Andrew David Gordon Choat

The court sentenced Abel Assefa for possession of a loaded, restricted firearm without a license, contrary to s. 95 of the Criminal Code.

The decision reviews the facts, the parties' positions, and the applicable sentencing principles, including the impact of systemic anti-Black racism.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, to be served in the community, with periods of house arrest and curfew, and ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal from acquittals entered after a trial judge excluded evidence of narcotics seized from Prince Asante's vehicle, finding the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The appellate court held that the trial judge erred in law by misapplying the standard for reasonable and probable grounds, improperly discounting circumstantial and pattern evidence, and requiring proof of the accused's identity beyond what the law demands for a lawful arrest.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused, Abel Assefa, was charged with multiple counts relating to drug trafficking and firearms offences following an undercover police investigation.

The court found the evidence sufficient to convict on the count of possession of a loaded restricted firearm but entered acquittals on all other counts, finding the circumstantial evidence did not establish knowledge, consent, or control over the drugs and firearms found in the apartment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court sentenced Pritpal Singh for trafficking and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, possession of opium, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The case involved a Garofoli application regarding the excision of unconstitutionally obtained evidence from an Information to Obtain (ITO), which was dismissed.

The court reviewed the applicable sentencing ranges for large-scale heroin trafficking, considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and imposed a global sentence of 13 years, with all sentences to run concurrently.

The appellant, Robert Rouse, appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the negative impact of his time spent on house arrest.

The Court of Appeal found that the strict conditions of house arrest, which required the appellant to be supervised by his full-time working surety, did indeed have a significant impact on his liberty and ability to carry out normal activities.

The Court concluded that this impact should have mitigated his sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal was allowed, resulting in a 7.5-month reduction to the appellant's sentence.

The appellant, David Griffith, appealed his convictions for possession for the purposes of trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained in breach of his Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)).

The trial judge found breaches but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the *Grant* analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the *Grant* analysis, specifically regarding the lawfulness of the pat-down search incident to investigative detention and the application of discoverability.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The applicants, Lakhpreet Brar and Sukhvir Singh, sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter due to a breach of their section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating the total delay for Brar as 22 months and 10 days, and for Singh as 24 months and 8 days, both exceeding the 18-month Provincial Court ceiling.

The court found minimal defence delay (3 days for Brar, 4 days for Singh) and rejected arguments that COVID-19 or the case's complexity constituted exceptional circumstances justifying the delay.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the applicants' Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings for both.

The accused, Miguel Orlando Zavala-Martinez, was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

At sentencing, the defence sought a stay of proceedings or a reduced sentence, arguing police misconduct in obtaining the search warrant constituted Charter violations (ss. 8 and 9) and an abuse of process.

The court found that the affiant police officer failed to be full, frank, and fair in drafting the Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant, leading to an infringement of the accused's Charter rights.

While the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, it considered the state misconduct and the accused's personal circumstances (age, lack of criminal record, medical conditions, family responsibilities) as significant mitigating factors.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with a three-month probationary period, a ten-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, departing from the typical custodial range for such an offence.

Deepak Prasad was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered aggravating factors, including prior convictions and trafficking for profit, and mitigating factors such as youthfulness, rehabilitation efforts, family support, and remorse.

The Crown sought an 18-month sentence, while the defence proposed a suspended sentence with credit for time on bail.

The court imposed a global sentence of 11 months of incarceration, comprising 11 months for cocaine trafficking and one month concurrent for marijuana trafficking, followed by 12 months of probation with conditions.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The accused, Miguel Orlando Zavala-Martinez, was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

At sentencing, new defence counsel sought a reduction in sentence, including an absolute discharge or suspended sentence, alleging egregious violations of the accused's Charter rights (sections 7, 8, 9) and police misconduct during the investigation and search.

The defence argued that the evidence presented to the jury was obtained through fabricated grounds and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant.

The Crown opposed, arguing that these issues should have been raised at a pre-trial admissibility hearing and that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to decide Charter violations at this stage.

The court denied the defence's claim of a section 7 Charter breach for non-disclosure but ruled that the defence could call a police witness to adduce evidence on the alleged Charter violations and state misconduct to determine if a sentence reduction is appropriate, potentially below statutory limits, in accordance with principles from R. v. Nasogaluak.

Deepak Prasad brought an application under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude evidence (drugs and cash) seized from his residence and car following the execution of search warrants.

The Crown conceded that the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) could not justify the warrants, leading to a "step six application" to consider unredacted portions.

The court found the judicial summary sufficient for the defence to challenge the warrant.

Applying the Debot criteria (credibility, compelling, and corroboration) holistically, the court determined that the issuing justice had reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrants.

The information from confidential informants was found credible, compelling, and corroborated by police surveillance and investigation, establishing reasonable grounds to believe in ongoing drug trafficking and the presence of evidence in the specified locations.

Consequently, the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

Three appellants appealed their convictions for drug trafficking offences arising from Project O'Bunker, a large joint forces investigation in London, Ontario.

The appellants challenged the dismissal of their s. 11(b) Charter applications alleging unreasonable delay, and one appellant also challenged his conviction on the merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding that while the total delay of 39-40 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 30 months established in R. v. Jordan, the delay was justified by the exceptional complexity of the prosecution and the transitional exceptional circumstance based on reasonable reliance on the previous Morin framework.