R. Cary Boswell

The defendant, a Type-1 diabetic, was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a head-on collision.

The defense argued that the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the risk due to severe hypoglycemia (neuroglycopenia) and was in a state of automatism.

The court found that the defendant was in a state of neuroglycopenia when he began driving erratically and lacked the capacity to appreciate the risk, distinguishing the case from R. v. Elson where the driver was aware of dropping blood sugar.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the defendant's acquittal.

The automatism defense was not fully analyzed but the court was not satisfied it was proven on a balance of probabilities.

Jerome Derby pleaded guilty to four firearm-related offences, including discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm, occupying a vehicle with a prohibited firearm, and breach of a weapons prohibition order.

The sentencing judge considered aggravating factors such as the seriousness of the offences, the public setting of the shooting, and the offender's significant criminal record, including a prior manslaughter conviction.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, the offender's lived experience with anti-Black racism and poverty, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9.5 years, which, after credit for pre-sentence custody, resulted in a net sentence of 5 years and 3 months.

The defendant, Kyle Hughes, brought a disclosure application in a criminal case involving child pornography charges, seeking technical information about automated law enforcement software (Torrential Downpour and Torrential Downpour Receptor) used to investigate his IP address.

The application sought operational copies, source codes, user manuals, training materials, and changelogs to challenge software functionality, potential Charter breaches (s. 8), and the sufficiency of grounds for a search warrant.

The Crown resisted, arguing irrelevance, lack of possession/control, and privilege.

The court ruled that user manuals and changelogs for the software are "obviously relevant" first-party disclosure, subject to privilege claims.

Operational copies of the software were deemed third-party disclosure, meeting the "likely relevant" threshold for a second-stage privilege assessment.

However, the court dismissed requests for source codes and training materials, finding them not "likely relevant" or "obviously relevant" respectively, and clarified that foreign agencies providing investigative leads are not part of the "investigating police force" for disclosure purposes.

J.D. was charged with one count of sexual interference involving his wife's five-year-old niece.

The trial focused on whether J.D. committed the alleged act.

The Crown presented the complainant's testimony, which the court found credible and consistent despite minor inconsistencies.

The defence presented J.D.'s wife, J.C., whose exculpatory testimony regarding J.D.'s opportunity, the complainant's alleged motive to fabricate, and a potential third-party suspect was largely rejected by the court as unbelievable and unreliable.

The court applied the principles of R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. B.(G.). in assessing witness credibility, ultimately finding the complainant's evidence compelling and sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jessy Lewis pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm and possession of cocaine.

The court considered sentencing objectives, aggravating and mitigating factors, including the offender's significant rehabilitation efforts, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, and stringent bail terms.

The court also addressed the consideration of anti-Black racism in sentencing, as per R. v. Morris.

Ultimately, a conditional sentence of 6 months and 3 weeks was imposed, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and forfeiture of the weapon and drugs, but not the seized currency.

The offender was convicted of internet child luring following a police sting operation where he believed he was communicating with a 15-year-old girl.

The court considered the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 172.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, finding it unconstitutional based on binding precedent.

Weighing the offender's difficult background as a refugee against the gravity of the offence and the Supreme Court's direction to increase sentences for child sexual offences, the court imposed a sentence of 16 months' imprisonment, one year of probation, and ancillary orders.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant for damages arising from the defendant's failure to close a real estate transaction.

The defendant raised numerous defenses, including intoxication, misrepresentation, non est factum, undue influence, duress, and unconscionability, largely blaming the dual real estate agent.

The court found that none of the defenses raised a genuine issue for trial, noting the defendant's lack of credibility and failure to provide supporting evidence.

The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the motion was an inappropriate request for partial summary judgment due to an outstanding third-party claim against the real estate agent.

The court awarded the plaintiff $168,962.63 in damages and declined to stay the enforcement of the judgment.

The third party, an appraisal company, moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike a third party claim brought by the defendants for negligent misrepresentation.

The defendants alleged the appraiser negligently undervalued a property, causing a purchaser to back out of a sale.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding it plain and obvious that the claim could not succeed because the appraiser owed no duty of care to the defendants, having prepared the report exclusively for a lender, and because the defendants did not rely on the appraisal.

The defendant, C.R., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving his step-grandson, T.C., then 10-11 years old.

The trial judge, sitting without a jury, assessed the credibility and reliability of both the complainant's and the accused's testimony.

