Melvin I. Rotman

The applicant sought a declaration that $525,000 provided to his son and daughter-in-law in 2011 to purchase a home was a loan to be held in constructive or resulting trust, rather than a gift.

The respondents contended the money was a gift and that the application was time-barred.

The court found the money was clearly a gift based on the signed gift letter, the applicant's admission of never requesting repayment, his payment of rent to the respondents, and his knowledge that he was not on title.

The court also found the application statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act, as the claim accrued in 2011 and the application was brought in 2024.

The plaintiff, Michael Forstner, sued the defendants, Manbir Singh Sandhu, Gurpreet Singh Sandhu, and Computer Window Inc., for conversion of a computer/dialer and for assault and battery following an altercation.

The court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims.

It found that the plaintiff failed to prove conversion, as the computer was returned, and that the alleged assault and battery by Mrs. Sandhu was not established on a balance of probabilities.

The plaintiff's credibility was significantly undermined by inconsistent evidence regarding the purchase date and timeline of events.

Damages for conversion and personal injury were also not proven.

The defendants' counterclaim was withdrawn at the outset of the trial.

The appellant, Jaswant Singh Kooner, appealed a trial judgment that found he owed his lawyer, Peter Verbeek, outstanding legal fees.

The trial judge had found an oral retainer agreement for fees and disbursements, not a contingent fee, and awarded Verbeek $59,342.42 plus $22,500 in costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings regarding the oral retainer agreement or the reasonableness of the fees.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also dismissed.

The appellants, Twisha Talpade and Vineet Talpade, appealed a lower court order concerning mortgage enforcement and their dismissed counterclaim.

They alleged judicial bias, procedural unfairness, and errors in the calculation of outstanding mortgage amounts and the failure to award them damages.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias or procedural unfairness, noting that the appellants had consented to the lower court's process while represented by counsel.

The court also found no palpable and overriding errors in the motion judge's factual findings regarding the mortgage amounts or the decision not to award damages, as the counterclaim had been dismissed by consent.

The appeal of the costs order in favour of Jay Parmar and Canada Lend was also dismissed.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment in a defamation action where the plaintiff was awarded general and punitive damages, the parties could not agree on costs.

The plaintiff sought $50,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the defendants' conduct was reprehensible.

The court found the defendants' conduct in the litigation did not rise to the egregious level required for elevated costs and noted the plaintiff's claimed time was excessive.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity basis in the all-inclusive amount of $23,000.

The appellant entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for a property and paid a $40,000 deposit.

The transaction failed to close because the appellant could not secure financing.

The appellant sought the return of the deposit, arguing there was an oral agreement that it would be refunded if the sale failed.

The application judge dismissed the application, applying the parol evidence rule to exclude the oral agreement and finding no grounds for relief from forfeiture.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the written contract governed and that the deposit forfeiture was not unconscionable.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that held them liable for the balance of a business purchase price.

Their defence was based on fraudulent misrepresentations about the business's revenues.

The motion judge had dismissed this defence, relying on an "entire agreement" clause in the purchase agreement and the appellants' opportunities for due diligence.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in law by giving preclusive effect to the entire agreement clause, as such clauses do not immunize against fraudulent misrepresentation.

Furthermore, opportunities for due diligence do not negate a party's right to avoid a contract based on fraudulent misrepresentation if actual knowledge of the untruth was not proven.

The Court concluded that a genuine issue for trial existed regarding the fraudulent misrepresentation and allowed the appeal, setting aside the summary judgment and remitting the matter for trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a defamation action against the defendants for publishing articles on a website and sending WhatsApp messages containing false allegations of financial impropriety and misappropriation of funds.

The court found the case appropriate for summary judgment and held that the articles were defamatory.

The defendants failed to establish any defences, including justification, responsible communication, qualified privilege, or fair comment, due to a complete lack of evidence supporting the allegations and a reckless failure to verify them.

The court awarded the plaintiff $75,000 in general damages and $25,000 in punitive damages, but declined to grant a permanent injunction.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment in a mortgage enforcement action, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $22,126.11.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of $101,830.30, arguing the plaintiff prolonged the action by taking an incorrect legal position on the applicable interest rate.

The court found the plaintiff was prima facie entitled to costs but reduced the award to $13,060 because the plaintiff's insistence on an unsustainable interest rate prolonged the proceedings and hindered settlement.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that they continued to own their condominium unit and to void a non-arms' length transfer by power of sale executed by the second mortgagee.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.

The court found that the alleged oral agreement to transfer the property to the mortgagee was not binding and that the subsequent non-arms' length sale was presumptively void, with no evidence provided to rebut the presumption.

To avoid the rule against partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs withdrew their claim for punitive damages.

The court granted summary judgment voiding the sale and ordered a reference to determine the amounts due under the mortgage.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a vendor take-back mortgage, promissory note, and personal guarantee following the sale of a coin laundry business to the defendants.

The defendants opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for production of financial records, arguing the plaintiff misrepresented the business's income.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The court enforced the entire agreement clause in the purchase agreement, noting the defendants had ample opportunity to conduct due diligence, verify the income, and walk away from the transaction before closing.

The appellants appealed a judgment, arguing that the Negligence Act applied and that the respondents' actions constituted an intentional tort.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Negligence Act had no application because the respondent's cause of action was grounded on rule 60.08(17) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, not in tort.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding no just cause for the respondent's termination and extending the notice period by two months.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of no just cause, as the appellant failed to show the trial judge was clearly wrong.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the judgment amount by one-third because the trial judge erred in extending the notice period without evidence that the termination prolonged or aggravated the respondent's depression.