WARNING
The Court hearing this matter directs that the following should be attached to the file:
An order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code shall continue. These sections of the Criminal Code provide:
486.4(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences;
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(iii) REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order.
(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
(4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014, c. 25, ss. 22, 48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18.
486.6(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
(2) For greater certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.
COURT FILE NO.: CR-21-23 BR
DATE: 2021/05/10
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
A.P.
William Barnes, Counsel for the Crown
Robert Taillefer, Counsel for the Accused
HEARD: April 26, 2021
detention review ruling
leroy, j.
Introduction
[1] Section 525 of the Criminal Code of Canada requires that a Superior Court review the pre-trial detention of an accused person after 90 days in custody for an indictable offence. A. P. was detained by Justice of the Peace Winchester after arrest on October 27, 2020 and bail hearing on November 2, 2020.
[2] The charges include trafficking in persons, receiving material benefit from trafficking in persons, procuring, advertising sexual services, assault and failure to comply with undertaking.
[3] The allegations are that A.P. as the “bottom girl” and another pimped the complainant between August 2, 2020 and October 2, 2020 after which the complainant escaped.
The issue
[4] The issue is whether continued detention remains justified under one of the grounds provided in s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.
[5] Section 515(10) restricts the circumstances in which detention of an accused person before trial is justified. The Crown argued the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention. The presumption of innocence and the right to reasonable bail enshrined in the Charter preclude pre-trial detention as the default outcome. In our system of justice, detention before trial is the exception. The reverse onus situation, as is the case at bar, may shift the evidentiary burden but does not change the underlying question before the Court.
[6] For the following reasons, I agree with Justice of the Peace Winchester’s determination in November 2020 finding grounds for detention under the secondary review and disagree with her determination that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice in accord with the third ground in s. 515(10).
[7] Further, I accept that the initiatives A.P. undertook in the ensuing six months in custody together with an improved release plan mitigate concerns for detention under the secondary grounds to the point she can be released on terms.
A.P.
[8] A.P., age 31, is Indigenous. She and her mother, C.D. have been haunted with substance abuse issues through their lives. Such is often recognized as a colonization legacy. A.P. acknowledged that her criminal record was driven largely by substance abuse issues.
[9] A.P.’s criminal record prior to these incidents was consistent and involved low end criminal activity together with display of little regard for Court order and responsibility.
[10] Her convictions began with Excise Act offences in 2009 and 2010. She was convicted under the CDSA for possession of cocaine in 2010. She was convicted in 2016 under s. 131 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of counselling and sentenced to four months imprisonment and probation. In 2018, she was convicted for shoplifting. In 2019, there was a conviction for impersonation with intent.
[11] Attached to the possession conviction in 2010 was conviction for failing to appear. Attached to the IRPA conviction in 2016 were convictions for failing to attend court and failing to comply with recognizance. Attached to the impersonation conviction in 2019 was a conviction for failing to comply with a probation order.
[12] A.P. had unrelated unresolved charges when she was arrested for these offences that included shoplifting in January 2020, driving while suspended and impaired driving in May 2020, failure to attend for fingerprinting, driving while suspended and failure to comply with undertaking in August 2020.
[13] A.P. pled guilty to those charges on February 8, 2021 and was sentenced globally to 6 months imprisonment less time served for an aggregate of 54 days expiring April 2, 2021.
Detention review considerations and evidence
[14] The overarching question at the detention review hearing is whether the continued detention of the accused in custody is justified within the meaning of s. 515(10). The purpose of the s. 525 hearing is to prevent the accused from “languishing” in pre-trial custody and to ensure prompt trial. The presiding judge at a detention review considers:
A. The impact of the passage of time on the proportionality of the detention;
B. The impact of unreasonable delay on the proportionally of the detention;
C. The rationale offered for the original detention order; and
D. Any new evidence or change in the circumstances of the accused.
A. Impact of the Passage of Time
[15] The time which has already elapsed since the accused was detained and the time which is anticipated to pass before trial should be considered by the judge to determine whether continued detention could erode public confidence in the administration of justice. The primary concern is the proportionality of the detention. It would necessarily erode public confidence in the administration of justice if an accused person spent more time or an equal amount of time in pre-trial detention than they would have if convicted. This also raises concerns of induced guilty pleas which are profoundly detrimental to the integrity of the criminal justice system. Assessing the proportionality of the detention need not be an "exhaustive inquiry", but the judge should apply the sentencing principles to the circumstances known at the time of the detention review.
