R. Cary Boswell

Following competing motions for security for costs, the court ordered the plaintiff to post security and dismissed the plaintiff’s own motion for security.

The defendants sought costs of $18,618.92 while the plaintiff argued the amount should be reduced due to duplication of effort after the defendants changed counsel and allegedly excessive preparation and travel charges.

Applying the discretionary principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized proportionality, fairness, and reasonableness in fixing costs.

The court found some duplication attributable to the change of counsel and considered the limited scope of the half‑day motion.

Costs were fixed at $14,000 all inclusive payable by the plaintiff.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings on historical sexual assault charges, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, abuse of process under s. 7, and prejudice from lost evidence.

The original charge was laid in 1986 and withdrawn shortly after, then re-laid in 2010 with additional counts.

The court found the 24-year gap between charges was neutral time and the institutional delay was within acceptable guidelines.

The court dismissed the abuse of process claim, finding no prosecutorial misconduct.

While the court found a breach of the right to make full answer and defence due to a lost exculpatory statement, it reserved the determination of the appropriate remedy until the end of the trial.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder arising from a domestic homicide, the court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The offender stabbed his common law spouse during a heated argument in their shared home, resulting in her death.

The court considered the statutory framework for second degree murder sentencing, including ss. 235(1), 745(c), and 745.4 of the Criminal Code, as well as general sentencing principles under ss. 718–718.2.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of criminal record and the impulsive nature of the violence, while aggravating factors included the sudden lethal attack against an unarmed intimate partner and the breach of trust inherent in domestic relationships.

Balancing these factors and comparable case law, the court imposed a life sentence with a 12‑year period of parole ineligibility.

The defendant insurer sought leave to appeal a motion judge's refusal to strike the plaintiff's jury notice in an action for life insurance proceeds.

The insurer argued the claim was for declaratory relief, which must be tried without a jury under s. 108(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the motion judge's conclusion that the pith and substance of the claim was a factual dispute regarding the deceased's insurability, rather than a claim for declaratory relief.

The mother appealed an order making her two young children Crown wards with no access, and moved for a stay to reinstate access pending the appeal.

The Children's Aid Society brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the appeal under Rule 38(28) of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that the trial judge had given adequate consideration to the proposed kinship placement with the maternal grandparents and made no palpable and overriding errors.

Concluding that the appeal had no chance of success, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the appeal.

The mother's motion for a stay was also dismissed, as there was no serious issue to be tried and reinstating access was not in the children's best interests.

The applicants, former volunteer board members of a charity, were unsuccessful in their application to set aside an election.

The respondents sought substantial indemnity costs of nearly $100,000, including costs against the applicants' solicitor personally.

The court rejected the argument that the applicants' volunteer status immunized them from costs, but found the respondents' pre-litigation conduct warranted a reduction.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity scale at $30,000 plus disbursements, and the issue of the solicitor's personal liability was reserved.

The applicants, former board members of a hospice charity, sought judicial review and leave to appeal several rulings made by a court-appointed arbitrator regarding a disputed board election.

They also sought to set aside the election results based on alleged irregularities.

The court held that judicial review is not available for decisions of a private consensual arbitrator.

The court further found that the applicants were out of time to appeal most of the arbitral awards under the Arbitration Act, and regardless, the arbitrator made no errors of law.

Finally, the court declined to set aside the election results, finding that the alleged irregularities were minor and did not go to the heart of the electoral process.

The defendant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering it to pay the balance of a contract for boiler installation and related work.

The defendant alleged the plaintiff was part of an organized crime conspiracy to sabotage the project and that the trial judge improperly interfered with the presentation of its case.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and dismissed the conspiracy allegations as frivolous.

Although the trial judge's excessive interference in witness examinations amounted to an error in law, the court declined to order a new trial, concluding that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred given the complete lack of merit to the defence.