ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
COLIN STOKES
Defendant
Avik K. Ghosh for the Crown
Yonatan Eshetu for Mr. Stokes
HEARD: January 7, 2026
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
C. BOSWELL J.
This written ruling is to be considered the official version and takes precedence over the oral reasons read into the record. If there are any discrepancies between the oral and written versions, it is this official written ruling that is to be relied upon.
1Mr. Stokes was charged with one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. He entered a guilty plea on August 7, 2025. Sentencing was adjourned to October 22, 2025 to enable a pre-sentence report to be completed. The report was not yet completed at October 22, 2025 and sentencing submissions were adjourned to January 7, 2026 when they were completed. The following reasons explain the sentence imposed today.
Overview
2The circumstances of the offence are straightforward. Mr. Stokes was subject to police surveillance. That surveillance led to a warrant to search his residence. The search resulted in the discovery of 1,176.6 grams of cocaine in a duffle bag in the garage, over $65,000 in Canadian currency, and multiple cell phones. There is no dispute that Mr. Stokes was in possession of the drugs and currency. Nor is there any dispute that the amount of cocaine is consistent with trafficking.
3Cocaine is a controlled substance in Canada. It is an offence under s. 5 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (the “CDSA”), to possess it for the purpose of trafficking. Indeed, it is a very serious offence. Those convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking face a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
4In this instance, the Crown seeks a sentence of two years and two months in custody, along with a number of ancillary orders including a ten-year weapons prohibition, an order that Mr. Stokes provide a sample of his DNA, and a forfeiture order in relation to the seized drugs, money, and a motor vehicle.
5Defence counsel urges the court to impose a sentence of two years less one day. The ancillary orders are not disputed.
6At first blush it may appear that the parties’ positions are not far apart. Closer scrutiny reveals that they are significantly so. The Crown’s position would see Mr. Stokes serve time in the penitentiary. The defence position is that the sentence should be served in the community, pursuant to a Conditional Sentence Order.
7The following reasons explain the sentence imposed today.
The Principles and Purposes of Sentencing
8The fundamental purpose of sentencing for offences under the CDSA is set out at s. 10 of that Act. Specifically, it is “to contribute to the respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society while encouraging rehabilitation, and treatment in appropriate circumstances, of offenders and acknowledging the harm done to victims and to the community.”
9Achieving that fundamental purpose requires the court to consider certain sentencing objectives. There is no dispute that the most significant objectives in play here are denunciation of Mr. Stokes’ offending, deterring him and others from engaging in similar offending in the future, and, given that he is a youthful, first-time offender, rehabilitation.
10Sentencing is an inherently individualized exercise. Arriving at a fit and just sentence that achieves the fundament purpose of sentencing and meets the objectives I have just mentioned, requires the court to carefully consider the circumstances of the offence and of the offender (including any aggravating and mitigating circumstances), as well as the impact of the offence on the community. In doing so, the court must fashion a sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offending and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
11Proportionate sentences serve the fundamental purpose of sentencing. They also reflect the key elements of censure and restraint. As Justice LeBel observed in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, at para. 37, a sentence must promote justice for victims and enhance public confidence in the administration of justice. At the same time, it should not exceed what is appropriate in light of the moral blameworthiness of the offender. The principle of restraint directs the court to impose the least intrusive sentence and the shortest duration necessary to achieve a just, fit and proportionate sentence. See R. v. Hamilton (2004), 2004 5549 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.) at paras. 95-96.
12Inherent in the concept of proportionality is the principle of parity. Imposing sentences proportionate to the gravity of offences and the moral blameworthiness of offenders requires the court, on the one hand, to recognize where there are material differences between different offenders and different offences. On the other hand, any sentence imposed must be similar to those imposed on offenders who have committed similar offences with equivalent moral blameworthiness. See R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 32.
Mr. Stokes’ Circumstances
13I earlier described the straightforward but serious nature of Mr. Stokes’ offending. I will take a moment now to discuss his personal circumstances. Most of what follows comes from the Pre-Sentence Report of Probation and Parole Officer, Michaela Wilson, dated December 30, 2025.
14Mr. Stokes is 22 years old. He was just shy of 20 years old at the time of his arrest. He has no criminal record.
15Each of Mr. Stokes’ parents was raised in a dysfunctional environment. His mother’s father was murdered when she was 12. Her stepfather was an alcoholic. She spent her teenaged years in foster care. Her three sisters all struggled with drug addiction, and all are deceased.
16Mr. Stokes’ father grew up with alcoholic parents and became an alcoholic himself.
