RULING ON BAIL REVIEW APPLICATION
COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-006 BR DATE: 20200428 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – B.J., Defendant
Counsel: Kimberly Miles for the Crown J. Scott Cowan for B.J.
HEARD: April 23, 2020
Boswell J.
[1] B.J. was arrested on November 7, 2019 and has been in custody since that time. He faces a dozen serious criminal charges which include multiple counts of trafficking in methamphetamine and cocaine, multiple counts of possession of the proceeds of crime and participating in a criminal organization.
[2] A bail hearing was conducted in Bracebridge on January 14, 2020. B.J. was detained in custody on the basis that his detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to the circumstances of the alleged offences, their seriousness, the apparent strength of the Crown’s case, and the prospect of a lengthy term of imprisonment should B.J. be convicted.
[3] B.J. applies for a review of the detention order. The Crown opposes B.J.’s release, arguing that it remains necessary in order to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.
The General Legal Framework
[4] The past five years have seen three very significant bail decisions released by the Supreme Court: R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27; R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27; and R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18. In each of these decisions, the court has made it clear that justices presiding over bail applications must bear in mind an overarching principle: pretrial detention is the exception, while the earliest possible release, on the least onerous terms, is the default presumption.
[5] The presumption in favour of early release on the least onerous terms possible is grounded in two Charter-protected rights. First, the presumption of innocence (s. 11(d)). Second, the right not to be deprived of reasonable bail without just cause (s. 11(e)).
[6] The presumption of innocence is a foundational principle of our criminal justice system. It has been described as a “golden thread” running through the web of the law. See [Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] AC 462 (H.L.)]. That we would restrict an accused person’s liberty, or deprive him or her of it altogether while awaiting trial, tends to contradict this golden thread. For that reason, the Supreme Court has been clear that just cause to deny bail will only arise in a narrow set of circumstances and only where necessary to promote the proper functioning of the bail system. See R. v. Pearson, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 665 at para. 58; R. v. Antic, as above at para. 40.
[7] Parliament has recognized that the bail system does not function properly if accused persons released on bail fail to show up for court or commit further offences. Moreover, it does not function properly if granting bail in a particular case would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.
[8] In s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, Parliament has identified three grounds upon which pretrial detention will be justified. They are referred to, by convention, as the primary, secondary and tertiary grounds. They have survived constitutional scrutiny. See R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 and R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64.
[9] The primary ground for denying bail is concerned with ensuring that accused persons attend court as required and do not abscond.
[10] The secondary ground for denying bail is concerned with protection of the public.
[11] The tertiary ground for denying bail is concerned with maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.
[12] In most cases, the Crown bears the onus of establishing that there is just cause to deny an accused person bail on one or more of the primary, secondary and tertiary grounds. Sometimes, however, that onus shifts to the accused person. This is one of those times. Because B.J. is charged with offences under s. 5 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act punishable by imprisonment for life and also because he is alleged to have committed offences in association with a criminal organization, he bears the onus of establishing that his continued detention is not justified. See ss. 515(6)(a)(ii) and (d) of the Criminal Code.
[13] B.J.’s application is brought under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, which provides that an accused person may, at any time before trial, apply to a judge for a review of a detention order made under s. 515. This court does not, however, have an open-ended jurisdiction to review detention orders. That jurisdiction may only be exercised in three situations: (1) where there is admissible new evidence; (2) where the reasons for the detention order contain an error in law; or (3) where the detention order is clearly inappropriate. See R. v. St. Cloud, as above.
The Parties’ Positions
[14] B.J. argues that this court has jurisdiction to review the detention order of Justice of the Peace Noordegraaf based on admissible new evidence. He points to the following new evidence, which he says demonstrates a material and relevant change in the circumstances of the case: (1) the inclusion of electronic monitoring in his proposed release plan; and (2) the danger that the COVID-19 pandemic poses to inmates in remand facilities and to the broader public.
[15] B.J. proposes a very stringent plan of release. He proposes two sureties: his father, who is prepared to pledge $50,000, and a family friend, B.J.J., who is prepared to pledge anywhere between $2,000 and $10,000. B.J. proposes that he will reside with B.J.J. on house arrest conditions. He will not leave B.J.J.’s residence unless in the direct and continuous presence of one or more of his sureties. He will, moreover, wear an ankle bracelet so that his movements may be continuously monitored electronically.
