Luke M. Ruberto

This trial concerned a dispute between two cottage neighbours over vehicular access to a road ("the Pink Road") located primarily on the respondent's property.

The applicant sought a court order for vehicular access based on proprietary estoppel, following an earlier phase of the application under the Road Access Act which was dismissed.

The court examined the history of the road's use, including a 1968 oral agreement between the original owners, and subsequent blockages in 1992 and 2015.

The court found that the 1968 agreement was a personal license, not an easement, as it lacked the essential characteristic of accommodating the dominant tenement by reasonable necessity.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to establish the elements of proprietary estoppel, as there was no inducement or detrimental reliance sufficient to create an equitable interest.

The application was dismissed, with the court concluding that the applicant's use of the road after 2015 constituted trespass.

The applicant sought a declaration under the Road Access Act, arguing that a road on the respondent's property (the "Pink Road") was an "access road" to her dock, which the respondent had blocked.

The respondent contended that the applicant had alternative vehicular access to her property via a municipal road.

The court found that the applicant's property was not "landlocked" as she had vehicular access via a municipal road to her undivided parcel of land.

The Act was interpreted to prevent blocking all road access to a parcel, not to guarantee preferred access to a specific portion (like a dock) when other vehicular access exists.

The application was dismissed, with the court concluding that the Pink Road was not an "access road" under the Act.

A long-time valued employee brought an action for damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering and wrongful dismissal after her employer rehired an executive who had been dismissed 11 years earlier partly because he had sexually harassed the plaintiff.

The trial judge found the plaintiff was constructively dismissed and awarded damages equal to 12 months' pay in lieu of notice plus $100,000 in Honda damages, but dismissed the intentional infliction of mental suffering claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the constructive dismissal finding and Honda damages award, but dismissed the appeal of the intentional infliction of mental suffering claim.

The court held that while the employer's conduct was flagrant and outrageous and resulted in visible and provable illness, the plaintiff failed to establish that the employer knew serious psychological injury was substantially certain to follow from its rehiring decision and offer of accommodation.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

Following a trial held over three dates in 2016, the court found that the child was in need of protection due to the mother's mental health concerns, paranoid behaviour, inadequate supervision, and emotional harm to the child.

The child was ultimately returned to the mother's care on a voluntary basis.

The child protection agency sought costs against the mother, arguing that she had acted unreasonably by refusing to accept a statement of agreed facts and proceeding to trial despite two independent judicial findings of protection concerns.

The court awarded nominal counsel costs of $500 plus full disbursements of $2,569.40 against the mother.