Ian J. Perry

The applicants sought directions to remove the respondent's notice of objection to their application for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee.

The respondent claimed a financial interest in the estate based on an alleged debt owed by the deceased for partnership expenses related to a jointly owned property.

The court found that the respondent was merely a creditor or potential creditor, which does not constitute a 'financial interest' in the estate under Rule 75.03(1).

Consequently, the respondent lacked standing to maintain the notice of objection, and the application was granted.

On a Small Claims Court appeal, the appellants challenged a judgment entered after their pleadings were struck when their paralegal failed to attend on time for trial because of a diarizing error.

The appeal court held that the Deputy Judge erred in law by treating the earlier ruling as functus officio and refusing to consider whether the order striking the pleadings should be set aside once the paralegal arrived before the proceeding had concluded.

The court found that procedural fairness required consideration of available discretionary remedies, including permitting participation in the damages hearing and requiring proof on liability-related issues.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new trial before a different Deputy Judge on condition that the amount of the impugned judgment, excluding costs and interest, be paid into court within 60 days.

No costs were ordered for the first trial or the appeal.

The applicant challenged Ontario pandemic legislation, a municipal medical officer of health's closure order and enforcement directions, and a trespass notice issued after he deliberately reopened a restaurant for indoor dining in protest of COVID-19 restrictions.

The court held that the EMCPA, the ROA, and O. Reg. 82/20 were intra vires provincial legislation addressing local public health and economic regulation.

It found no infringement of freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, or ss. 7, 8, or 9 Charter rights, and held that any infringement would in any event be justified under s. 1.

The court also held that the medical officer of health acted within statutory authority under the HPPA and the Trespass to Property Act, and that the judicial review aspects could properly be heard together with the constitutional application.

The application for judicial review, constitutional relief, and Charter relief was dismissed.

The applicants, neighbours of the respondent, brought a nuisance claim alleging that the respondent's year-round use of a woodstove emitted toxic smoke and that he engaged in retaliatory noise bombing with outdoor speakers.

The court found the applicants' evidence lacked credibility, noting their complaints had evolved over time and were unsupported by expert evidence, while multiple complaints to authorities had resulted in no enforcement action.

The court preferred the respondent's evidence and dismissed the application, finding no substantial interference with the applicants' property enjoyment.

The respondent was awarded $25,000 in costs.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff in a mortgage dispute involving the sale of a property and alleged construction deficiencies.

The court considered whether to release funds from the sale, vacate a writ of execution, set aside the default judgment, consolidate proceedings, and set a timetable for summary judgment.

Applying the established five-factor test, the court found the motion to set aside the default judgment was not brought promptly, lacked a plausible explanation for the default, and that the balance of prejudice and the integrity of the administration of justice weighed against granting the relief.

The motion was dismissed, but the court ordered the release of certain funds and vacated the writ of execution on consent.

No costs were awarded to either party.

The moving defendants sought an interlocutory or interim injunction restraining a mortgagee from completing a power of sale of a residential property that was also alleged to be a matrimonial home.

They argued the underlying promissory note and mortgage were unconscionable, the spouse had not validly consented to the encumbrance, and the statutory notice requirements under the Mortgages Act were not met.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald framework, the court held that most asserted grounds did not raise a serious issue to be tried, found no irreparable harm because any loss was compensable in damages, and concluded the balance of convenience favoured the mortgagee and the third-party purchaser.

The motion was dismissed and the sale was permitted to proceed.

The court rendered a costs and interest decision following a trial where the plaintiff's (BBD) claim for lien was discharged and its action dismissed, while the defendants (TRN) were awarded damages on their counterclaim.

The court addressed the defendants' costs claim, their offer to settle under Rule 49, and prejudgment interest.

The court found the mandatory aspects of Rule 49.10 inapplicable due to the Construction Act's broad discretion on costs.

It also criticized the defendants' conduct regarding costs outlines and the landlord's (264) conduct regarding document production.

Ultimately, the court awarded TRN $25,000 in partial indemnity costs from BBD, and no costs between BBD and 264, along with prejudgment interest on the damages awarded to TRN.

The plaintiff contractor brought an action to enforce a construction lien of $14,091.10 for the renovation of a roastery café.

The defendant owner counterclaimed for $386,047.87, alleging overcharging, delay, deficiencies, and flood damage.

The court found the contract was a cost-plus contract, not a fixed-price contract.

The contractor failed to meet its heavy evidentiary burden to prove its actual costs, resulting in an overpayment finding of $182,825.55 in favour of the owner.

The court dismissed the owner's claims for delay and deficiencies but found the contractor partially liable for flood damage in the amount of $1,300.

The contractor's lien was discharged, its action dismissed, and the owner was awarded $184,125.55 on its counterclaim.

This was a motion brought by His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario for security for costs against William Adamson Skelly and Adamson Barbecue Limited.

The court applied the two-step analysis under Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

It found that Mr. Skelly was ordinarily resident outside Ontario and Adamson Barbecue Limited had insufficient assets in Ontario.

The applicants failed to establish impecuniosity or that the order would be unjust.

The court also noted the low likelihood of success for the applicants' underlying constitutional challenge to the Reopening Ontario Act and related regulations, which were spent or revoked.

The motion for security for costs was granted in the amount of $30,000, and motion costs of $2,000 were awarded to Ontario.