[16] B.J. contends that the court should not have any concerns on the secondary ground based on the stringency of his proposed plan of release. Moreover, the court ought not to have concerns on the tertiary ground for a number of reasons. Again, because of the stringent conditions being proposed with respect to his release, but also because of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Reasonable members of the public will view the release of inmates in a different light because of the pandemic and will understand why every reasonable effort must be made to reduce prison populations.
[17] Crown counsel is not satisfied that B.J. has demonstrated a material change in circumstances in any respect save for the pandemic. The release plan he is proposing is identical to the one proposed to Justice of the Peace Noordegraaf, save for the proposal of electronic monitoring. There is no reason the earlier proposal could not have included electronic monitoring. It was B.J.’s choice not to include it. Accordingly, it is not a material change in circumstances.
[18] In Crown counsel’s submission, the pandemic cannot justify the abandonment of the rule of law. B.J. must demonstrate that his detention is no longer justified on the tertiary ground because of a material change in circumstances. The presence of the pandemic simply does not meet the threshold. There is insufficient evidence that B.J. is at an elevated risk of contracting the virus, or of experiencing a serious adverse outcome, to justify his release. The virus otherwise impacts him only minimally. Given the seriousness of the allegations against him, his criminal antecedents and his serious, unaddressed drug addiction, his release on bail would undermine the public’s confidence in the administration of justice.
[19] Counsel agree that there are no primary ground concerns.
Discussion
[20] Given the evidence tendered on the application and the positions taken by the parties, my analysis will address the following three issues. First, whether B.J. has established a material change of circumstances, thereby triggering this court’s jurisdiction to review his detention. Second, whether the proposed plan of release is sufficient to attenuate any concerns on the secondary ground. Third, whether, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, continued detention is justified on the tertiary ground.
Material Change
[21] The admissibility of new evidence must be determined according to the test laid out in Palmer v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, modified to fit the bail context. The test has four parts:
(i) The evidence must be truly new or, if it existed at the time of the initial release hearing, there must be a legitimate and reasonable explanation for why it was not tendered; (ii) The evidence must be relevant to the factors to be considered under s. 515(10); (iii) The evidence must be credible and trustworthy; and, (iv) It must be reasonable to think, having regard to all the circumstances, that the evidence could have affected the balancing act engaged in by the justice at the initial show cause hearing.
See R. v. St. Cloud, as above, at paras. 128-137.
[22] Provided the proffered evidence meets the four criteria for admissibility, the reviewing justice may engage anew in the s. 515(10) analysis.
[23] In this case, B.J. points to two pieces of new evidence. The first – the availability of electronic monitoring – is evidence that could have been presented at the initial show cause hearing but was not. The second – the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic – is truly new.
[24] There is a relatively straightforward explanation for why B.J. did not include electronic monitoring at the initial show cause hearing. He did not think it was necessary. He expected his proposed plan of release would be sufficient. He was, to some extent at least, correct. The presiding justice of the peace was satisfied that the plan of release proposed at that time, which did not include electronic monitoring, was sufficient to attenuate any secondary ground concerns. She detained B.J. on the tertiary ground.
[25] Electronic monitoring is expensive, not to mention intrusive. It is not necessary for every detainee to assemble the most stringent release plan imaginable. In fact, such a requirement would run contrary to the ladder principle. The ladder principle requires that accused persons be granted bail on terms no more onerous than necessary. It requires the presiding judicial officer to begin his or her analysis with a consideration of the least restrictive release terms – unconditional release on an undertaking to appear. Increasingly restrictive terms may only be considered once less restrictive terms have been considered and rejected. See R. v. Antic, as above at para. 67.
[26] A recognizance with sureties is one of the most onerous forms of release. B.J. proposed two sureties with a house arrest provision. It was a stringent plan of release. It was, in my view, reasonable and legitimate for him to not go further and include electronic monitoring.
[27] The proposal for electronic monitoring is, in my view, admissible new evidence. It is relevant to the s. 515(10) inquiry, it is credible and trustworthy, and it may have affected the balancing performed by Justice of the Peace Noordegraaf at the show cause hearing. It is a material change in circumstances.
