William Edward Corry Barnes

The appellant, Raimonds Mark Stivrins, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the legal limit.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s findings regarding care and control, the admissibility and weight of certain evidence, and the trial judge’s assessment of credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge’s factual findings and dismissed the appeal.

Alex Clarke was convicted of one count of sexual assault involving attempted penial penetration.

This decision outlines the sentencing, where the Crown sought 3.5-4 years imprisonment and the defence sought a sentence at the lower end of the 3-5 year range established for penetrative sexual assaults.

The court considered the aggravating factors, including an element of planning and the significant impact on the victim, and the mitigating factor of no prior criminal record.

The court imposed a sentence of 3 years in the penitentiary, along with ancillary orders for a firearms prohibition and sex offender registry registration, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The court issued supplementary reasons clarifying its prior ruling on a Charter application.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence, including cell phones and their contents, arguing a breach of s. 8 Charter rights.

The court reiterated that no Charter breach was established regarding the search of the applicant's person incident to a lawful arrest for firearm offences, and therefore, there was no basis to exclude the seized phones or their information under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The initial ruling dismissing the application remained unchanged.

The defendant, Alex Clarke, was charged with one count of sexual assault.

The central factual issue was whether the complainant, S.A., consented to the sexual activity that occurred on June 30, 2020.

The court found S.A.'s testimony credible and reliable, concluding that she never consented to any form of sexual activity with the defendant.

The court rejected the defendant's claim of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding his interpretation of S.A.'s passive responses and her "go slow" comment as consent to be unreasonable and self-serving.

The court emphasized that consent must be affirmatively communicated for each sexual act and that "only yes means yes." The defendant was convicted of sexual assault.

The applicant, Noah Hope, brought a motion seeking to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his vehicle and backpack, arguing a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The vehicle was involved in a single-car accident.

Police entered the vehicle without permission after a tow truck driver noted items left inside.

A gun was found, leading to the applicant's arrest and further searches.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or its contents, primarily because he was not the lawful owner and had no legal right to control access, effectively being a trespasser.

The accused, a former high school teacher, was charged with four counts of sexual exploitation and sexual assault involving a 16-year-old complainant.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the credibility and reliability of the complainant and her mother.

The court found significant internal and external contradictions in the complainant's testimony, inconsistencies with prior statements, and issues with physical evidence.

Evidence also suggested collusion and collaboration between the complainant and her mother in revising statements to align their narratives.

Due to these profound credibility issues and the resulting reasonable doubt, the accused was acquitted on all charges.

The accused, Graham Polmateer, brought an application for an in-person trial, while the Crown brought a s. 714 application.

The court dismissed the accused's application, ordering the trial to proceed remotely as previously scheduled.

The court found the application was brought too late, violating the 60-day notice rule, and that the accused was bound by his earlier agreement to a remote trial.

The judge emphasized that "personally" in the Criminal Code does not necessitate physical presence in a courtroom, and that modern technology facilitates access to justice.

The Crown's s. 714 application was deemed moot but would have been allowed.

The appellant appealed her guilty pleas to multiple Provincial Offences Act charges, including operating a motor vehicle without insurance and failing to comply with probation.

She argued that her guilty plea was not informed, that she acted under duress, and sought to have the entire proceeding quashed and sent back for trial.

The trial court had imposed a sentence of 7 days in jail and a $5,000 fine.

The appeal court examined the validity of the guilty plea under the five conditions set out in the Provincial Offences Act and found that the appellant failed to meet her onus of demonstrating that the plea was involuntary, uninformed, or equivocal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial addressed two key issues: (1) whether a discrepancy in dates between the Certificate of a Qualified Technician and the Intoxilyzer Test Record Card undermined the reliability of the Certificate; and (2) whether the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the approved screening device used for the roadside test was in proper working order, thereby justifying the warrantless seizure of breath samples under section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the date discrepancy was a typographical error and did not affect the Certificate's reliability.

The court also found that the officer had objectively reasonable grounds to believe the device was properly calibrated and functioning correctly based on recent accuracy checks, calibration records, and a self-test.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act and Highway Traffic Act.

Following a trial before a Justice of the Peace, concerns arose regarding the defendant's capacity to conduct her own defence due to disorganized and incoherent statements.

The court referred the defendant for psychiatric assessment.

A psychiatrist concluded the defendant was unfit to stand trial, presenting with a psychotic disorder and being unable to meaningfully participate in legal proceedings or communicate with counsel.

The court found on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was unfit to stand trial and suspended the proceedings.