[16] This consideration has nominal influence on the analysis. Although A.P. has been detained for six months, in terms of pre-trial detention accumulation on the outstanding charges began April 3, 2021. These charges, if proven, will attract penitentiary time.
B. Impact of Unreasonable Delay
[17] Unreasonable delay is not a precondition for a s. 525 review. Even when the passage of time has not led to a disproportionate detention, the judge should still consider whether unreasonable delay caused by the parties could erode public confidence in the administration of justice.
[18] This file has been moving through the preliminaries with relative alacrity. A.P. was arrested in late October 2020. Her bail hearing was determined November 2, 2020. There have been four judicial pre-trials. There remain disclosure issues particularly regarding A.P.’s cell phone analysis. At some point after the preliminary enquiry, defence will likely move for 3rd party records. The preliminary is set for July 6-8, 2021. The practice in Superior Court is to assign priority to in custody trials. I don’t expect the time it takes to analyse and produce the fruit of the analysis relative to A.P.’s cell phone to delay trial.
C. Prior Detention Orders
[19] The Supreme Court is clear that a detention review is different in nature than a bail hearing or bail review. It differs from a bail review because it is a review of the detention itself and not the detention order. The section does not require the judge presiding to reconduct the original bail hearing in its entirety simply because 90 days have elapsed. Deference is owed to the first-level decision maker’s findings if there is no cause to interfere. The reasons for detention from the most recent detention order will always be relevant subject to the caveat that the reviewing judge is not to simply rubber-stamp such decisions. If there was an error of law in the detention order, the detention review is an opportunity to redress.
[20] Further, while a detention review is not by right a second kick at the can, it can be because the balancing exercise or weighing of factors conducted by the initial bail judge must be reviewed in light of the time elapsed and other relevant considerations.
[21] As the passage of time may undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, the same bail plan rejected at the bail hearing in the absence of an error of law may be sufficient to justify release after the detention review. The Court will always consider whether implications from the passage of time requires re-weighing or re-balancing of the relevant factors or allowed for a material change in circumstances. For example, the defence argue that A.P. after six months in custody, detoxification and rehabilitative program refreshers mitigated the obvious secondary ground concerns in the moment of the arrest.
[22] The secondary ground risks attenuated by the accused’s insight gleaned from sobriety can be outweighed by the certain cost of the accused person's loss of liberty or of a loss of public confidence in the administration of justice inherent in continued pre-trial detention.
[23] The issue is whether intervening events and the change in plans sufficiently mitigates the secondary grounds for detention cited by the Justice of the Peace.
[24] Justice of the Peace Winchester cited the following reasons for detention:
i. The outstanding charges at the time arising from events between January 21, 2020 and August 27, 2020;
ii. The charges from events between August 2nd, 2020 and October 2nd, 2020 are extremely serious, the extent of the organization inherent in the criminal undertaking was significant, that such a victim is expected to suffer psychological difficulties;
iii. Under the auspices of the secondary ground Justice of the Peace Winchester referenced concern for the safety and protection of the public and victim, A.P.’s criminal record and the implications for offending inherent in convictions for failing to comply, failing to attend, impersonation, failing to comply with probation order;
iv. Justice of the Peace Winchester accepted applicability of Gladue principles and factors but cited dearth of evidence aside from residence on the Akwesasne reserve. She did not allude to the disproportionate representation of Indigenous bound over in pre-trial detention in the country and merits of giving consideration to other forms of pre-trial behaviour management; nor to circumstances consistent with known colonization legacies;
v. She referenced the strength of the Crown case which she found strong, gravity of the offences that included violence, the potential for lengthy penitentiary sentence on conviction, the circumstances surrounding commission of the offences including planning and organization and concern for the public’s confidence in the administration of justice factoring Gladue and addiction;
vi. The same circumstances were cited in relation to the third ground for detention;
vii. Justice of the Peace Winchester noted deficiencies in the release plan offered that failed to assuage grounds cited for detention. She expressed dissatisfaction with the fact of only one surety, a cousin who lacked engagement in the rehabilitative aspect of the initiative and demonstrated passivity in the control aspects of the release plan. She noted that the prime mover behind the plan, Carla Desormiere was not bound as a surety. The learned Justice of the Peace noted that a reliable surety would have enhanced the release plan. Justice of the Peace Winchester also noted that the release plan could be sufficient to redress grounds to detain in light of the antecedents, but the plan did not mitigate concerns for the secondary and tertiary grounds when balanced against the instant offences.
