Kimberly Miles

The offender pleaded guilty to five counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking, including fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine, and one count of possession of property obtained by crime.

The court classified the offender as a mid-level trafficker operating a planned commercial enterprise.

After considering aggravating factors, such as the lethality of fentanyl, and mitigating factors, including a guilty plea, youth, and an Impact of Race and Cultural Assessment (IRCA), the court imposed a global sentence of 72 months' imprisonment.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of an undertaking.

She was on bail pending appeal for a prior trafficking conviction at the time of the offence.

The court weighed her guilty plea, remorse, and the harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (including triple bunking and lockdowns) against the large quantity of cocaine and her related criminal record.

The court imposed a total sentence of 6 years and 3 months, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused brought a mid-trial application alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights, arguing that police exceeded the temporal scope of a search warrant when extracting data from his seized cell phones.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the application.

The court found that the warrant's temporal limits applied only to usage timelines, not to communications related to trafficking, and that the accused failed to provide evidence that police actually examined data outside the warrant's scope.

The application was summarily dismissed as manifestly frivolous.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and driving while prohibited, sought to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10.

The court found that the police officer's stop was a pretextual investigative detention, not a legitimate Highway Traffic Act stop, and that the officer's testimony was not credible.

The court identified multiple, deliberate breaches of the applicant's rights, including arbitrary detention (s. 9), failure to inform of reasons for detention (s. 10(a)), and eliciting incriminating information before providing right to counsel (s. 10(b)).

While racial profiling was alleged, it was not established on the evidence.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the state's Charter-infringing conduct and the significant impact on the applicant's protected interests outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The court issued supplementary reasons clarifying its prior ruling on a Charter application.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence, including cell phones and their contents, arguing a breach of s. 8 Charter rights.

The court reiterated that no Charter breach was established regarding the search of the applicant's person incident to a lawful arrest for firearm offences, and therefore, there was no basis to exclude the seized phones or their information under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The initial ruling dismissing the application remained unchanged.

The applicant, Noah Hope, brought a motion seeking to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his vehicle and backpack, arguing a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The vehicle was involved in a single-car accident.

Police entered the vehicle without permission after a tow truck driver noted items left inside.

A gun was found, leading to the applicant's arrest and further searches.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or its contents, primarily because he was not the lawful owner and had no legal right to control access, effectively being a trespasser.

Police officers Paul Fyke and Jeffrey Smith were jointly charged with assault causing bodily harm following an altercation with Mario Maurice Baptiste Jr. during an attempted arrest for theft.

The court found that Constable Smith's initial arrest for theft lacked reasonable and probable grounds, making his use of force unlawful.

However, Constable Fyke's subsequent involvement was justified as he had reasonable grounds to arrest Mr. Baptiste for assaulting a peace officer or resisting arrest.

The court acquitted Constable Fyke, finding the Crown failed to prove his force was excessive.

Constable Smith was acquitted of assault causing bodily harm but found guilty of the lesser included offence of assault, as the Crown failed to prove his force caused the specific bodily harm alleged.

The appellant, Nathaniel Tulloch, appealed a sentence imposed after pleading guilty to robbery with an imitation firearm, robbery, and use of an imitation firearm.

The sentencing judge had accepted a joint submission for a global custodial term, but all parties inadvertently overlooked section 85(4) of the Criminal Code, which mandates that the sentence for the imitation firearm offence be served consecutively.

The sentencing judge acknowledged the error but was functus officio.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, supported by the Crown, and varied the sentence to ensure the section 85(2)(a) offence was served consecutively, while adjusting the other counts to maintain the originally intended global sentence.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with serious firearms and drug trafficking offences, sought a bail review on the sole ground that the Justice of the Peace failed to give due weight to Gladue considerations under s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the application of Gladue principles at the bail stage, noting that while judicial notice must be taken of systemic factors, the accused should provide case-specific information bearing on release.

The court found the Justice of the Peace had properly considered the applicant's unique circumstances and dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction to review.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and failure to comply offences, applied for a bail review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code after spending over a year in pre-trial custody.

The court found that the applicant's continued detention was no longer justified under the primary, secondary, or tertiary grounds, noting the unreasonable delay in bringing the review, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on custodial conditions, and the applicant's acceptance into a bail supervision program.

The application was granted and the applicant was released on strict conditions without a surety.

The accused, B.J., applied for a bail review after being detained on tertiary grounds for serious drug trafficking and criminal organization charges.