17Mr. Stokes’ parents struggled with mental health and financial issues. He struggled himself with anxiety and was hyper-concerned about financial issues.
18His parents separated when he was 15. He initially lived with his mother but moved in with his father after his mother moved in with a new partner. His father continued to struggle with mental health issues and alcoholism. About a year prior to Mr. Stokes’ arrest, there was a suspicious fire at his father’s home. Mr. Stokes awoke in the middle of the night to find the home on fire. His father had been extremely intoxicated that evening. Mr. Stokes wondered whether his father deliberately set the fire, despite the fact that he was in the home. The fire was a prime motivator for Mr. Stokes to move out of his father’s residence.
19It was after he moved out of his father’s residence that Mr. Stokes got into the business of selling cocaine. He advised the author of the Pre-Sentence Report that he was groomed into selling drugs by a close friend. When the friend went to jail, an opportunity arose to assume his business. His involvement in the drug trade was motivated by financial reasons.
20Mr. Stokes was released on bail shortly after his arrest. He has been subject to bail release conditions for almost three years. For the first year, he was subject to a house arrest provision. That was subsequently varied to a curfew that required him to be in his surety’s residence each night from 10:00 p.m. to the following morning at 5:00 a.m.
21Following his release, Mr. Stokes moved back in with his father, who was initially his residential surety. However, his father committed suicide in the summer of 2025, necessitating a move to the residence of a family friend and a change in sureties.
22Despite the challenges he has faced, Mr. Stokes has made significant efforts to rehabilitate himself subsequent to his arrest. For starters, he cut ties with those individuals who were a negative influence in his life.
23He completed a two-year business program at Durham College where he was an honour roll student and graduated first overall in his class.
24Since August 2023, he has been employed as a mechanic at a trailer company. His employer wrote to the court in his support and expressed that he is an integral and essential part of their business. Indeed, concern was expressed that his incarceration would result in significant hardship to the business.
25Mr. Stokes has also engaged in counselling and has gained insight into his offending and the factors that led him into drug dealing. His therapy has focused on early life instability, trauma and adversity, core beliefs and emotional patterns, taking responsibility and making value-aligned decisions. He has also been volunteering in the community.
26Defence counsel filed some 10 other letters in support of Mr. Stokes, from family members, friends, roommates, and educators. He is consistently described as kind, respectful, responsible, fair, helpful, honest, and accountable. Many make note of the significant personal changes he has undergone since his arrest, in an effort to turn his life around.
27Mr. Stokes made compelling submissions to the court when offered his right of allocution. He expressed deep remorse for his conduct. He is ashamed about his involvement in the drug trade. He acknowledged the harm he caused and that he sold drugs to addicts and to people with instabilities. He recognizes that his family have carried a heavy burden as a result of his conduct and the charges against him. He understands the gravity of the offence he committed and that he must face the consequences, however, he very much wants to continue to build a positive future.
Discussion
28Trafficking in cocaine is a serious offence. It is not a victimless offence. Cocaine is an insidious drug. It is addictive and destructive. Its importation, distribution, and sale are associated with other aspects of criminality, some violent. It is a source of significant misery in our community.
29The seriousness of the offence informs the sentencing range applicable to cases where the offender possesses a significant amount of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. To be clear, Mr. Stokes possessed a significant amount of cocaine. He was also in possession of substantial funds which undoubtedly reflected the proceeds of the sale of other, significant amounts of cocaine. He was what I would describe as a mid-level trafficker.
30The Court of Appeal has been relatively clear about the applicable range of sentence for mid-level traffickers. In R. v. Bryan, 2011 ONCA 273, a case cited by Crown counsel, they held that a sentence of 5 to 8 years would normally apply where someone, without a record, is convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, where the amount was in excess of one pound. Mr. Stokes was in possession of more than 2 ½ pounds.
31Similarly, in R. v. Bajada, 2003 15687 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 721 (C.A.), Weiler J.A. observed that sentences of 5 to 5 ½ years “are not uncommon for possession of a substantial amount of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking following an accused’s plea of guilty or where the accused has no prior criminal record.”
32The range of sentence identified by the Court of Appeal is now well-settled and is routinely applied by trial courts in this province.
33That said, while defined ranges aid the court in identifying a proportionate sentence, and in honouring the parity principle, they are not written in stone. As the Supreme Court held in R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, at para. 57, ranges are not “straitjackets” but instead are “nothing more than summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past”. In that way they act as “historical portraits for the use of sentencing judges.”