D. New Evidence or Change in Circumstances
[25] Even though there need not be fresh evidence or material change in circumstances to review detention, the court is necessarily sensitive to new evidence or material change in the circumstances of the accused and to its impact on the question whether continued detention in custody is justified. Evidence of treatment in detention and release plans involving supervised treatment for individual with substance abuse and mental health issues may adequately address risks raised under s. 515(10) by mitigating secondary ground concerns previously in play.
[26] As such, both the accused and the Crown are entitled to present additional credible or trustworthy information that is relevant and material. If the evidence existed at the time of the bail hearing, then the due diligence and relevance criteria discussed at paras 130-135 of R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27 apply.
[27] A.P. testified. The hearing was conducted by teleconference. She comported herself well and was articulate and coherent. She has been in detention for six months. Any substance withdrawal concerns have resolved. She is committed to the methadone program as substitute for opioids.
[28] She confirmed a long history of engagement in the methadone treatment program and advised that, historically, trouble finds her when she re-lapses. She said she wants to recover on a sustainable basis. She accessed such programs as there are in the detention center through the pandemic.
[29] The Court takes notice that prospects for in-patient treatment during pandemic constraints are unlikely. She discovered an online counselling program through the auspices of the “Jean Tweed Treatment Center” for women and their families on release and declared personal commitment to participating.
[30] A.P. with the assistance of her mother has assurance of part time employment with a coffee franchise in Akwesasne.
[31] Her mother, C.D. and brother, B.T. presented as sureties. Although her mother was available and central to the bail hearing release plan in November, she did not present as “surety” because of concern for the influence of her criminal record and unpaid fines. The surety offered in November was found inadequate to the task.
[32] C. D. is an addict in recovery with a criminal record. She has five shoplifting convictions but asserts recovery since 2019 when she achieved sobriety and began employment with the same coffee franchise where A.P. has assurance of part time employment on release.
[33] C.D. was convicted of cocaine possession a number of years ago.
[34] She accrued significant fines for Excise Act transgressions with no means to settle. She survives pay cheque to pay cheque with $1K in savings. She offered to make a cash deposit of $1K as security for A.P.’s release.
[35] As C.D.’s criminal record, financial constraints and the unpaid fines were underscored by Crown counsel through detention review proceedings as obstacles to her suitability as surety, her explanation for not coming forward in November resonates.
[36] A.P.’s brother is twenty-five, gainfully employed but for the pandemic with savings in the range of $3K and no criminal record. He lives in the same rental with his mother and, if released, his sister. He understands the role of surety and expectations should A.P. breach term of release. Although unstated explicitly, it is implicit that B.T was unwilling to offer as surety for his sister in the condition she was in in November 2020.
Detention review discussion
[37] The ruling to detain in November 2020 was justified on the secondary ground for the reasons given.
[38] Further, six months detention and the release plan offered on the detention review alone cannot undo concerns cited then for protection and safety of the public (the victim) and offending on release inherent in:
• the criminal record for failing to honour Court orders,
• that A.P. was on release bail during August and September 2020,
• that the nature of the offences alleged at bar involved allegations of planning, organization, violence,
• noted strength of the Crown case, and
• the public’s confidence in the administration of justice.
[39] A release plan at the time short of in-house detoxification was not going to cut it. That A.P. was lost in the vortex of substance abuse exacerbated those concerns. She needed a pause; something to break her out of the cycle of and ensuing criminality. Her mother’s entreaties were ineffectual. A.P.’s grasp on appreciation for normalized function in society was compromised by substance addiction. A.P.’s circumstances fell squarely into the second ground for pre-trial detention in s. 515(10). What has transpired; however, is that A.P. in a qualitative fashion redressed what only she could do to ameliorate the consequence of her record with the law and concern for substantial likelihood of offending on release. She re-applied herself to a more fulfilling purpose in life inherent in adoption of abstinence practices and strategies, re-investment in the methadone program, re-integration with family and employment.
[40] Personal instability of the accused person in November 2020 was righted. Whereas the perception in November 2020 was such that no simple surety release plan mitigated concern for likelihood of offending in a way that threatened the safety of the public/victim A.P. has in the only way she can developed an appearance of stable reliability.
