R. Cary Boswell

The applicant College brought an application for a declaration that the respondent contravened the Psychology and Applied Behaviour Analysis Act, 2021 and the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, and for a statutory injunction requiring compliance.

The respondent, who was not a member of the College, advertised herself as a psychologist with a doctorate, offered psychotherapy, and performed controlled acts.

The respondent did not appear.

The Court found clear breaches of the legislation and granted the statutory injunction to protect the public interest.

The self-represented plaintiffs commenced an action attempting to relitigate a failed 2016 real estate transaction that had already resulted in a substantial judgment against the primary plaintiff and multiple subsequent dismissed claims.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motions and struck the claim without leave to amend, finding it prolix, confusing, lacking any reasonable cause of action for the secondary plaintiff, an abuse of process constituting a collateral attack on prior judgments, and statute-barred against the agent defendants.

The moving party, a terminated project manager, brought motions to dismiss or stay claims advanced against it in two related construction actions on grounds of abuse of process and multiplicity of proceedings.

The responding parties had advanced identical counterclaims for deficiencies and delay across multiple proceedings arising from the same construction project.

The court found the counterclaim in the simplified procedure action was duplicative and an abuse of process, but accepted the responding parties' discontinuance of that claim.

The court declined to dismiss the separate balcony deficiency action, finding the issues sufficiently distinct and the parties not identical, but ordered that it be heard together with or immediately after the lien action in the interests of judicial economy.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after punching the complainant multiple times in the face following a slap, rendering the complainant unconscious and causing significant facial injuries.

The trial was re-opened to permit a third-party witness to testify, but her evidence was rejected as neither credible nor reliable due to her intoxicated state.

On summary conviction appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: uneven scrutiny of defence-led evidence, misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant striking the appellant in the back of the head, and failure to properly apply R. v. W.(D.).

The appeal court found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, no misapprehension of material evidence, and no W.D. error, as the substance of the reasonable doubt instruction was respected throughout the reasons.

Appeal dismissed.

A motion was brought under s. 105(2) of the Courts of Justice Act for an order requiring an elderly party, aged 92, residing in a secure memory care facility, to undergo a cognitive capacity assessment.

The subject had been diagnosed with moderate stage dementia and had a documented history of confusion, memory deficits, and failed capacity screening.

He opposed the motion by affidavit, asserting his capacity.

The court applied the two-part threshold under s. 105(3) and the factors from Abrams v. Abrams, finding ample evidence of significant cognitive deficits and that capacity was a material issue in both the action and a related application.

The motion was granted, and a concurrent stay of a related motion to remove the moving party as litigation guardian was ordered pending the outcome of the assessment.

On a motion to compel responses to discovery undertakings in a simplified civil action with a counterclaim under the Business Corporations Act, the moving party asserted three undertakings remained outstanding.

The court found that production of specific Visa statements and a witness list with contact information had been satisfactorily provided, but held that the will-say materials were insufficient because they did not adequately summarize anticipated evidence for expected trial witnesses.

Applying disclosure principles referenced in the jurisprudence, the court required meaningful witness-evidence summaries rather than generic topic statements.

The motion was granted in part with a direction to provide sufficient will-say statements within 30 days.

Costs of $1,000 all-inclusive were awarded to the moving party.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found over 1.1 kilograms of cocaine and $65,000 in his garage.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 26 months, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court noted the offender was a youthful, first-time offender who had made exceptional efforts toward rehabilitation, including completing a business program and securing employment.

Finding that a conditional sentence would meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence while recognizing the offender's rehabilitation, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation.

The offender pleaded guilty to four offences: exercising control over a person for sexual services, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, advertising sexual services, and sexual assault.

The offender exploited a vulnerable 22-year-old woman by forcing her into sex work, taking a percentage of her earnings, and sexually assaulting her.

The court imposed a global sentence of four years, reduced to one year net after crediting 1,074 days of pre-sentence custody at a 1.5:1 ratio and applying a one-year reduction for egregious remand conditions.

The court also imposed ancillary orders including DNA collection, lifetime weapons prohibition, non-communication order, 20-year SOIRA registration, and forfeiture order.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the defendant following his conviction on four offences: assault with a weapon (predicate offence), uttering death threats, mischief under $5,000, and breach of probation.

The defendant had a 15-year history of violent outbursts, including three serious knife assaults on family members.

The court found the defendant met all criteria for dangerous offender designation based on a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour and persistent aggressive behaviour showing substantial indifference to consequences.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding that no lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff mortgagee, MCC Mortgage Holdings Inc., against the defendants, Cajetan Jose Fernandes and Maria Dolly Fernandes, for possession of the mortgaged property and payment of the outstanding balance.

The main dispute concerned the validity and enforceability of certain fees and charges levied by the plaintiff, particularly those related to mortgage renewals and default.

The court found that most fees were contractually agreed to and enforceable, except for certain penalties (such as NSF fees) which were found to be unenforceable as penalties under the Interest Act and common law.

