Bradley A. Smith

A long-time valued employee brought an action for damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering and wrongful dismissal after her employer rehired an executive who had been dismissed 11 years earlier partly because he had sexually harassed the plaintiff.

The trial judge found the plaintiff was constructively dismissed and awarded damages equal to 12 months' pay in lieu of notice plus $100,000 in Honda damages, but dismissed the intentional infliction of mental suffering claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the constructive dismissal finding and Honda damages award, but dismissed the appeal of the intentional infliction of mental suffering claim.

The court held that while the employer's conduct was flagrant and outrageous and resulted in visible and provable illness, the plaintiff failed to establish that the employer knew serious psychological injury was substantially certain to follow from its rehiring decision and offer of accommodation.

The plaintiff, Dennis Rego, was terminated by the defendant, Northern Air Solutions Inc., for alleged lack of cooperation in completing required winter operations training.

Following a summary judgment motion, a minitrial was held to determine if the failure to complete training constituted just cause for termination.

The court found that the employer had condoned the lack of training by allowing the plaintiff to continue flying and that, once warned, the plaintiff agreed to complete the training.

Therefore, dismissal was not warranted, and the employer failed to prove just cause.

Damages for breach of contract were awarded, but claims for overtime, aggravated, and punitive damages were dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a simplified procedure wrongful dismissal action after his employer terminated him alleging cause.

The employer relied on two grounds: alleged misrepresentation of credentials at the time of hiring and failure to complete required winter flight training.

The court held that the employer failed to establish misrepresentation of credentials, noting the lack of supporting evidence and the absence of the allegation in the termination letter.

However, the evidence regarding the training dispute involved conflicting affidavits and credibility issues that could not be resolved on the written record.

The court declined to grant summary judgment and directed that further procedural submissions be made to determine an appropriate process, potentially involving oral evidence.

The court determined costs following a family law motion concerning the interpretation of a consent divorce order dealing with division of a pension.

The moving party successfully argued that the order required the respondent’s pension to be divided on a “delinked” basis rather than a “linked” basis.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court reaffirmed that the successful party is presumptively entitled to costs, subject to considerations of reasonableness and proportionality.

Although the successful party claimed over $18,000 in costs and more than 80 hours of lawyer time, the court found that amount excessive for the circumstances.

The court fixed costs at $12,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST as a fair and reasonable award.

The applicant brought a motion seeking enforcement and interpretation of a consent divorce order requiring the respondent to divide his pension benefits such that the applicant would receive 40% of the current plan benefit.

The parties disagreed whether the order required a "linked" or "delinked" pension division under the Ontario Public Service Employees Union Pension Plan.

Applying principles of contractual interpretation to the consent order, the court held that the language requiring the pension to be divided so the applicant was "entitled, as a member of the plan" supported a delinked structure creating two separate pensions.

The court further held that such an arrangement did not offend the Pension Benefits Act because payment to the applicant would still only occur once the member’s pension came into pay.

The respondent was ordered to instruct the pension administrator to divide the pension on a delinked basis.