[41] She and her family offer a house arrest release plan with exceptions for employment, counselling and court related activities. While I cannot disagree with the Crown’s position as to the tenuous pull of bail on C.D. (having regard to the hitherto unpaid fines), there is more at stake for this mother than a financial pledge; rather, it unpacks to a mother’s desire to retrieve her real daughter.
[42] Further, there is no evidence to impeach the reliability of B.T., age 25, as surety with $1K bond. He said he will be off work until the border re-opens. He does not have a criminal record. He said he has $3K in savings. As sibling who values the pull of bail, I am confident he will report release breach in the moment.
[43] That he will be called back to work before trial is not insurmountable. He and A.P. appreciate that if he is unable to have confidence in release term compliance during his work hours, in order to protect the bond, he will have to terminate his status as surety. That has to motivate A.P. to maintain best practices pending trial.
[44] So even though this plan may border on the surety-shuffle classification, I recognize A.P.’s qualitative redress and the value added by the addition of immediate family to the plan. Together they are sufficient to mitigate detention concerns under the second ground.
Third ground for Detention
[45] Section 515(10)(c) permits the detention of an accused person based on the public’s reaction to the decision to release free from concern about the accused person absconding, re-offending or interfering with the administration of justice.
[46] The Supreme Court in R. v. St. Cloud (2015), 231 C.C.C.(3D) 307 clarified earlier confusion about resort to the third ground for any type of crime as opposed to exceptional circumstances, unexplainable crimes and certain types of offences such as murder.
[47] Justice of the Peace Winchester’s observations regarding the public perception of a release in the circumstances of this case were “the public would be quite leery of release – page 34, “it is the type of offence that is not easily accepted by the public – it is not something that people shrug off very easily”.
[48] Of concern to this Court is the apparent adoption of a visceral negative reaction to the crime and accused reflected in the analysis. She applied a conclusory analysis when alluding to her view of the strength of case, nature and quality of A.P.’s alleged conduct, gravity of offence and serious potential for lengthy prison term, organization and planning behind the offences alleged, the impact of release in our community and Ms. Pickup’s criminal record.
[49] Such a view was discarded by Baudouin J.A. in R. v. Lamothe (1990), 1990 3479 (QC CA), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 530 (Que. CA) as one that should not be permitted to dominate the perception of the public interest.
“The perception of the public is to be situated at the level of one reasonably informed about our system of criminal law, and capable of judging and perceiving without emotion that the application of the presumption of innocence has the effect that people who may later be guilty of serious crimes will be released for the period between arrest and trial. The criteria of the public perception must not be that of the lowest common denominator.”
[50] Justice Wagner approved the perspective articulated in Lamothe and elaborated further in R. v. St. Cloud at p.337 when he wrote:
“In short the person in question in s. 515(10)(c) is a thoughtful person not one who is prone to emotional reactions, whose knowledge of the case is inaccurate, or who disagrees with society’s fundamental values. But he or she is not a legal expert familiar with all the basic principles of the criminal justice system, the elements of criminal offences or the subtleties of criminal intent and of defences available to accused persons.”
[51] If the learned Justice of the Peace had applied a more rigorous analysis to the evidence before her, she would have ruled that the evidence did not support the third ground for detention.
[52] Strength of case: Justice of the Peace Winchester quantified the strength of the Crown case with the observation that “The Crown has a victim, witnesses, and has another person involved and I think the Crown will have evidence to present that is going to be credible.”
[53] The police synopsis depicts A.P. as the “bottom girl”. That term was unknown to me. My research revealed that a bottom girl, woman, or bitch is a term for a prostitute who sits atop the hierarchy of prostitutes working for a particular pimp. A bottom girl is usually the prostitute who has been with the pimp the longest and consistently makes the most money.
[54] That characterization tends practically to exclude A.P. from position in organizational executive management and bears on the plausibility of the Crown theory applicable to A.P.’s function and role.
Circumstances surrounding commission of the offence:
[55] As Justice Trotter notes in the Law of Bail in Canada, 3rd ed. at 3-46, this review involves a more qualitative analysis. While on its face, the offences alleged are heinous and violent by perhaps, a gang, the extent of A.P.’s participation as drug addicted prostitute, herself a possible victim is an issue. The effect of her role in organization and planning of the events in August September 2020 as mitigating or aggravating remains a live issue.
[56] Further, A.P.’s criminal record, although persistent was of a different generic than the charges before the Court. The correlation between her criminal record and bouts of substance addiction is an easy one to connect.