34Appellate courts have repeatedly emphasized that sentencing is an inherently individualized exercise. There are inevitably occasions where the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case, including the circumstances of the particular offender, situate it either above or below the normal range of sentence.
35Crown and defence counsel are agreed that the circumstances of this case situate it below the normal range of sentence. As I noted, though Crown counsel asserted, correctly in my view, that the starting point is a five-year penitentiary sentence, a 26-month sentence was ultimately sought. Crown counsel explained that Mr. Stokes’ personal history, coupled with his exemplary efforts to turn his life around, support a reduced sentence of 3 years in the penitentiary. That sentence is further mitigated, in the Crown’s submission, by a 10-month reduction to reflect the length of time Mr. Stokes has been on bail, and the restrictive release conditions he has been subject to.
36Defence counsel argued that a sentence of two years less a day, or roughly two months less than the Crown’s submission, is fit and proportionate in all the circumstances. Should the court impose a sentence under two years, Mr. Stokes, in his counsel’s submission, should be permitted to serve it in the community, pursuant to a Conditional Sentence Order.
37Defence counsel referred the court to several cases where conditional sentences of two years less a day have been imposed despite the fact that the offender possessed significant amounts of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. I will comment on them in some detail because the details matter.
38In R. v. Pang, 2010 BCCA 500, the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on a 29-year-old male convicted, following a jury trial, of possession of 1.35 kg of methamphetamine. Mr. Pang sold drugs to support his own addiction. By the time of sentencing, Mr. Pang had turned his life around. He was working in a management position at a restaurant owned by his parents. He was remorseful and had substantial family support. The sentencing judge concluded that Mr. Pang’s significant progress towards rehabilitation would be best supported by permitting him to serve his sentence in the community.
39In R. v. Kelly, 2022 ONSC 5500, Woollcombe J. imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day on a 29-year-old female offender found guilty by a jury of attempting to import one kilogram of cocaine and attempting to possess the cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. She was 23 at the time of the offences. Woollcombe J. identified several significant mitigating factors including: (1) the offender’s role in the offence was secondary – her function was to pick up the cocaine and deliver it to someone else; (2) the offender was a relatively young, first time offender; (3) she had faced social and economic disadvantages in her life; (4) she had experienced systemic and personal racism as a young, Black female; (5) she had a wide and supportive network of family and friends; and (6) she had worked significantly to rehabilitate herself since being charged. The Crown had sought a sentence of three years.
40In R. v. Gorman, 2013 NLSC 34, Boone J. of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day on a 34-year-old, first-time offender convicted by a jury of possession of two kilograms of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. Though the amount of cocaine was significant, Mr. Gorman’s role in the offence was limited to picking up a parcel containing cocaine at a UPS mailbox and passing it off to another person, in exchange for a $400 payment. He was described as having a solid work and education history and good prospects for future employment. Boone J. determined that a proportionate sentence would be two years less a day and that a conditional sentence would serve the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence and would better serve the objective of rehabilitation than would incarceration. The Crown had sought a sentence of 30 months.
41In R. v. Collins, 2023 ONSC 5768, Code J. imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day on a 29-year-old repeat offender who had entered guilty pleas to five counts: trafficking cocaine; possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking; possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm; breach of a s. 109 weapons prohibition order; and possession of the proceeds of crime. The amount of cocaine seized by the police on two separate occasions totalled 67 grams, which situated Mr. Collins in the gram-level, street dealer category of offender.
42The sentence imposed was considerably less than the usual range applicable to the offences Mr. Collins was convicted of, which would easily have been between 5 and 8 years. Code J. identified a number of mitigating circumstances, however, that had a significant impact on his sentencing decision. They included:
(i) Mr. Collins’ guilty plea;
(ii) Mr. Collins had experienced a difficult upbringing. His mother was a 17-year-old stripper at the time of his birth. She was unable to care for him. His father was in and out of jail when Mr. Collins was young. He ended up being raised by a stepmother. His birth mother was subsequently murdered and dismembered when he was 13. A year later his best friend was murdered. He was also the victim of a number of armed robberies. In 2019, Mr. Collins was the victim of a shooting. He was pursued by two assailants who shot 40 times at his car. He was injured but survived;
(iii) Mr. Collins had strong community and family support;
(iv) Since being charged with the index offences, Mr. Collins had turned his life around. He became a father and embraced that role. He began to write and record rap music. He became reasonably successful and was earning a decent living from his music;
(v) During the course of their investigation, the police had committed two serious breaches of Mr. Collins’ Charter rights, under ss. 8 and 10(b); and
(vi) Mr. Collins had spent 20 months subject to a house arrest bail provision.
