurisdiction Decision was unreasonable because it lacked a coherent analysis, and misconstrued material facts.

52The RPS submits that the Jurisdiction Decision was reasonable. The Hearing Officer outlined the rationale for his decision and identified the clear correspondence from the Board that the right of review procedure was not in effect, and that the Applicant could seek judicial review of the Extension Decision before this court.

53The Board submits that once it became aware of its mistake, it acted reasonably and diligently to inform the parties that the right of review was not available, and about the availability of the judicial review. However, the Applicant chose to disregard the November and December 2023 corrections and failed to initiate a judicial review.

(b) Analysis

54Having determined that the Extension Decision was reasonable, the Jurisdiction Decision and the existence of the review process are now moot. I would note, however, that the Board could not create jurisdiction for the Hearing Officer by erring in its statement about the proper path of review.

Hearing Officer Removed Without Prejudice to the Chief Appointing Another Hearing Officer

(a) Position of the Parties

55The applicant submits that the Hearing Officer conducted himself in such a manner that a reasonable person would conclude that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the Hearing Officer was simply doing what he was directed to do by the PSB, the entity paying him. As part of this submission, the Applicant states that the Hearing Officer used the word “ingenious” to describe the Board’s actions preceding the Jurisdiction Decision. The Applicant seeks to supplement the record of proceeding with email correspondence to corroborate this allegation. Further, the Applicant submits that the Hearing Officer “cut and pasted” portions of his analysis in the Recusal Decision from another decision.

56The RPS submits that there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Hearing Officer has demonstrated an actual bias or that would meet the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias. The fact that the Hearing Officer was appointed by the Chief is not evidence of bias, and the Applicant has not provided any evidence that the Chief directed the Hearing Officer in any way. The Hearing Officer’s reasons in the Jurisdiction Decision and the Recusal Decision were articulate and responsive to the submissions. With respect to the allegation that the Hearing Officer copied portions of his analysis from another decision, he appears to have used several paragraphs related to legal tests and conclusions, which is a common practice amongst adjudicators, and does not create an apprehension of bias.

(b) Analysis:

57It is unnecessary to address the request to supplement the record of proceedings with email correspondence, because the record is otherwise sufficient for the court to conclude that the hearing of the charges should be held before a different Hearing Officer, to be selected by the Chief.

58While the Hearing Officer’s conduct did not reflect bias in fact, his involvement in the deeply flawed procedural history of his case, which has led to substantial delay, during two years of which the Applicant’s pay has been suspended unfairly, together with the Respondent’s unyielding position that the current Hearing Officer should remain, taken altogether, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias: Baker, at para. 46.

59As described above, the Board directed the parties that the proper procedure to review the Extension Decision was through the Board’s right of review. The Board sent the parties the rules and appointed the Hearing Officer. Later, the Board determined that the right of review was not in effect and that the proper route to challenge the Extension Decision was through judicial review. The Board submitted that the Hearing Officer should not hear the review because he lacked jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Hearing Officer held the hearing but agreed with the Board that he lacked jurisdiction to review the Extension Decision.

60The criminal charges were disposed of in September 2022. The disciplinary charges should have proceeded to a hearing on the merits thereafter and should have been concluded before the Applicant’s pay was suspended. The protracted proceedings below, all in respect to a preliminary decision respecting the extension, have delayed adjudication of the charges, on the merits, for years, to the substantial prejudice of the Applicant. The merits portion of the proceedings below has not moved forward, and there will be no prejudice to the hearing process for another Hearing Officer to be appointed to deal with the discipline charges on the merits.

61While normally an extensive procedural history before the Hearing Officer would not create a reasonable apprehension of bias, in the unique circumstances of this case, a new Hearing Officer should be appointed. The overall impression of the history below is one of substantial prejudice to the Applicant. The Hearing Officer is implicated in this because of the protracted process before him to decide the Jurisdiction Decision, followed by a referral to this court. It is simply better to start over, fresh.