[28] The COVID-19 pandemic is undeniably new information. In my view, it is also relevant to the s. 515(10) inquiry. Evidence of its impact, in the form of an affidavit of an epidemiologist, Dr. Aaron Orkin, is credible and trustworthy. It is evidence that likely would have affected the balancing performed by Justice of the Peace Noordegraaf had it been known at the time of the initial show cause hearing. It constitutes a material change in circumstances. A number of other courts have reached similar conclusions. See, for instance, R. v. J.S., 2020 ONSC 1710 and R. v. Paramsothy, 2020 ONSC 2314.
[29] I am satisfied, in the circumstances, that I have the jurisdiction to repeat the s. 515(10) analysis as if I was the initial decision-maker: St. Cloud, at para. 138. I must decide if, from the perspective of the public, B.J.’s continued detention is justified. The Crown asserts that it is, based on concerns under the secondary and tertiary grounds. I will turn to those now.
The Secondary Ground
[30] Detention is warranted on the secondary ground where necessary for the protection or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence.
[31] The Crown’s position is that B.J. poses an unacceptable risk to public safety if released.
[32] In assessing the Crown’s position, the court must look at all of the surrounding circumstances, including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice.
[33] The “substantial likelihood” threshold does not require the court to make exact predictions about future dangerousness: see R. v. Morales as above. It is essentially a slightly enhanced balance of probabilities standard.
[34] The assessment of the likelihood of re-offence or interference with the administration of justice, and of the protection of the public more generally, requires a consideration of a cluster of factors. The nature of the offence, the criminal record of the accused, the strength of the Crown’s case and whether the accused was already on bail or probation at the time of the alleged offence(s) are all relevant considerations: see [R. v. K.D., [2006] O.J. No. 2616 (S.C.J.)] and [R. v. Vairavanathan, [2006] O.J. No. 3053 (S.C.J.)].
[35] This is a reverse-onus case, as I indicated above. It is therefore B.J.’s onus to satisfy the court that, all things considered, his continued detention is not necessary for the protection of the public. If the court concludes that public safety is at risk, and/or that there is a substantial likelihood of re-offence or interference with the administration of justice, then B.J. bears the onus of persuading the court that he has a plan of release that will adequately attenuate any public safety concerns.
[36] The Crown’s position is that B.J. does represent a danger to public safety and his release plan is insufficient in view of the nature of the offences, the strength of the Crown’s case, B.J.’s criminal antecedents and his unresolved drug addiction.
[37] B.J.’s counsel accepts that there are valid concerns about the possible risk that releasing B.J. poses, but takes the position that the stringent plan of release on offer is more than sufficient to address those concerns.
[38] I will briefly consider the relevant secondary ground factors in turn.
The Nature of the Offences
[39] B.J. was one of a significant number of people arrested in connection with Project Shoreham – an investigation into an extensive drug trafficking network in Barrie and Muskoka. He faces a number of serious charges, including participating in a criminal organization. Arguably the most serious charges involve trafficking in large quantities of methamphetamine.
[40] B.J. was allegedly trafficking in drugs out of his parents’ trailer park, which was populated with families with children.
The Strength of the Crown’s Case
[41] Assessing the strength of the Crown’s case on a bail review is always tricky. The court has a very limited vantage point. I have reviewed the transcripts from the initial show cause hearing, during which the Crown outlined the allegations against B.J. and some of his co-accused.
[42] This was an undercover police operation. The undercover officers had both direct and indirect interactions with B.J. Assuming the officers come across as credible and reliable witnesses, then it seems to me that the Crown has a strong case. That said, I appreciate that circumstances may change as the evidentiary record evolves.
B.J.’s Criminal Record
[43] B.J. is just shy of 53 years old. He has a long-time partner and a young son.
[44] B.J. has no criminal antecedents prior to 1998, when he was 31 years old. His record now spans the period 1998 through 2014. In my experience it is somewhat unusual for a man’s record to begin in his 30s and continue with regular entries into his late 40s or 50s.
[45] In June 1998 B.J. was convicted of personation with intent. He was placed on 12 months probation. Five months later he was convicted of breach of recognizance and sentenced to 30 days.
[46] In September 1999 he was convicted of possession of a narcotic for the purposes of trafficking. He was sentenced to 90 days intermittent and 10 months probation. There was then a six year gap.
[47] In October 2005 he was convicted of possession of Schedule I and II substances, resisting a police officer and breach of an undertaking. He was sentenced to 60 days in total. Four months later he was convicted of another breach of undertaking and handed a one day sentence on top of 15 days of pre-sentence custody.
[48] Arguably the most serious convictions on B.J.’s record appear in June 2008, when he was convicted of break and enter with intent and assault with a weapon. He was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment on top of a year of pre-sentence custody.
[49] In February 2009, B.J. was convicted of possession of a Schedule I substance and breach of recognizance. A gap in his record then followed and continued until 2014.
[50] In December 2014 B.J. was convicted of mischief under $5,000 and placed on 12 months probation.
B.J.’s Drug Addiction
[51] B.J. has an admitted drug addiction. The exact nature of that addiction was not made clear to me. He has been in custody at the Central North Correctional Centre since November 7, 2019. In theory, he has been clean of drugs for the past 5 ½ months. I say “in theory” because it is an unfortunate reality that drugs do find their way into correctional facilities on a regular basis.
[52] There is no evidence that B.J. has received addiction treatment while at CNCC. There is little that can be done presently to assist him with his addiction if he is released given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Plan of Release
[53] B.J.’s plan of release is quite stringent. I described it above at para. 15 and will not repeat it here.
[54] Each of B.J.’s proposed sureties is aware of his history of drug addiction. Each expressed concerned about it and assured the court that they will do what they can to make sure it is monitored closely.
[55] B.J.J. lives in a rural location on 48 acres. He plans to keep constant supervision over B.J. He operates a landscape design company. Presently all projects are on hold due to the pandemic. Once operations resume, he has work that B.J. can assist him with. He will always be present, however, at any site where B.J. is put to work. In the meantime, B.J.J. grows many of his own shrubs, as well as gensing. B.J. can be kept busy with tending to this growing operation.
[56] B.J.’s father is his other proposed surety. He came across as quite earnest in his testimony. I am satisfied he wants a better life for his son than the one he is now living. He testified that he is prepared to drive to B.J.J.’s home daily to assist in his son’s supervision. He is prepared to drive his grandson there for visits.
[57] B.J.’s sister is one of his co-accused. She resides at the family trailer park. B.J. Sr. assured me that he will not permit his son to attend the park and he will ensure that his son and daughter are kept apart.
[58] The release plan now also includes a proposal for electronic monitoring.
[59] Stephen Tan, the Director of Operations for Recovery Science Corporation, provided the court with a letter confirming that his company is ready and able to provide monitoring for B.J. They have confirmed that B.J.J.’s residence is in an area with cellular coverage.
Discussion
[60] There are several reasons why, in my mind, B.J. poses a risk to public safety. They focus on the substantial likelihood that he will re-offend. They are:
(i) The nature of the offences. The allegations are very serious. They involve participating in an extensive drug-trafficking network. They involve significant amounts of insidious drugs, well above street-level trafficking; (ii) B.J.’s criminal record. I have seen many that are longer, but his is certainly extensive. It is concerning that it began in his 30s – a time when he should have been maturing – and continued for two decades thereafter. There are a number of convictions for breach of recognizance and breach of undertakings; and, (iii) B.J.’s unresolved drug addiction. I suspect that his drug addiction has a lot to do with his criminal antecedents and it will continue to pose real and substantial difficulties for him if it is not addressed professionally.
[61] Having said all of that, I note that the justice of the peace was satisfied with his proposed release plan as presented at the initial show cause hearing. She had confidence in his proposed sureties. I take the same view. They appear to me to be well-meaning, sincere, earnest and informed.
[62] The plan presented on this review is even more stringent than that presented at the show cause hearing, with the addition of electronic monitoring.
[63] B.J. will be supervised on a 24/7 basis by B.J.J., supported by B.J.’s father. He will be living in a relatively remote area. He will be unable to leave the residence unless in the company of one or more of his sureties. And his movements will be tracked by electronic monitoring.
[64] I am satisfied that any concerns I have on the secondary ground are met by the proposed release plan.
The Tertiary Ground
[65] The justice of the peace detained B.J. on the tertiary ground. The primary thrust of the Crown’s submissions on this review application is that continued detention remains justified on the tertiary grounds.
[66] As I noted above, continued detention is justified on the tertiary ground where release is necessary to maintain the public’s confidence in the administration of justice.
[67] The court is directed by s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code to consider the following factors when assessing whether continued detention is justified on the tertiary ground:
(i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case; (ii) the gravity of the offence; (iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used; and (iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more.
[68] In R. v. St-Cloud, as above, the Supreme Court provided a summary of the principles that should guide justices hearing bail review applications where the tertiary ground is raised as a justification for continued detention. Those principles include the following:
(a) The tertiary ground is not a residual ground for detention that applies only where the first two grounds for detention are not satisfied. It is a distinct ground that itself provides a basis for ordering the pre-trial detention of an accused; (b) The tertiary ground is not restricted to rare cases or exceptional circumstances or only to certain types of crimes; (c) The four listed factors listed in s. 515(10)(c) are not exhaustive. The court may consider other relevant factors based on the circumstances of any given case; (d) The court must not order detention automatically even where the four listed circumstances support such a result. The court must instead consider all the circumstances of each case, paying particular attention to the four listed circumstances; (e) No single circumstance is determinative. The justice must consider the combined effect of all the circumstances of each case to determine whether detention is justified; (f) After balancing all relevant circumstances, the ultimate question to be asked is whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. To answer this question, the court must adopt the perspective of the "public", that is, the perspective of a reasonable person who is properly informed about the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case. However, this person is not a legal expert and is not able to appreciate the subtleties of the various defences that are available to the accused; and, (g) A reasonable person's confidence in the administration of justice may be undermined not only if a court declines to order detention where detention is justified having regard to the circumstances of the case, but also if it orders detention where detention is not justified.
[69] Public confidence in the administration of justice may be shaken where individuals charged with very serious criminality, in circumstances where the Crown has a strong case, are free to roam the streets and potentially continue with their criminal lifestyles while awaiting trial. At the same time, public confidence in the administration of justice is not particularly enhanced when accused persons, who are presumed innocent, languish in remand facilities potentially for two years or longer, awaiting trial.
[70] I have already addressed the circumstances and gravity of the offences B.J. faces. They are, in my view, very serious. He is alleged to have played a relatively senior role in a drug trafficking network and to have trafficked as much as a half a kilogram of crystal methamphetamine to an undercover police officer. He is undoubtedly facing a significant penitentiary term if convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine and of participating in a criminal organization.
[71] I have also addressed the fact that the Crown appears to have a compelling case, at least from my current, limited vantage point.
[72] The factors specifically identified in s. 515(10)(c) tend, in my view, to point in the direction of continued detention. But they are not the only factors to be considered.
[73] I consider three other factors to be of significance in my assessment of the tertiary ground.
[74] First, the stringent plan of release. I have noted above the particulars of the plan and my confidence in it.
[75] Second, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on court processes. B.J. is one of a group of individuals charged jointly with trafficking and other offences. Cases with multiple defendants tend to move more slowly through the criminal justice system than single-defendant matters. Exacerbating delay issues is the fact that the normal operations of the courts are largely suspended due to the pandemic.
[76] B.J.’s case is still in the Ontario Court of Justice. He has yet to set dates for a preliminary hearing and I suspect it will be some considerable time yet before he is able to set those dates. Once the normal operations of the court resume, the courts – both the Ontario Court and the Superior Court – will be facing significant pressures with case loads that will inevitably result in further delays. Should B.J. be detained until his trial date, he may be languishing in pre-trial custody for a very long time.
[77] Third, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on public health.
[78] Many recent bail applicants have been filing and citing an affidavit sworn on April 7, 2020 by Dr. Aaron Orkin, a physician and epidemiologist. His affidavit has generally been accepted as credible and trustworthy evidence under s. 518 of the Criminal Code.
[79] While I do not consider everything said by Dr. Orkin to have a sound evidentiary basis, much of what he says about the COVID-19 virus and the threat it poses to public health makes a lot of sense.
[80] Dr. Orkin notes that the central strategy for the population health management of COVID-19 is to “flatten the curve”. Social distancing is the key focus of the flatten the curve strategy.