[57] A.P. is Indigenous. Gladue principles transcend and inform all stages of criminal proceeding. They apply to all aboriginal persons wherever they reside, whether on‑ or off‑reserve, in a large city or a rural area. In defining the relevant aboriginal community for the purpose of achieving an effective disposition, the term “community” must be defined broadly so as to include any network of support and interaction that might be available. Given the empirically disproportionate representation of Indigenous in detention, the judge bears the obligation of trying to find an alternative to imprisonment.
[58] The merit of Gladue restraint is indicated. A.P. appears before the Court with a criminal record correlated to substance abuse, impoverishment and real prospects within the charges of victimization as prostitute.
Gravity of Offence/Liability for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment
[59] The trafficking in persons charge on conviction attracts a maximum/minimum sentence of imprisonment for up to fourteen years and four years imprisonment.
[60] The learned Justice of the Peace was entitled to consider the nature of the offences facing the accused and the degree to which the evidence foreshadows the future determination potentially lengthy sentence.
[61] That said, potential for lengthy sentence is not a standalone factor for rationalizing the third ground for detention.
Conclusion
[62] For those reasons order to issue as follows:
[63] The continued detention of the applicant, A.P., in custody is no longer justified as a proportionate measure within the meaning of subsection 515(10);
[64] A.P. is to be released from custody pending the trial of these charges on her entering into a recognizance on terms:
a. To reside at XXX Island Rd. E, Akwesasne, Ontario with your sureties, C.D. and B.T., and abide by the rules of the residence;
b. Any proposal for a change of address requires a bail variation application, prior to moving;
c. To remain in your residence twenty-four (24) hours a day, except:
i. for medical emergencies involving you or a member of your immediate family (parent, sibling);
ii. for the purposes of travelling directly to, from and while at court appearances, or meeting with your lawyer, or for purposes of complying with this or any other court Order ;
iii. for purposes of travelling directly to, from and while at work or school;
iv. for purposes of travelling directly to, from and while attending counselling, programming or other services arranged in advance by your sureties;
v. overnight Monday May 10, 2021 to remain at the Monteith Correctional Facility and for purposes of travelling directly from the Correctional Facility by bus en route to Cornwall, Ontario on release May 11, 2021;
vi. when you are in the presence of one or both of your sureties;
d. To remain in Ontario;
e. Report to Cornwall Police Services every Wednesday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. and sign in as required commencing this next Wednesday;
f. Do not contact or communicate in any way either directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means, with the following:
i. M.B. (co-accused), E.A., C.O. and A.P. (complainant), except for required court appearances;
g. Do not be within 200 metres of any place you know the above person(s) to live, work, attend school, or happen to be;
h. Do not communicate in any way with anyone known to you to have criminal, drug or youth record except members of your immediate family (parent, sibling) except:
i. in the presence of counsel for the purpose of preparing a defence and
ii. incidental contact for purposes of employment or attending an educational or vocational program;
i. Make reasonable effort to seek and maintain employment or attend school;
j. Do not possess:
i. a firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all those things until dealt with according to law (section 515(4.1), Criminal Code);
ii. any weapon(s) as defined by the Criminal Code (for example, but not restricted to, a pellet gun, firearm, imitation firearm, cross-bow, prohibited or restricted weapon or device, ammunition or explosive substance or anything designed to be used or intended for use to cause death or injury or to threaten or intimidate any person);
iii. or any imitation of above;
iv. If you now possess any weapon(s) as defined in the Criminal Code, you must deposit them, along with every authorization, licence and registration certificate relating to any of these items, to the Cornwall Police Services at within 48 hours of your release from custody;
v. Do not apply for an authorization, licence or registration certificate for any weapon as defined by the Criminal Code;
k. Abstain from the possession or consumption of any drug or narcotic listed in the Schedule of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act or being found in the company of any persons known to you to use or deal in such substances;
[65] And further:
That A.P. be bound by an amount of $1,000 without deposit;
That the surety, C.D., be bound by an amount of $1,000 without deposit; and
That the surety, B.T, be bound by an amount of $1,000 without deposit.
The sureties and A.P. confirmed on record their consent to execution of documents by the court registrar.
The Honourable Mr. Justice Rick Leroy
Released: May 10, 2021
COURT FILE NO.: CR-21-23 BR
DATE: 2021/05/10
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
A.P.
detention review ruling
The Honourable Mr. Justice Rick Leroy
Released: May 10, 2021