43Code J. considered a series of cases where conditional sentences had been imposed in drug trafficking cases, despite being below the usual range of sentence. He concluded, at para. 90 of his decision, that “exceptionally strong mitigating circumstances, relating to both diminished moral culpability and the complete reformation of the accused while on bail, can justify a departure from the normal need for substantial jail sentences in firearms possession and drug trafficking cases.”
44In Mr. Stokes’ case, there are, of course, significant aggravating features. That said, Crown and defence counsel are clearly agreed that there are very significant mitigating circumstances present as well.
45By way of aggravation, Mr. Stokes made an informed decision to engage in serious criminality. This is not a case, like Pang, where he sold drugs to support his own addiction. His involvement in the cocaine trade was entirely commercial. And the amount of cocaine he possessed, for the purpose of trafficking, was substantial.
46By way of mitigation:
(i) Mr. Stokes was a youthful, first-time offender;
(ii) He faced numerous challenges in his life, growing up;
(iii) He entered a guilty plea and took responsibility for his conduct;
(iv) He has engaged in counselling and has gained genuine insight into his offending, both in terms of the factors that led to his offending and into the harm that his offending caused in the community;
(v) He has spent roughly three years subject to bail conditions. For the first year, he was subject to house arrest. For the balance, he has been subject to a curfew;
(vi) He has substantial support in the community, including from his family and from his employer; and
(vii) He has taken remarkable steps to rehabilitate himself and turn his life around. I have every confidence that Mr. Stokes will not re-offend or find himself before the court again.
47There are certainly exceptionally strong mitigating circumstances present here. That said, what makes this sentencing so difficult is that, despite those exceptionally strong mitigating circumstances, the gravity of the offending was quite significant.
48The difference between counsel’s positions in terms of the proposed length of the sentence is minor. Both their positions factor in the mitigating circumstances present. What is really in issue is whether, in light of the gravity of the offending, the objectives of denunciation and deterrence demand that a jail sentence be imposed, or whether a conditional sentence is capable of meeting those objectives in the circumstances of this case.
49After much anxious consideration, I have concluded that a conditional sentence of two years less one day, with strict conditions, coupled with a three-year period of probation, is capable of meeting the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, and at the same time recognizes Mr. Stokes’ exceptional efforts towards rehabilitation. In my view, incarcerating Mr. Stokes in the penitentiary would be counter productive to his rehabilitation and is not necessary to meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.
50The jurisprudence recognizes that conditional sentences are jail sentences, though they are served in the community. Where stringent conditions are imposed, and when combined with a period of probation, conditional sentences may, in fact, impose greater burdens on offenders than traditional jail sentences. See R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, at paras. 40-41. Conditional sentences are, for instance, not subject to reduction through parole. The proposal here, which I accept, is that Mr. Stokes be subject to a house arrest provision for the whole of the period of the Conditional Sentence Order.
51In the result, I impose a sentence of two years less one day, to be served in the community, pursuant to a Conditional Sentence Order. Such an order will not, in my view, endanger the community in any way, given Mr. Stokes’ extraordinary efforts at rehabilitation.
52The terms of the conditional sentence order shall include:
Keep the peace and be of good behavior;
Appear before the court when required;
Report to a supervisor within 72 hours of the signing of this order and thereafter as required;
Remain within the jurisdiction of the court unless written permission to go outside that jurisdiction is obtained from the court or the supervisor;
Notify the court or the supervisor in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court and the supervisor of any change of employment or occupation;
Attend counseling as directed by your supervisor and sign any release necessary for your supervisor to monitor your progress; and
Throughout the term of the Conditional Sentence Order, remain in your residence at all times except:
(a) for medical emergencies involving you or a member of your immediate family;
(b) for travel directly to, directly from, and while attending at counseling sessions or at your place of employment;
(c) with advance written permission from your supervisor; or
(d) Sundays from 11 a.m to 3 p.m. for the purpose of obtaining the necessaries of life.
53A three-year period of probation will follow the completion of the conditional sentence. The terms of the probation will include:
Keep the peace and be of good behavior;
Appear before the court when required;
Notify the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the probation officer of any change of employment or occupation;
Attend counseling as directed by the probation officer and sign any release necessary for the probation officer to monitor your progress; and
Perform 100 hours of community service.
54In addition, the following ancillary orders are imposed:
A DNA order;
A weapons prohibition order for ten years; and
A forfeiture order in the form signed by me today.
Justice C. Boswell
Released: January 27, 2026