The court also found that the summary judgment process was appropriate in this case, as there were no genuine issues requiring a trial.

The defendant, Mark Andre Dajka, moved to dismiss a six-year-old action for delay under rules 24.01(1)(c) and 48.14(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that while the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, there was insufficient evidence of prejudice to the defendant’s ability to have a fair trial.

The motion to dismiss was therefore denied, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The court considered motions by the plaintiffs to keep their claim alive and by the defendants to dismiss for delay.

The action, commenced in 2016, had experienced significant periods of unexplained delay.

The court found the delay inordinate and inexcusable, and that the presumption of prejudice to the defendants had not been rebutted.

The plaintiffs' action was dismissed for delay under Rule 24.01(1)(c).

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff in a mortgage dispute involving the sale of a property and alleged construction deficiencies.

The court considered whether to release funds from the sale, vacate a writ of execution, set aside the default judgment, consolidate proceedings, and set a timetable for summary judgment.

Applying the established five-factor test, the court found the motion to set aside the default judgment was not brought promptly, lacked a plausible explanation for the default, and that the balance of prejudice and the integrity of the administration of justice weighed against granting the relief.

The motion was dismissed, but the court ordered the release of certain funds and vacated the writ of execution on consent.

No costs were awarded to either party.

The plaintiff, Gashtaseb Gholipour, sued Saeid Vahid Rezaei and Persia Bakery & Kabob for breach of a shareholder agreement.

The court found that Mr. Rezaei wrongfully excluded the plaintiff from the business, constituting a breach of contract.

The plaintiff was awarded reliance damages of $177,130.75, plus interest and costs, representing the start-up funds he invested in reliance on the agreement.

The court also addressed the winding up of the company and dismissed the counterclaim and crossclaim.

The court sentenced Pritpal Singh for trafficking and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, possession of opium, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The case involved a Garofoli application regarding the excision of unconstitutionally obtained evidence from an Information to Obtain (ITO), which was dismissed.

The court reviewed the applicable sentencing ranges for large-scale heroin trafficking, considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and imposed a global sentence of 13 years, with all sentences to run concurrently.

This is a sentencing decision following convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The defendant caused a collision by speeding and running a red light, resulting in significant injuries to an elderly passenger, though causation of death was not proven.

The jury acquitted the defendant of impaired driving.

The court considered the defendant's pro-social background and remorse against the serious nature of the offences and his poor driving record, including recent breaches of court orders.

The Crown sought a three-year prison sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, a $2,000 fine for the refusal offence, and a total driving prohibition of 2 years and 9.5 months, rejecting a conditional sentence due to the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The plaintiff initiated a negligence action against two psychiatrists following a tragic incident where their son killed their spouse.

The defendants sought to strike the claim.

The court determined that a duty of care related to the negligent treatment of the patient by the psychiatrists could not be established due to inherent conflicts of interest between the patient's best interests and those of third parties.

However, the court found that a claim based on a duty to warn third parties of a patient's danger was novel but arguable, particularly in light of the public safety exception to confidentiality.

Despite this, the duty to warn claim was struck with leave to re-plead, as it lacked sufficient factual particularity to meet the criteria for establishing such a duty.

The defendant, Gianmarco Di Luciano, was charged with refusal to provide a breath sample causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

The court, in a judge-alone trial, considered the requisite mens rea for refusal offences under s. 320.15(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that Parliament's 2018 amendment clarified the mens rea to be knowledge that a demand has been made.

The defendant was found to have known a demand was made and refused to comply, thus satisfying the mens rea for refusal simpliciter.

However, the court acquitted the defendant of the aggravated offence of refusal causing bodily harm, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew or was reckless as to whether the collision resulted in bodily harm, as the risk of injury did not rise above mere speculation given the information available to him at the time of refusal.

Mr. Walker pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg and possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm.

For the firearm offence, a joint submission resulted in a two-year net prison term.

For the Over 80 offence, while counsel agreed on the minimum fine and driving prohibition, they disagreed on whether Mr. Walker should receive credit for a 14-month pre-sentence driving prohibition.

The court, applying the reasoning from R. v. Basque, granted the credit, finding that the common law discretion to credit pre-sentence driving prohibitions applies and that failing to do so would result in double punishment.

L.F. pleaded guilty to five counts of historical offences: indecently assaulting four young females between 1977-1983, and assaulting a young male in 1992-1993, while in positions of trust as an elementary teacher and librarian.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court considered the significant gravity of the offences, the profound harm to the victims as detailed in their victim impact statements, and the offender's breach of trust.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age (75), lack of prior criminal record, genuine remorse, and a guilty plea that spared the victims from testifying about traumatic historical events.

The court determined that a conditional sentence of two years less one day, followed by three years of probation, would adequately meet the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence, given the unique circumstances of the case.

Ancillary orders included a weapons prohibition, DNA order, and Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance.