R. Cary Boswell

The offender was convicted of conspiring to import 300 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The Crown sought a sentence of 15 to 16 years, while the defence argued for a significantly lower sentence based on the offender's limited role and the principle of parity with co-conspirators.

The court found that the offender played a minor role in the conspiracy and noted that co-conspirators with greater involvement received or were facing sentences of 5 to 6.5 years.

Applying the principles of proportionality and parity, the court determined a fit sentence was 8 years, reduced to 7.5 years to account for strict pre-sentence bail conditions.

K.P. was convicted, following guilty pleas, of sexual assault of a female under 16, making child pornography, and extortion, all arising from a sexual relationship with a young female, B.C., which included grooming, luring, and a threat to disseminate a sexual video.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the victim's age (13-15), K.P.'s position as a family friend, the extended period and invasive nature of the sexual activity, and the creation and threatened use of child pornography.

Mitigating factors included K.P. being a first-time offender, having family support, facing immigration consequences, and entering a guilty plea.

Applying the principles of denunciation and deterrence, and guided by sentencing ranges for similar offences, the court imposed a global sentence of five years imprisonment, along with various ancillary orders including DNA orders, a weapons prohibition, SOIRA compliance, and a no-contact order with the victim.

The defendant, Cody Moreau, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the application of Gladue principles.

The court found the Gladue principles inapplicable due to insufficient objective evidence of Indigenous ancestry or connection to an Indigenous community.

The offence involved extreme violence, a two-on-one attack, and stomping on a helpless victim, resulting in severe head injury.

Moreau had a prior conviction for assault causing bodily harm and was on probation at the time.

Despite mitigating factors such as a difficult upbringing, substance abuse issues, and efforts towards rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of 30 months imprisonment, along with a DNA order and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The defendant, Dajour Campbell, was convicted after trial of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and flight from police.

The conviction for simple possession of fentanyl was conditionally stayed.

The Crown sought a sentence of 6-8 years for the drug offence and a consecutive 4-month sentence for the driving offences.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence of less than two years for the drug offence, contending that Campbell's lack of knowledge that the substance was fentanyl (believing it to be Percocet) should mitigate his moral blameworthiness, and a concurrent 90-day intermittent sentence for the driving offences.

The court imposed a sentence of 3 years for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and 3 months concurrent for dangerous driving and flight from police, to be served consecutively to the drug offence, for a total of 39 months imprisonment.

The court rejected the argument that Campbell's lack of knowledge about the specific controlled substance (fentanyl vs. Percocet) mitigated his moral blameworthiness, citing jurisprudence that knowledge of a controlled substance is sufficient.

The court also declined to apply systemic racism as a mitigating factor without a demonstrated linkage to the offences.

The defendant, Gianmarco Di Luciano, brought a motion to re-open a pre-trial Charter application, seeking to exclude evidence of his refusal to provide a breath sample.

The basis for the motion was an alleged material change in circumstances, specifically that the arresting officer, PC Shannon Swiderski, had embellished her testimony at trial regarding the odour of alcohol, thereby undermining her credibility and the lawfulness of the initial arrest and subsequent breath demand.

The court found that while the officer's trial testimony was indeed an embellishment, it did not constitute a material change that would have likely altered the original finding that she had honest, subjective, and objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand.

Consequently, the motion to re-open the Charter application was dismissed.

The accused, Pritpal Singh, was tried for multiple drug trafficking and possession offences alongside a Garofoli application challenging several search warrants.

The court dismissed the majority of the Garofoli application, finding that the accused did not have standing to seek excision of evidence obtained through the breach of a third party's Charter rights, and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) established reasonable grounds for most of the warrants.

Based on an Agreed Statement of Fact, the court found the accused guilty of trafficking heroin, possession of heroin and opium for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, relying on circumstantial evidence and the doctrine of constructive possession.

The co-accused daughter was acquitted at the Crown's request.

Giedrius Kesminas was tried on two counts: conspiracy to import cocaine (Count 7) and conspiracy to utter forged documents (Count 11), stemming from "Project Southam." The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence.

Kesminas denied participation, claiming he only pretended to agree to the cocaine importation scheme.

The court applied the two-step Carter analysis for conspiracy membership, rejecting Kesminas's "pretence" defence and finding him an enthusiastic participant.

Kesminas was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt on Count 7.

However, the court reserved its decision on Count 11 due to a material discrepancy between the indictment's particularization (registering a property in Helen Lauro's name) and the evidence presented (obtaining a mortgage for Hans Lauro), citing the principle from R. v. Saunders that the offence as particularized must be proved.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility findings and a mid-trial ruling allowing cross-examination on text messages.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to take a holistic view of evidence, ignored an alleged motive to fabricate, and applied uneven scrutiny.

He also contended the text messages were undisclosed, subject to a Crown undertaking not to use them, and their use constituted case-splitting.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility assessments and finding no error in the admission of the text messages for impeachment and reply evidence, or in the handling of the "recent fabrication" argument.

The offender, L.R., was sentenced following convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation involving a 15-16 year old elite hockey player he coached between 2009 and 2010.

The Crown sought an 8-year global sentence, while the defence proposed 2-3 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for child sexual abuse cases, guided by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Friesen.

Aggravating factors included the significant age gap, abuse of a position of trust and vulnerability, multiple instances of sexual touching over an extended period, and the profound emotional trauma suffered by the victim.

Mitigating factors included L.R. being a first-time offender, having family support, and leading a pro-social life, along with the impact of stringent pre-sentence release conditions that prevented him from working.

The court imposed a global sentence of 57 months (4 years and 9 months) imprisonment, with concurrent sentences for each count, along with various ancillary orders including DNA, lifelong weapons prohibition, SOIRA registration, and a Section 161 prohibition.

The accused, a young Black man, was stopped by police while driving and subsequently subjected to a pat-down search, arrest, and strip search, leading to the discovery of a loaded handgun and drugs.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging racial profiling and arbitrary detention.

The court found that the traffic stop was a pretext for a drug investigation and that racial profiling played a significant role in the suspect selection, rendering the detention and subsequent searches unlawful.

Finding multiple breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 15 of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) and entered acquittals on all counts.

The accused, charged with multiple counts including impaired operation and refusing to provide a breath sample causing death and bodily harm, brought a pre-trial application seeking to quash, amend, or sever the refusal counts.

The court dismissed the request to quash the counts based on issue estoppel and rejected the argument that the Crown was limited to a single refusal count under s. 320.15(4) of the Criminal Code.

However, the court granted the application to sever the refusal counts from the impaired and dangerous operation counts, finding that the interests of justice favoured severance to allow the accused to testify on the refusal counts without prejudice to the remaining charges.

The defendant, Gianmarco Di Luciano, on trial for dangerous and impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and death, applied for a directed verdict on the counts alleging bodily harm to two victims.

The Crown's case was in, and the defence argued that the evidence of soft tissue injuries and psychological sequelae was insufficient to establish 'bodily harm' as defined in the Criminal Code, and that objective foreseeability of injury was required.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that objective foreseeability of bodily harm is not an essential element for dangerous or impaired driving causing bodily harm offences, citing R. v. Creighton and R. v. K.L. While agreeing with the Crown that psychological injuries would not be considered for this ruling, the court found sufficient evidence from the victims' self-reports of physical injuries to allow the jury to consider the bodily harm counts.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter and trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl after selling drugs to a vulnerable individual who subsequently died of a fentanyl overdose.

The Crown sought a 12-year sentence, while the defence argued for 4 to 6 years.

The court emphasized the extreme danger of fentanyl and the need for denunciation and deterrence, rejecting the argument that the victim's autonomous choice to ingest the drugs mitigated the offender's moral blameworthiness.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years in prison, comprising 8 years for manslaughter, 30 months concurrent for fentanyl trafficking, and 1 year concurrent for cocaine trafficking.

The accused was charged with impaired operation causing death and refusing to provide a breath sample following a serious motor vehicle collision.

He brought pre-trial applications alleging multiple Charter breaches and seeking to exclude evidence of his refusals to provide breath samples and data seized from his vehicle's Airbag Control Module.

The court found breaches of s. 8 (unlawful roadside breath demand), s. 9 (unjustified continued detention), and s. 10(b) (failure to hold off questioning).

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the accused's refusals at the roadside and in the booking area.

However, the court found that a subsequent demand by a breath technician constituted a 'fresh start' and admitted the final refusal.

The application to quash the search warrant for the vehicle data was dismissed.

The defendant, Kyle Hughes, was convicted of possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

The Crown sought a three-year prison sentence, while the defence proposed a one-year conditional sentence.

The court emphasized that denunciation and deterrence are paramount in child pornography cases, especially following the Supreme Court's directive in Friesen for increased sentences in child sexual abuse cases.

The court found no exceptional circumstances to warrant a conditional sentence.

Considering aggravating factors such as the large and disturbing collection (over 1,700 images and 22 videos, many depicting prepubescent females and infants in explicit acts) and the defendant's active role as a downloader/uploader on the BitTorrent network, balanced against mitigating factors like being a first-time offender, showing remorse, having no prior record, and a supportive family, the court imposed a global sentence of 30 months.

This was reduced by one month to 29 months due to stringent bail conditions, particularly during the pandemic.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, and a 10-year s. 161 Criminal Code prohibition order, but a s. 109 weapons prohibition was not imposed as the actus reus of the offences did not involve violence.

A victim surcharge of $200 was also ordered.

The offender pleaded guilty to possessing a loaded, prohibited firearm after fleeing from a residence during the execution of a search warrant.

The Crown sought a 30-month sentence, while the defence sought 18 months, citing harsh remand conditions and systemic racism detailed in an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report.

The court found no causal link between the offender's experiences with anti-Black racism and the offence, but granted mitigation for harsh pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The court imposed a 30-month sentence, reduced to 417 days net after applying Summers credit for pre-sentence custody, along with 18 months of probation.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, sought a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the "faint hope" provision (s. 745.6 Criminal Code).

The application required a preliminary judicial screening to determine if it had a "reasonable prospect of success" before a jury could be empanelled.

The applicant also brought a Charter application to quash his conviction, which the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, noting it was an attempt to relitigate a previously exhausted appeal.

The court found that the applicant fundamentally misunderstood the purpose of the faint hope application, focusing on re-litigating his conviction rather than demonstrating transformative changes in his character or conduct in custody.

Given his lack of responsibility for the offence, history of violence in custody, antisocial personality traits, and lack of future plans, the court concluded there was no reasonable prospect that a jury would unanimously agree to truncate his parole ineligibility.

The application was dismissed, with a directive that no new application could be brought for five years.

The defendants brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for theft and conversion as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued the limitation period was suspended until the conclusion of a related criminal investigation, believing a restitution order would be an appropriate remedy.

The court found that the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the material facts by July 2019.

It held that an ongoing criminal investigation or the mere prospect of a restitution order does not constitute an "appropriate means" to remedy a civil loss, nor does it suspend the limitation period, unless the civil claim is directly against the Crown or police.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim as out-of-time.

The defendant was charged with multiple drug and driving offences following a police pursuit.

The court determined the defendant was the driver of the vehicle.

The defendant was convicted of possession of fentanyl, possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, dangerous driving, and flight from police.

Acquittals were entered for public mischief, possession of cocaine, heroin, and oxycodone, and possession of cocaine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking, primarily due to insufficient evidence of the defendant's knowledge and control over substances found in other locations or misidentification of the substance.

The defendants in a motor vehicle accident claim brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend defence medical examinations and to disclose the entire contents of her social media accounts.

The court dismissed the request for medical examinations, finding the defendants failed to provide a reasonable explanation for seeking the examinations long after the deadline for serving expert reports under Rule 53.03 had passed.

Regarding the social media accounts, the court declined to order blanket disclosure due to privacy concerns, but ordered the plaintiff to produce a further and better Affidavit of Documents listing relevant photographs.