Ralitza Tzvetanova Anguelova

The Toronto Police Service (TPS) denied Yazdan Khorsand's application for special constable employment with the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) based on a pre-screening background check, without disclosing reasons or information.

Khorsand sought judicial review, arguing a breach of procedural fairness and systemic discrimination.

The Divisional Court found the decision judicially reviewable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed this, holding that the pre-screening decision was part of a private employment hiring process by the TCHC, not a sufficiently public exercise of state authority by the TPS Board, and therefore not amenable to judicial review.

The court emphasized that the broad public impact of a decision does not automatically make it judicially reviewable and that public law remedies were unsuitable given the need to protect sensitive law enforcement information.

The applicant, a racialized individual with no criminal record, applied for a Special Constable position with the Toronto Community Housing Corporation.

He was denied the position after failing a pre-screen background check conducted by the Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB).

The TPSB refused to provide reasons or disclose the information relied upon.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court held that the TPSB's decision was of sufficient public character to be subject to judicial review and that the TPSB breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant with reasons and an opportunity to respond.

The decision was quashed and remitted to the TPSB.

The plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution and Charter breaches against the Crown and the Toronto Police Services Board, arising from a 2013 police shooting during the execution of a search warrant and his subsequent criminal prosecution, which ended in acquittals in 2014.

The plaintiff sought leave under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act to continue his claim against the Crown.

The Board moved for summary judgment based on the expiry of the limitation period, and the Crown moved to strike the Charter claims.

The court denied leave, finding no reasonable possibility of success for the malicious prosecution claim.

The court granted summary judgment to the Board, as the action was commenced more than six years after the acquittals and the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability.

The Charter claims against the Crown were also struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her action against the municipality for property damage caused by falling tree branches.

She also brought a motion to admit fresh evidence regarding subsequent tree damage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the new evidence irrelevant to the issues at trial.

The appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in concluding the municipality took reasonable care and did not cause a substantial interference with the appellant's property.