[81] Social distancing is particularly difficult in congregate living facilities like nursing homes, cruise ships and prisons. He offered the following reasons why:
(a) Outbreaks in tight spaces happen very quickly and are nearly impossible to control once they happen; (b) People living in congregate living facilities tend to have underlying comorbidities that make them more prone to serious adverse outcomes from infection; (c) Outbreaks in congregate living facilities have the potential to overwhelm the health care system; and, (d) Outbreaks in congregate living facilities serve as “tinder for the fire” in more generalized outbreaks.
[82] Our Court of Appeal has accepted that outbreaks in prisons threaten not only inmates and staff at those facilities, but also the public at large. In R. v. Kazman, 2020 ONCA 251, Justice Harvison Young said the following, at para. 18:
As the public health authorities have emphasized at this time, the need for social distancing is not only a question of protecting a given individual but also the community at large. In the prison context, a COVID-19 outbreak may turn into wider community spread as prison staff return home. As we are repeatedly hearing during this pandemic, the wider the spread, the greater the pressure will be for scarce medical resources.
[83] The need to reduce prison populations wherever it can be done reasonably and safely is a pressing concern not just for the health of the inmates but for the broader protection of the public at large. As Justice Harris recently observed in R. v. Rajan, 2020 ONSC 2118, the COVID-19 crisis has impacted significantly on tertiary ground considerations.
[84] The focus in considering the tertiary ground is on the perspective of a reasonable person who is properly informed about the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case. The “circumstances of the case” now include COVID-19 concerns.
[85] B.J. is accused of serious, but non-violent crimes. He is 53 years old and has health problems, including a diagnosed mild case of bibasilar atelectasis, which is a condition that occurs when there is a partial collapse of one or both lungs. In other words, he is individually at a heightened risk of an adverse negative outcome should he contract the COVID-19 virus.
[86] In my view, taking into account all of the relevant circumstances, B.J. has met his onus to satisfy the court that his continued detention is not justified on the tertiary ground. In my view, reasonable and informed members of the public would not lose confidence in the administration of justice due to his release on the stringent terms I have described.
Conclusion
[87] In conclusion, B.J. will be released on a release order with conditions which include the following:
(a) He will have two sureties: B.J.J., in the amount of $5,000; and S.J., in the amount of $50,000; (b) He is to reside with his surety, B.J.J., at 247 Chetwynd Road, Burk’s Falls, Ontario; (c) He is to be subject to house arrest. That means he is to remain inside his residence at all times, unless he is in the direct and continuous presence of one or more of his sureties; (d) He is to observe a curfew to be inside of the residence at all times between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., except in the case of a medical emergency; (e) He must present himself at the door of the residence within five minutes when asked to do so by a police officer to ensure compliance with this Order; (f) He is not to attend the Silver Sands Trailer Park in Huntsville, Ontario; (g) He must remain in Ontario; (h) He is not to have any direct or indirect communication with any of the following: J.X., K.J., R.P., K.A., R.P., L.S. and K.C.; (i) He must not possess any weapon(s) as defined by the Criminal Code (for example, but not restricted to, a pellet gun, firearm, imitation firearm, cross-bow, prohibited or restricted weapon or device, ammunition or explosive substance or anything designed to be used or intended for use to cause death or injury or to threaten or intimidate any person); (j) He must not possess or consume any unlawful drugs or substances (as defined in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act) except with a valid prescription in his own name; (k) He must not possess any cell phone, pager or personal digital assistant; (l) He shall, at his own expense, be subject to GPS Monitoring by Recovery Science Corporation (Hereinafter referred to as ‘RSC’) within 48 hours upon his release from custody and: A. Enter into RSC’s participant agreement and comply with its terms; B. Wear a GPS ankle bracelet at all times; C. Permit RSC to install supplementary equipment to inspect, replace and maintain equipment as it deems necessary; D. Comply with RSC leave notification and battery charging requirements; E. Consent to all RSC leave notifications being emailed directly to the Ontario Provincial Police and the Barrie Police Service; F. Cooperate fully with RSC staff; G. Consent to login credentials being provided to the OPP and Barrie Police Service by RSC for the purpose of obtaining current and historical GPS location information at any time; and, H. Consent to RSC providing information to sureties upon request by the sureties for purposes of current location and location history.
Boswell J. Released: April 28, 2020