The plaintiff, Randy Burbidge, sought a declaration that the defendants, Pat Casullo and Denise Cardy, held a condominium in trust for him, or alternatively, an award of damages for unjust enrichment.

The condominium was transferred to the defendants in 2006 while the plaintiff was incarcerated, allegedly to protect it from creditors, with an oral agreement for reconveyance upon debt repayment.

The defendants claimed the transfer was a foreclosure and subsequent payments were rent.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence more credible, declared a resulting trust or constructive trust due to unjust enrichment, and ordered the condominium transferred to the plaintiff.

A reference was ordered to determine any remaining amounts owed by the plaintiff for the loan and carrying costs.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff due to the defendants' conduct, including strategic litigation at the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to set aside a Notice of Sale and stay a pending sale related to a vendor takeback mortgage default.

They argued the redemption amount was inflated due to an illegal interest rate and unjustified charges, prejudicing their ability to obtain financing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the issue moot as the property had been sold and no stay was sought pending appeal.

The court noted evidentiary problems and stated that the questions of amounts owing were better suited for adjudication in the outstanding mortgage action.

The applicants purchased a boat from the respondent, Roman Korytski, which was later discovered to be stolen.

The respondent Aviva Canada Inc. claimed ownership by right of salvage.

The applicants sought compensation from Korytski for breach of contract (nemo dat principle) and reimbursement of expenses from Aviva for the boat's upkeep.

The court found Korytski liable for the original purchase price of $33,200, rejecting the claim for current market value due to lack of expert evidence.

The claim against Aviva for expenses was dismissed, as the applicants had possession and use of the boat during the period the expenses were incurred.

The City of Hamilton successfully moved to dismiss an application challenging its mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy on the basis of mootness, after the City suspended the policy.

Both parties sought costs.

The court found that the applicants achieved significant success by prompting the policy's suspension and were entitled to partial indemnity costs up to that date.

The City was entitled to partial indemnity costs for its successful motion to dismiss.

The court set off the respective costs entitlements and ordered that no costs be paid by either party.

The National Organized Workers Union appealed the denial of an interlocutory injunction to prevent Sinai Health System from enforcing a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The union argued that the policy compelled vaccination without informed consent, constituting irreparable harm not remediable by arbitration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in declining to exercise the Superior Court's residual jurisdiction in labour relations.

The court affirmed that the potential harm of unpaid leave or termination due to non-compliance with a workplace policy is fundamentally related to employment and is remediable by a labour arbitrator through reinstatement and compensation for lost wages, thus not creating a 'remedial gap' that would warrant Superior Court intervention.

The applicants, non-unionized employees of the City of Hamilton, challenged the termination provisions of the City's mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy under the Charter.

After the application was commenced, the City suspended the termination provisions indefinitely and brought a motion to dismiss the application for mootness.

The court granted the motion, finding no live controversy existed because the provisions were suspended and no applicants had suffered adverse consequences.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case, citing judicial economy and the hypothetical nature of any ruling on a suspended policy.

The plaintiffs brought a defamation action against the defendants regarding statements made during a union organizing drive where the plaintiffs sought to displace the incumbent union.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 21.01(3)(a), arguing the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) had exclusive jurisdiction.

Applying the Weber analysis, the court determined the essential character of the dispute concerned alleged misrepresentations during a displacement campaign, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the OLRB under the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant mortgagors sought to set aside a Notice of Sale issued by the respondent mortgagee, arguing that the notice and a subsequent mortgage statement claimed unlawful interest rates and fees.

The court found that while the 18% interest rate charged on arrears likely violated section 8 of the Interest Act, the original Notice of Sale was valid as the disputed amounts were not sufficient to invalidate it.

Furthermore, the applicants were unable to obtain sufficient financing to redeem the mortgage even if the disputed charges were removed.

The application to stay the sale was dismissed, with disputed funds from the sale ordered to be paid into court.

Following the dismissal of the union's application for an interim injunction against the employer's mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy, the employer sought partial indemnity costs of $34,146.11.

The union argued no costs should be awarded as the matter was of public interest and novel concern, or alternatively that costs should be capped at $10,000.

The court rejected the novelty argument, finding existing case law was adequate to resolve the issue.

After considering the factors under Rule 57.01, including the importance of the issues, the urgent timeline, and reasonable expectations, the court fixed costs at $27,000 payable by the union.

The applicant unions sought interim injunctions to restrain the respondent employers from enforcing mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policies pending the outcome of labour arbitrations.

The court dismissed the Sinai application on the basis that the labour arbitration process provided an adequate alternative remedy, precluding the exercise of the court's residual jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the TTC application on the merits of the injunction test, finding that the loss of employment or income did not constitute irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience strongly favoured the employer's obligation to protect public health and workplace safety.

The plaintiffs, a group of unionized and non-unionized hospital employees, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant employer from enforcing a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy that threatened termination of employment.

The court dissolved a previously granted interim injunction.

For the unionized employees, the court held that the essential character of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour arbitration process under the collective agreements, and declined to exercise its residual jurisdiction to grant interim relief where the unions had carriage of the grievances and had not sought such relief.

For the non-unionized employees, the court found no irreparable harm, as monetary damages would be an adequate remedy if their employment was wrongfully terminated.