62The Chief is entitled to appoint the new Hearing Officer. The Chief’s power to appoint the Hearing Officer does not, in and of itself, create a reasonable apprehension of bias. While I am persuaded that there should be a new Hearing Officer, I see no basis for the allegations of bias in fact or a basis to conclude that the Chief’s authority to appoint a Hearing Officer should not continue: Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23, v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 282, at para. 25.

63Accordingly, I would remove Morris Elbers the Hearing Officer and direct that a new Hearing Officer may be appointed by the Chief.

Prematurity and Limitations Issues

64Ordinarily, this court will decline to hear an application for judicial review until the process below has been completed: Ontario College of Art v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1993), 1993 3430 (ON CTGDDC), 11 O.R. (3d) 798 at 800 (Div. Ct.); Volochay v. College of Massage Therapists of Ontario, 2012 ONCA 541 at para. 68; Kahissay v. Intact Insurance, 2023 ONSC 3650 (Div. Ct.); Talwar v. Grand River Hospital, 2024 ONSC 1523, at paras. 7-9 (Div. Ct.). Fragmentation of administrative proceedings is undesirable, and issues raised by interlocutory rulings may be rendered moot by the final disposition of the proceedings.

65This issue, “prematurity”, was not raised by the parties or by the court during oral argument. I would note the issue, however, since this case should not stand for the proposition that prematurity concerns do not apply to the issues raised in this application. Interim suspension decisions are a category of interlocutory orders that this court is more likely to view as exceptional circumstances, since the serious consequences of such decisions may cause prejudice that cannot readily be remedied in the final disposition of the proceedings and a subsequent application to this court. Further, the procedural morass into which this case descended, with consequent delay and ultimately a decision by this court to remove the Hearing Officer, places this case as exceptional: had the prematurity issue been raised, I would have found that this court should entertain the application.

66As noted above, the Board objected to the Applicant’s late commencement of judicial review proceedings in respect to the decision to suspend without pay. Section 5(2) of the JRPA provides that this court may grant an extension to file an application for judicial review. I would grant that extension, in the circumstances of this case: doing so does not prejudice the proceedings below, which were already enmeshed in procedural issues that led to the application before this court. The prejudice to the Applicant of retrospective application to his case of the new suspension provisions is substantial, and there is no prejudice to the Respondents (as prejudice is understood in the jurisprudence) in permitting the Applicant’s late challenge the suspension of his pay. I would also note that the availability of an application for judicial review in respect to the Chief’s decision to suspend without pay was not made known to the Applicant at the time the Chief delivered the impugned suspension decision. Had that information been provided in a timely manner, that could have affected my exercise of discretion in considering whether to extend the time to seek judicial review.

Disposition

67I would allow the application in part and would direct:

I. The Chief’s decision to suspend the Applicant without pay is quashed; the suspension with pay is restored, effective to the date the suspension without pay was implemented.

II. Morris Elbers is removed as the Hearing Officer, without prejudice to the Chief appointing a new Hearing Officer.

III. The balance of the application is dismissed.

68The Applicant has been substantially successful on two issues, but not in his efforts to terminate the disciplinary proceedings against him. If the partes are unable to resolve the issue of costs between them within 10 business days from the date of this decision, the parties are to serve and file their bill of costs, and may each make written submissions on costs limited to 3 pages in writing, plus any offers to settle, within 30 days of the date of this decision.

“M. McArthur J.”

I agree: “D.L. Corbett J.”

I agree: “Shore J.”

Date: April 27, 2026

CITATION: Sawyer v. Rama Police Service, 2026 ONSC 2188

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 24-1599-00JR

Footnotes

1. 1An allegation that Mr Sawyer stopped his spouse while she was driving for failure to produce a driver’s license.
2. 2Mr Elbers was appointed as the “Arbitrator” to hear the review proceedings, and as the “Hearing Officer” to hear the underlying disciplinary charges. I refer to him as the “Hearing Officer” in these Reasons.
3. 3If the Applicant had been referred to Divisional Court proceedings from the outset, it would be reasonable to supposed that the disciplinary proceedings, themselves, would have been decided before the Applicant’s pay was suspended.