CITATION: Sun v. Teefy, 2026 ONSC 4068
COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00732806-0000
DATE: 20260713
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MEI SUN and XIAOFEI XING
Plaintiffs
– and –
TEEFY DEVELOPMENT, IAN LATIMER, REX (WENMING) CHENG, and JAMES (HAITO) WANG
Defendants
Mei Sun and Xiaofei Xing in person
Lucas H. Strezos and Susanne M. Balpataky for Teefy Developments (Bathurst Glen) Limited
Evan Farrugia for Rex (Wenming) Cheng
Scott K. Gfeller for James (Haito) Wang
HEARD: July 10, 2026
RULING ON DEFENCE MOTIONS TO DISMISS
C. boswell j.
[1] There is a well-known adage, known as the First Law of Holes, that states “if you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.”
[2] Ms. Sun found herself in a hole after she agreed to buy a new home in the fall of 2016 that she was unable to afford. Come closing date, she defaulted. She was sued by the vendor, and a judgment was rendered against her for almost a quarter of a million dollars. It was a tragedy and financially devastating for her. Since the judgment, she has kept digging, in a search for some way to undo it. Her efforts have been met with consistently poor results.
[3] This action appears to be the fifth initiated by Ms. Sun following the judgment against her in February 2021. Four previous attempts to relitigate the case have been struck or dismissed. Numerous costs orders have been made against her along the way.
[4] This action was dismissed on consent against Mr. Latimer on May 11, 2026. The balance of the defendants now move to strike or dismiss it on a variety of grounds, which I will describe in some detail below. For the reasons that follow, their motions are granted. The plaintiffs’ claim is struck.
OVERVIEW
The Purchase and Sale Agreement
[5] The Toronto real estate market was hot in 2016. Ms. Sun got caught up in it. Teefy Development (“Teefy”) was building new homes in Vaughan, Ontario near her place of employment. She was interested to take a look at them. Mr. Wang was a realtor and someone Ms. Sun had known for about a decade. She enlisted his help in getting her into Teefy’s sales office on September 15, 2016. On that day, Teefy’s sales representatives were hosting a broker event for real estate agents. While there, Ms. Sun met Mr. Cheng and spoke to him about Teefy’s properties.
[6] Mr. Cheng was not a sales representative for Teefy. He was one of a number of agents attending their broker event. But it appears he spoke with Ms. Sun at the event and encouraged her to purchase a property from Teefy. He suggested to her that she would easily be able to assign the agreement to a third party should she elect not to proceed with the purchase herself. She did not know that Teefy was paying referral fees to agents in the amount of $25,000 per purchase. Mr. Cheng no doubt was incentivized to get Ms. Sun’s signature on the dotted line, so to speak, and he succeeded in doing so.
[7] Ms. Sun signed an agreement of purchase and sale on September 15, 2016, for a home to be constructed. The purchase price was roughly $1.54 million. The closing date was July 9, 2018. By the next day she was having significant buyer’s remorse and asked Mr. Cheng if she could get out of the deal. He said no but again suggested that she could later assign it if she needed or wanted to.
[8] Ms. Sun thereafter continued to make deposits on the purchase agreement through to January 2017. In total she deposited $150,000.
[9] It eventually became clear that Ms. Sun would not qualify for mortgage financing and would be unable to raise the funds to complete the purchase. In the meantime, the real estate market cooled off significantly. In a suddenly falling marking, assignment of her purchase agreement proved not to be feasible.
[10] The closing date was extended on several occasions, ultimately landing on November 7, 2018. Ms. Sun was unable to complete the transaction due to a lack of funds and she breached the deal.
The Trial
[11] Teefy subsequently sold the property for $1.2 million, some $340,000 less than Ms. Sun had agreed to pay. They sued her for the difference in an action commenced November 16, 2018, in file CV-18-00000221.
[12] The trial was heard before Lemon J. on December 3 and 4, 2020. He released a decision on February 2, 2021, which awarded Teefy damages in the amount of $240,562.78, inclusive of pre-judgment interest, plus $30,000 in costs.
[13] Ms. Sun attempted to appeal the judgment, but she did so out of time. A motion to the Court of Appeal to extend the time to appeal was dismissed by Nordheimer J.A. on December 6, 2021, with costs of $7,500. One of the reasons cited by Nordheimer J.A. was that the proposed appeal lacked merit. Ms. Sun sought a panel review of his ruling. The panel review was dismissed on May 27, 2022, with costs of $5,700. Ms. Sun sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Her motion for leave was dismissed on May 18, 2023, with costs.
The Lawsuits that Followed
[14] On March 30, 2022, Ms. Sun commenced action CV-22-00679129, naming Mr. Cheng and Mr. Wang as defendants, along with the brokerages they worked for. In that action, she claimed general damages of $2 million plus aggravated, exemplary and punitive damages of $1 million. The claim appears to have been grounded in alleged negligence and breaches of fiduciary duties allegedly owed by Mr. Cheng and Mr. Wang to Ms. Sun. Though she avoided pleading that Cheng and Wang were her agents with respect to the purchase from Teefy, it is hard not to conclude that such an agency relationship was asserted.
[15] In any event, the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim on the basis that it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B. Their motion came before Morgan J. on May 2, 2023. On May 3, 2023, he released an endorsement granting the motion. He found that Ms. Sun was aware or should have been aware through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of the assertion that Cheng and Wang were her agents at the time of her pleading in the Teefy action in 2018. Her claim against them in 2022 was out of time. He dismissed it with costs to Mr. Cheng in the amount of $5,500 and costs to Mr. Wang in the amount of $11,800.
[16] Ms. Sun appealed the ruling of Morgan J. Her appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on January 29, 2024, with costs to Mr. Wang in the amount of $10,000 and costs to Mr. Cheng in the amount of $7,000. A motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed with costs on August 29, 2024.
[17] On February 1, 2023, Ms. Sun commenced action CV-23-00694000 against Teefy, Ru Nan Shi, and Ian Latimer. Ms. Shi had been Ms. Sun’s lawyer in the trial before Lemon J. Mr. Latimer had been Teefy’s lawyer during the same trial. In that action, she sought unspecified damages based on an allegation that there was a conspiracy between Teefy, Ms. Shi, and Mr. Latimer to cause Ms. Sun financial loss. She alleged that Ms. Shi received secret monetary benefits from Teefy and/or Mr. Latimer to purposefully sabotage her case before Lemon J.
[18] Ms. Sun was adjudged bankrupt on November 16, 2023.
[19] On October 28, 2024, Ms. Sun commenced action CV-24-00730092 against Ms. Shi. I am not certain what the basis of that claim was, but nothing turns on it.
[20] On June 2, 2025, at the request of Ms. Shi, Merritt J. dismissed both actions CV-23-00694000 and CV-24-00730092 pursuant to r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that Ms. Sun did not have the capacity, in light of her bankruptcy, to commence or continue either of those actions.
[21] On October 30, 2024, Ms. Sun and her husband, Xiaofei Xing, commenced action CV-24-00730261 against Teefy. The claim is lengthy and unfocused. It is not clear what relief was sought nor on what basis it was sought.
[22] On June 27, 2025, Schabas J. struck action CV-24-00730261, pursuant to r. 2.1, on the basis that it was an abuse of process. He found that absent a “clear, concise and intelligible pleading,” the action would be struck. He gave the plaintiffs leave to re-plead provided they did so in a clear, concise and intelligible statement not exceeding 10 pages. They have not done so.
[23] On December 9, 2024, Ms. Sun and her husband commenced the claim now before the court in action CV-24-00732806, against Teefy, Mr. Latimer, Mr. Cheng and Mr. Wang. As I noted, it has been dismissed, on consent, against Mr. Latimer.
[24] On March 6, 2025, Callaghan J. declined to strike the plaintiffs’ claim in this action under r. 2.1 on the basis that it was “not practical for the court to wade through the claim to determine what if any causes of action” were properly pled. He suggested that the defendants’ complaints about the defects in the pleadings would best be addressed by way of a r. 20 or r. 21 motion.
THE MOTIONS
[25] The three remaining defendants all move to strike or dismiss the current action against them.
[26] Teefy moves under r. 21 for an order striking the plaintiffs’ claim on the basis that Ms. Sun was an undischarged bankrupt at the time the action was commenced and on the basis of issue or cause of action estoppel. Alternatively, Teefy moves under r. 20 for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim.
[27] Mr. Cheng and Mr. Wang each move to strike the claim under r. 21 on the basis that it is an abuse of process, more specifically because it is a collateral attack on the judgment of Lemon J. dated February 2, 2021, and the ruling of Morgan J. made May 3, 2023. In the alternative, they move to strike it on the basis that Ms. Sun was an undischarged bankrupt when it began and that Mr. Xing has no cause of action given that he was not involved in any of the transactions at issue in the claim. In the further alternative, they ask that the claim be struck on the basis of cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel. Finally, and in the further alternative, they seek summary judgment dismissing the claim.
[28] Ms. Sun moves for leave to amend her Statement of Claim in accordance with a draft Amended Statement of Claim uploaded to CaseCentre.
[29] In defence of the motions, Ms. Sun argues that:
(a) Her claim, as presently constituted, is not a rehashing of old grievances. Rather it is now framed as an action for damages for personal injuries. In particular, she seeks damages for psychological distress, reputational harm, loss of earning capacity, and loss of vision. It is about the defendants being held accountable for ten years of personal suffering she has endured. As I understand her position, that suffering has been the result of, amongst other things:
(i) being taken advantage of when the agreement of purchase and sale was initially entered into;
(ii) a mistake made by Lemon J. in determining that Mr. Cheng and Mr. Wang were her agents in relation to the purchase agreement;
(iii) fraud being committed by Mr. Cheng in forging her signature on a mortgage approval document and by Mr. Wang in forging her signature on a referral agreement; and
(iv) documents, in particular significant text messages, being altered or omitted from the record. These documents would purportedly support Ms. Sun’s position that Mr. Cheng and Mr. Wang were not buyer-side agents;
(b) Her claim should not be dismissed on the basis of a lack of capacity because the claims she advances are for personal injuries and not related to property. As such, they did not vest in her trustee;
(c) Her husband’s claim is separate and distinct from hers and relates to financial losses he has incurred as a result of the failed real estate transaction and its aftermath; and
(d) None of the issues before the court should be decided summarily. This is a complex matter that can only be fairly resolved on a full and accurate record.
DISCUSSION
[30] As I indicated at the outset of this ruling, I am satisfied that the plaintiffs’ claims must be struck. It is unnecessary to analyze each of the arguments advanced by the defendants. That said, there are several routes to the same result that, in my view, are relatively obvious. I will focus the balance of the ruling on them.
The Application of Rule 25
[31] Rule 25.06(1) provides that every pleading is to contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved. The plaintiffs claim fails in this respect rather spectacularly. It consists of 198 paragraphs over 58 pages. It is rambling, unfocused and essentially represents a stream of consciousness relating to all of the plaintiffs’ long held grievances.
[32] I appreciate that the plaintiffs are self-represented. They are not schooled in the fine art of legal drafting. Moreover, English is not their first language. They are undoubtedly doing their best to be clear and comprehensive. But the claim, as drafted, simply cannot stand.
[33] As I observed in Covello v. 2624221 Ontario Inc., 2022 ONSC 5467, at para. 40, it is well-settled that a statement of claim should serve the following functions:
(a) It should define with clarity and precision the question in controversy;
(b) It should give fair notice to the defendant of the precise case to be met and the precise remedies sought; and,
(c) It should assist the truth-finding function of the process.