The court found that the inclusion of electronic monitoring in the proposed release plan and the public health implications of the COVID-19 pandemic constituted material changes in circumstances, triggering jurisdiction for review.

The court was satisfied that the stringent release plan, including sureties, house arrest, and electronic monitoring, adequately addressed secondary ground concerns.

Considering the potential for lengthy pre-trial custody due to pandemic-related court delays and the accused's heightened health risk, the court concluded that continued detention was not justified on tertiary grounds.

B.J. was released on strict conditions.

Following a judge-alone trial on historical sexual offence charges involving two complainants, the court first addressed the admissibility of one complainant’s police statement and preliminary hearing testimony after she refused to complete cross-examination due to acute psychological distress.

Applying the principled hearsay exception and authorities dealing with unresponsive complainants, the court admitted the prior statements to preserve trial fairness and permit assessment of credibility through prior inconsistent accounts.

On the merits, the court found both complainants’ evidence contained significant and material inconsistencies going to the heart of the allegations.

The Crown failed to prove any count beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted on all six charges.

The Crown brought an application under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code seeking to have its central witness in a sexual assault case testify by videolink from Regina, Saskatchewan, rather than attend in person in Barrie, Ontario.

The witness had relocated out of province and faced financial hardship and an unspecified health issue.

The court dismissed the application, finding that where credibility is central to the case and the witness is a primary Crown witness, the defendant's right to make full answer and defence requires the witness to attend in court before the trier of fact.

The court emphasized that while videolink technology is a useful tool, it should not be used where it would impair the defendant's ability to confront the witness and the court's ability to assess credibility through observation of demeanour and facial expressions.

The offender was convicted by a jury of unlawful act manslaughter for the shooting death of his wife during a struggle over a loaded handgun.

The Crown sought 7 to 8 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a sentence of time served.

The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness to be at the higher end of the spectrum due to the domestic context and the introduction of a loaded firearm into a volatile situation.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years imprisonment, less enhanced pre-sentence custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in a net sentence of 2 years, 5 months, and 23 days.

Mitchell Brooks was found guilty of unlawful act manslaughter in the death of his wife, Deena Brooks, by a jury.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a loaded firearm in a domestic relationship, and mitigating factors such as his lack of prior record and remorse.

The court rejected depression as a mitigating factor and the defence's request for enhanced credit at 2:1 for lockdown time.

A global sentence of seven years was imposed, with enhanced pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5:1, resulting in a net sentence of two years, five months, and 23 days in penitentiary.

Ancillary orders for DNA, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of firearms were also made.

Dustin Klammer was found guilty of trafficking in fentanyl, possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of currency obtained by crime.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the quantity and strength of fentanyl, continued drug use, and a prior trafficking conviction while on bail.

Mitigating factors included no prior record at the time of the offences, expressed remorse, and efforts to address addiction.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation due to the dangers of fentanyl, alongside specific deterrence given the offender's continued involvement in drug culture.

A sentence of 33 months in custody was imposed concurrently on all counts, along with a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The Crown applied to admit the ante mortem statements of the deceased in a first-degree murder trial.

The deceased had made statements to friends and family about the breakdown of her marriage and her husband's resulting anger and behaviour.

The court held that the statements were admissible under both the traditional state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay, as they were relevant to animus and motive, and met the threshold for reliability.

On a Crown bail review, the court considered whether a Justice of the Peace erred in releasing the respondent on a reverse-onus basis on charges including sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and breach of recognizance.

The court held that the proposed surety plan did not amount to true 24/7 house arrest, contained material supervision gaps, and failed to adequately address public and complainant safety.

The court further found inadequate consideration of the respondent's prior breach record, evidence of additional breaches, and the strength of the Crown's case on the current breach allegation.

Tertiary grounds were rejected, but detention was ordered on secondary grounds and the release order was vacated.

At a preliminary inquiry into a charge of first-degree murder, the Crown alleged that the accused intentionally shot his wife following marital discord and separation discussions.

The defence argued the shooting was accidental, occurring during a struggle over a firearm as the accused attempted suicide.

The court found sufficient evidence of intentional shooting based on the common sense inference from pointing and firing a loaded handgun at close range, forensic evidence regarding trigger force and muzzle proximity, circumstantial evidence of the victim's incapacity at the time of shooting, and evidence of animus.

The court also found some evidence of forcible confinement based on ante-mortem and peri-mortem injuries and the time gap between the victim's final text and the 911 call.

The accused was committed to trial for first-degree murder.