Despite finding the complainant generally credible and the allegations highly likely, the judge found that inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, coupled with the absence of serious flaws in the accused's denial, prevented the Crown from proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation claim under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the defendant sought full indemnity costs of approximately $29,500.

The plaintiff argued that full indemnity costs were inappropriate because the claim had some merit and the defendant's statements were demonstrably false and reckless.

The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that the lawsuit was not a traditional SLAPP and was driven by the defendant's recklessness.

The court rebutted the presumption of full indemnity costs and awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,000.

Following a 19-day construction lien trial, a procedural dispute arose regarding closing submissions.

The defendant filed a surrebuttal that raised a new defence under the Limitations Act, 2002, and implicitly alleged professional negligence against the plaintiff's counsel.

The plaintiff requested a right of reply.

The court granted the plaintiff a limited right of reply, finding that trial fairness dictated the plaintiff must have an opportunity to respond to a newly raised, unpleaded limitations defence.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment in a mortgage enforcement action, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $22,126.11.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of $101,830.30, arguing the plaintiff prolonged the action by taking an incorrect legal position on the applicable interest rate.

The court found the plaintiff was prima facie entitled to costs but reduced the award to $13,060 because the plaintiff's insistence on an unsustainable interest rate prolonged the proceedings and hindered settlement.

The moving party brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a defamation claim arising from his distribution of a petition criticizing the responding party's leadership of a religious society.

The petition included a false allegation that the responding party's family sold society lands without accounting for the proceeds.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest, the responding party failed to show the claim had substantial merit or that there were no valid defences, and the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the harm to the responding party.

The plaintiff brought an action against the Children's Aid Society and several of its employees for $50 million, alleging breach of trust, Charter violations, and defamation after the Society determined she was not an approved caregiver and communicated this to families she was involved with.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the defendants were immune from liability under s. 37(1) of the CYFSA as they acted in good faith.

Furthermore, the court found no fiduciary duty, duty of care, or duty of confidentiality was breached, no Charter rights were engaged, and the defamation claims were defeated by the defences of justification and qualified privilege.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

He contended that following the enactment of Bill C-75, which eliminated preliminary hearings for his charge, the presumptive ceiling for his Superior Court trial should be 18 months rather than 30 months.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the 30-month ceiling applies to all cases in the Superior Court regardless of whether a preliminary hearing is held.

The court also found that the anticipated net delay of 22 months, after deducting Covid-19 related exceptional circumstances, was not markedly longer than reasonably required.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a mortgage claim against the defendants.

The defendants had defaulted on both a first and second mortgage on their property.

The plaintiff, as second mortgagee, bought out the first mortgage to protect its interests.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff breached its duty of honest contractual performance by allegedly misleading them about its intentions regarding the first mortgage.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, rejecting the defendants' bad faith arguments and fixing the outstanding mortgage balance at $2,472,567.91.

The third parties brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to disclose their real estate lawyer's files relating to the purchase of their property.

The plaintiffs opposed, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that the plaintiffs' former counsel had previously undertaken to produce the files and had thereby waived any claim to privilege.

The motion was granted and the plaintiffs were ordered to produce the files.

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent is a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act following years of litigation over a defaulted mortgage.

The respondent requested the judge recuse himself, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias based on comments made in a prior ruling.

The court dismissed the recusal request, finding the prior comments were an accurate assessment of the respondent's delay tactics.

The court granted the vexatious litigant application, finding the respondent had persistently instituted meritless proceedings, rolled over issues, failed to pay costs, and exhibited numerous hallmarks of a vexatious litigant.

The respondent was barred from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave of the court.

The applicant, facing multiple charges including sexual assault and attempted child abduction, applied for a review of his detention after spending 911 days in pre-trial custody.

The court found that the significant passage of time, combined with the harsh conditions of pre-trial detention during the COVID-19 pandemic, constituted a material change in circumstances triggering jurisdiction for a review.

The court concluded that a stringent release plan, including house arrest, a $100,000 surety, and GPS ankle monitoring, sufficiently attenuated the risks to public safety and maintained confidence in the administration of justice.

The detention order was vacated and the applicant was released on strict conditions.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The trial judge had delivered a brief oral acquittal and later provided comprehensive written reasons after inviting further submissions on a new appellate decision.

The parties agreed that under R. v. Teskey, the appellate court could not consider the written reasons, and under R. v. Sheppard, the oral reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The summary conviction appeal court accepted the joint submission, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.