See McCarthy Corp. PLC v. KPMG LLP, [2005] O.J. No. 3017, at para. 20, citing National Trust Co. v. Furbacher, [1994] O.J. No. 2385 at para. 9.
[34] The plaintiffs’ claim does not accomplish any of these things.
[35] It is all but impossible to discern exactly what the asserted cause of action is. The claim is confusing and prolix. It would be unfair to require the defendants to plead to this claim, or to attempt to manage discovery in its context.
[36] Rule 25.11 grants the court discretion to strike out all or part of a pleading, with or without leave to re-plead, where it may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action. Here, the claim, as drafted, would clearly prejudice the fair trial of the action and it must be struck out on that basis.
[37] I note that I have reviewed the draft Amended Statement of Claim and it suffers from all of the same problems I have identified here. Leave to amend the claim in accordance with that draft is, accordingly, refused.
[38] In light of my decision to strike the claim under r. 25, I could end my ruling here. But there are other significant impediments to this claim continuing and they inform my decision not to grant leave to the plaintiffs to re-plead and so I will move on to address them.
The Application of Rule 21.01(1)(b)
[39] Rule 21.01 provides as follows:
(1) A party may move before a judge,
(a) for the determination, before trial, of a question of law raised by a pleading in an action where the determination of the question may dispose of all or part of the action, substantially shorten the trial or result in a substantial saving of costs; or
(b) to strike out a pleading on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence,
and the judge may make an order or grant judgment accordingly.
[40] No evidence is permitted on a motion under r. 21.01(1)(b). Before striking a claim under that subrule, I must be satisfied, assuming the allegations made in the Statement of Claim are true, that it is plain and obvious that it discloses no reasonable cause of action. In other words, that it has no reasonable prospect of success. See Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, at para. 33.
[41] I focus here on the claims of Mr. Xing. I am satisfied, on the face of the pleadings, that his claims have no reasonable prospect of success.
[42] There is no discernable, viable cause of action pleaded by Mr. Xing against any of the defendants. Though I accept that he has suffered financially, his losses are directly traceable to the significant judgment and subsequent bankruptcy of his wife, not as a result of any actionable wrong against him.
[43] Mr. Xing was not a party to the real estate transaction at the heart of these proceedings. He had no relationship of any sort with any of the defendants. He is unable to assert any form of breach of contract. Moreover, he has not alleged that he was in a relationship of sufficient proximity to one or more of the defendants such that a duty of care might be imposed against them in his favour. Nor could he reasonably make such an assertion, in my view. In short, there is no viable legal basis available to support Mr. Xing’s claims.
[44] Mr. Xing’s claims are accordingly struck under r. 21.01(b).
Abuse of Process
[45] The court has the discretion to strike out a claim that constitutes an abuse of process. That discretion is grounded in the court’s inherent jurisdiction, as well as Rules 21.01(3) and 25.11(c).
[46] The defendants’ assertion is that the claim is an abuse of process because it constitutes a collateral attack on the judgment of Lemon J. in action CV-18-00000221, as well as on the ruling of Morgan J. in action CV-22-00679129.
[47] The Supreme Court recently considered the collateral attack and abuse of process doctrines in Resler v. Anglin, 2026 SCC 23. They made the following pertinent observations:
(a) The purpose of the collateral attack doctrine is to bar a second proceeding when a party, bound by an order, seeks to avoid compliance with that order by challenging the order itself and its enforceability, not directly but indirectly in a separate forum (Para. 28);
(b) The scope of the collateral attack doctrine is narrow and focuses on the order itself and its enforceability (Para. 44);
(c) The applicable test is whether the object of the proceeding is to reverse, vary or nullify an order or judgment made in a previous collateral proceeding that has not been varied or set aside on appeal (Para. 29);
(d) The collateral attack doctrine is primarily concerned with protecting the justice system rather than the interests of individual litigants (Para. 32);
(e) Similarly, the abuse of process doctrine is concerned with preserving the integrity of the court’s adjudicative processes. It is, however, broader than the collateral attack doctrine. It “is a flexible principle that engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation before it or would in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute” (Para. 46); and
(f) The abuse of process doctrine is a part of the court’s inherent jurisdiction. It has been used to “bar relitigation in circumstances where the strict specific requirements of issue estoppel or cause of action estoppel are not satisfied, yet allowing the claim to proceed would offend principles of judicial economy, consistency and finality” (Para. 46).
