Richard Henry Greene

The plaintiff commenced an action against five lawyers and their law firms for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence arising from the sale of a matrimonial home and payment of debts.

Four of the lawyers and their firms brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as she had discovered the material facts of her claim more than two years before commencing the action.

The court also noted that the action against opposing counsel in the family law proceedings would have been dismissed regardless, as no duty of care is owed to an opposing party.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge, found the appeal had no merit, and dismissed it with costs fixed at $5,000.

The moving party brought motions to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that denied his request to expand the appeal records and hear two appeals together, and ordered him to perfect both appeals within 45 days.

The moving party sought an adjournment of his review motions to obtain further evidence, which the court denied because the review must be based on the material before the single judge.

The court upheld the single judge's decision regarding the records and hearing the appeals together.

However, the court clarified the timeline for perfecting the cross-appeal in the family law matter, allowing the moving party 45 days after the appellant perfects her appeal.

The motion was otherwise dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent lawyer.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his former lawyer alleging solicitor’s negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, and also sought leave to appeal a substantial trial costs award.

The court held that the appellant had led no expert evidence on the standard of care, did not fall within recognized exceptions, failed to prove causation or damages, and did not establish any fiduciary breach.

The court further upheld the trial judge’s finding that the claim was discovered no later than February 9, 2006 and was therefore barred by the applicable limitation period when commenced on July 10, 2008.

The appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal costs was refused, and appeal costs were fixed at $28,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant and the deceased entered into a separation agreement in which the deceased represented that the appellant was solely entitled to his pension survivor benefits.

The agreement also provided that if the deceased remarried, he would make all possible efforts to have his new spouse release her claims to his pension.

The deceased remarried and subsequently died before retiring.

The appellant brought an action claiming entitlement to the pre-retirement death benefit, arguing the separation agreement constituted an assignment under the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the separation agreement did not amount to a clear and unequivocal assignment of the pre-retirement death benefit, particularly given the express recognition that a subsequent spouse might not release her rights.

The moving party sought summary judgment requiring a pension plan administrator to pay her a pre‑retirement death benefit under a federally regulated pension plan following the death of her former spouse.

The claim relied on a separation agreement stating that she would receive survivor benefits from the pension.

The court considered whether s. 25(4) of the Pension Benefits Standards Act permitted assignment of a pre‑retirement death benefit to a former spouse and whether the language of the parties’ separation agreement and related documents constituted an effective assignment.

Although the court held that the statute permits assignment of such benefits, it concluded the wording of the separation agreement and related direction did not clearly and unambiguously effect an assignment.

The statutory priority of the surviving spouse therefore prevailed and the death benefit was payable to the deceased member’s later spouse.

The court determined costs following a family law motion concerning the interpretation of a consent divorce order dealing with division of a pension.

The moving party successfully argued that the order required the respondent’s pension to be divided on a “delinked” basis rather than a “linked” basis.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court reaffirmed that the successful party is presumptively entitled to costs, subject to considerations of reasonableness and proportionality.

Although the successful party claimed over $18,000 in costs and more than 80 hours of lawyer time, the court found that amount excessive for the circumstances.

The court fixed costs at $12,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST as a fair and reasonable award.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondent and dismissing her solicitor negligence action on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The appellant argued she did not know the material facts of her claim until she received the results of a Law Society investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's own correspondence demonstrated she had subjective knowledge of the material facts underlying her complaints more than two years before commencing the action.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her solicitor negligence claim against her former lawyers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding discoverability.

The court noted that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the material facts giving rise to the claim when she signed a settlement agreement with the benefit of new counsel, yet she waited more than six years to commence the action.

The appeal was dismissed as statute-barred.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the trial judge.

The issues raised were essentially factual, and there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's findings.