Alexi N. Wood

The applicants, claimants under a Hepatitis C class action settlement, sought leave to sue the settlement administrator, Crawford & Company (Canada) Inc., for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

They alleged mismanagement of the Past Economic Loss and Dependents Fund (PELD Fund) and misleading advice regarding compensation options, which resulted in them receiving only a pro-rata share of their approved compensation.

The court granted leave, applying the "reasonable possibility of success" test.

It found that the proposed claims, if proven, demonstrated a reasonable prospect of success for all three causes of action.

The court distinguished the case from prior decisions denying leave, emphasizing that the allegations pertained to the administrator's conduct in providing advice while aware of fund insolvency, rather than merely challenging compensation calculations.

Arguments regarding release and limitation periods were dismissed as premature at this stage.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion brought by the defendants to strike, stay, or dismiss a tort action, which was dismissed by the court.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, while the defendants requested partial indemnity or no costs, arguing for divided success.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $36,665.22, all-inclusive, finding no divided success and deeming the plaintiff's costs reasonable.

The moving party sought a panel review of a prior order by Pardu J.A. that dismissed her motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay and to extend time to perfect the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no error in the motion judge's assessment of the moving party's delay or the lack of merit in the underlying appeal.

This endorsement clarifies a previous order dated October 15, 2021, due to disputes and uncertainty raised by the respondents regarding rental arrears, utilities, and obligations concerning a fence.

The court confirmed its original interpretation of the rental abatement period (November 2020 to February 2021), upheld the previously ordered amounts for utilities and BIA, and reaffirmed its decision on the fence, granting the respondents an extension to provide a modified design.

The appellant, Dr. Mistry, appealed an Associate Justice's order that granted a motion to add him and Dr. Karmali-Rawji as defendants in a medical malpractice action.

The core issue was whether the claim against Dr. Mistry for delayed diagnosis and failure to refer was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Master had found the claim was discovered in May 2017 when the plaintiff's counsel reviewed medical records, thus the limitation period had not expired.

Dr. Mistry argued the claim was discoverable earlier, by February 2015.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's decision.

It affirmed that the plaintiff, an unsophisticated litigant, and his counsel could not have drawn a plausible inference of liability against Dr. Mistry without the new information from the full medical records, which revealed the spinal lesion was diagnosable earlier.

The appellant, Elisa Romero Hategan, moved to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of her appeal and for an extension of time to perfect it.

The underlying appeal was from a summary judgment that dismissed Hategan's claims (wrongful appropriation of personality, civil conspiracy, injurious falsehood, negligence, unlawful interference with economic interests) and awarded damages for defamation against her, along with a permanent injunction.

The Court of Appeal considered the factors for extending time to perfect an appeal, including the length of delay, explanation for delay, prejudice to respondents, and merits of the appeal.

The court found the appellant's delay unreasonable and the appeal to have little or no merit, as her original claims lacked evidentiary support for false statements and the defamation counterclaim was well-founded.

The motion to set aside the dismissal and extend time was dismissed.

The applicant landlord brought an application regarding a commercial tenancy after the respondent tenants unilaterally withheld rent for 10 months.

The tenants claimed they were entitled to an abatement of rent because a failed Fire Code inspection delayed their ability to open a daycare facility on the premises.

The court found that while the landlord was responsible for some delay in rectifying the Fire Code violations, the tenants' withholding of 10 months' rent was an unduly aggressive self-help remedy.

The court granted a 4-month rent abatement, ordered the tenants to pay the remaining arrears within 45 days, and declined to order forfeiture of the lease.

The court also ordered the parties to cooperate on revising the design of a fence the tenants had installed without approval.

The Ryerson Students' Union (RSU) moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent Ryerson University from terminating an operating agreement and to compel the release of withheld student fees.

The University had terminated the agreement citing financial mismanagement by a previous RSU executive.

The court found that the RSU had taken prompt corrective actions, establishing a strong prima facie case that it had not repudiated the agreement.

The withholding of fees constituted irreparable harm, as it would force the RSU to cease operations.

The balance of convenience favored the RSU, as the University's proposed new governance process was initiated after the RSU's claim and its arguments regarding financial control were not substantiated.

The motion was allowed, ordering the University to comply with the agreement and release the funds.

This costs endorsement followed a prior decision where the plaintiffs' action for breach of contract was dismissed due to a lack of proven damages, despite a finding of breach.

The court determined that the defendant, Grant Thornton LLP (GT), was the more successful party, notwithstanding some mixed success, as the plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty and defamation were dismissed outright, and no remedy flowed from any of the plaintiffs' findings.

The defendant's offer to settle did not meet the requirements of Rule 49.10(2)(b), thus no costs consequences flowed from its non-acceptance.

Applying the "fair and reasonable" principle for fixing costs and considering Rule 57.01 factors, including the moderate complexity and the $10 million claim, the court awarded GT partial indemnity costs in the all-inclusive amount of $175,000.00.

The court determined costs following a reference decision on priority of claims.

The applicant, Joe Guerrieri, was awarded reduced substantial indemnity costs ($40,000) in priority to all parties except the first mortgagee, Frances Gower.

Gower was awarded significantly reduced substantial indemnity costs ($20,000) with first priority.

Rob Rolston Building Materials Ltd. was awarded $5,000 in costs.

Jerry Schmanda and Dawna Catharine Fairbairn (the Schmandas), whose unsuccessful equitable mortgage claim caused the reference, were made liable for any unrecoverable costs awarded to Guerrieri, Gower, and Rolston.

The court considered Rule 57 factors, proportionality, and settlement offers, noting that while offers were made, none were accepted in a way that avoided the reference hearing costs.

The appellant purchased a commercial property that was contaminated by hydrocarbons that had migrated from an adjacent former gas station property.

The respondents moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the contamination more than two years before commencing the action.

The motion judge granted the motion, finding that the appellant had knowledge of the claim by March 9, 2012, or alternatively by March 30, 2012.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by equating the appellant's suspicion of contamination with actual knowledge of contamination, and by failing to consider the relevant circumstances of the multi-property transaction and the waiver of conditions.

The applicants, members of a pro-life student group, sought judicial review of the Ryerson Students’ Union’s decision to deny their group "Student Group status." The RSU denied status based on its pro-choice, pro-feminist policies.

The court addressed whether it had jurisdiction to review the RSU's decision and whether the decision attracted Charter scrutiny.

The court found the RSU to be a private entity, not subject to administrative law principles or Charter scrutiny in this context, and dismissed the application.

An employer appealed a Master's order granting a motion to amend a statement of claim to add the employer as a defendant in an action against an insurer for termination of long‑term disability benefits.

The employee, a unionized worker, sought to claim that the employer was liable for disability benefits after the insurer stopped payments.

The court held that the employee’s entitlement to disability benefits against the employer arose from the collective bargaining agreement and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration.

Because the employer was not an insurer under the policy and could not be sued in court for obligations arising under the collective agreement, the amendment adding the employer as a party was improper.

The appeal was allowed and the Master's order set aside.

Residents of a Toronto apartment building sought certification of a class action following a fire allegedly caused by negligent maintenance of electrical systems and smart meters.

The proposed class sued the building owner, property managers, superintendent, and the electricity distributor.

The electricity distributor opposed certification, arguing the claim failed to disclose a viable negligence cause of action and that the certification criteria were not met.

The court held that the pleadings disclosed a viable negligence claim against the distributor and that the statutory and regulatory framework governing electricity distribution did not negate the claim at the certification stage.

The court certified the action as a class proceeding with a modified class definition excluding residents operating marijuana grow‑ops in the building.