[48] Ms. Sun strenuously objects to the characterization of her claim as a collateral attack on any prior proceedings. She urges the court to conclude that she is advancing new claims, not previously adjudicated upon.
[49] It is debatable whether the plaintiffs’ claim is an attempt to reverse, vary or nullify an order made in a prior, collateral proceeding. It certainly appears so to me, at least in relation to the judgment of Lemon J., which stands as the fountainhead of all the proceedings that subsequently ensued.
[50] At any rate, the claim is clearly an abuse of process. The plaintiffs are clearly trying – and have been trying now for five years, through a variety of proceedings – to indirectly undo the consequences of the Lemon J. judgment.
[51] Teefy’s claim in action CV-18-00000221 was a simple one. They had an agreement of purchase and sale with Ms. Sun. She failed to complete the transaction. Liability was straightforward, as was the calculation of damages. The trial took only two days.
[52] Ms. Sun’s main defence is that she was a vulnerable purchaser, who was taken advantage of by Teefy’s agents and unfairly induced to enter the agreement. The fact is, this defence was untenable. She was not a vulnerable purchaser. Moreover, she had little direct contact with Teefy’s agents.
[53] Ms. Sun simply cannot shake the factual finding that Mr. Cheng was her agent and not the agent of Teefy. Lemon J. provided clear and compelling reasons for his conclusion. It is one I agree with. Teefy had its own, retained sales agents. Mr. Cheng was not one of them. It is really no more complicated than that.
[54] Nevertheless, Ms. Sun has been trying to revisit the characterization of Mr. Cheng, and Mr. Wang, as her agents for five years now. She wants a do-over of the trial that took place before Lemon J. And she is simply not going to get that.
[55] The claim must be struck as an abuse of process.
The Limitations Issue
[56] Action CV-22-00679129, which Ms. Sun previously advanced against Mr. Cheng and Mr. Wang, was found, by Morgan J., to have been statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002. There are no allegations advanced in the present proceeding that were not advanced, or could have been advanced, in CV-22-00679129.
[57] If the proceedings against Mr. Cheng and Mr. Wang were statute-barred in 2022, they certainly remain statute-barred in 2026. Any claims advanced against them must be dismissed under r. 20. There can be no issue requiring a trial when the claims are statute-barred.
Leave to Re-Plead
[58] If the sole problem with the claim was that it was confusing and prolix, it would be necessary for the court to seriously consider whether it might be possible for it to be reconstituted in a concise and focused manner. But given the other bases I have set out to either dismiss or strike the plaintiffs’ claim, it would not be appropriate to permit the plaintiffs to attempt to reconstitute it.
[59] In fact, it is time for the plaintiffs to let the litigation go and to try to get on with their lives. They have been singularly unsuccessful in all of their attempts to relitigate the case. And they will continue to be unsuccessful. They have incurred substantial costs awards and will incur more costs in relation to this failed proceeding. It is time to stop digging.
COSTS
[60] I will consider the parties’ written submissions on costs. The defendants are each to serve and file costs submissions limited to a maximum of two pages, by July 27, 2026. The plaintiffs are to serve and file their costs submissions by August 10, 2026. Their submissions are limited to a maximum of three pages. No reply submissions are invited. Submissions should be uploaded to CaseCentre.
Boswell J.
Released: July 13, 2026