Ian J. Perry

The applicants, neighbours of the respondent, brought a nuisance claim alleging that the respondent's year-round use of a woodstove emitted toxic smoke and that he engaged in retaliatory noise bombing with outdoor speakers.

The court found the applicants' evidence lacked credibility, noting their complaints had evolved over time and were unsupported by expert evidence, while multiple complaints to authorities had resulted in no enforcement action.

The court preferred the respondent's evidence and dismissed the application, finding no substantial interference with the applicants' property enjoyment.

The respondent was awarded $25,000 in costs.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff in a mortgage dispute involving the sale of a property and alleged construction deficiencies.

The court considered whether to release funds from the sale, vacate a writ of execution, set aside the default judgment, consolidate proceedings, and set a timetable for summary judgment.

Applying the established five-factor test, the court found the motion to set aside the default judgment was not brought promptly, lacked a plausible explanation for the default, and that the balance of prejudice and the integrity of the administration of justice weighed against granting the relief.

The motion was dismissed, but the court ordered the release of certain funds and vacated the writ of execution on consent.

No costs were awarded to either party.

The court rendered a costs and interest decision following a trial where the plaintiff's (BBD) claim for lien was discharged and its action dismissed, while the defendants (TRN) were awarded damages on their counterclaim.

The court addressed the defendants' costs claim, their offer to settle under Rule 49, and prejudgment interest.

The court found the mandatory aspects of Rule 49.10 inapplicable due to the Construction Act's broad discretion on costs.

It also criticized the defendants' conduct regarding costs outlines and the landlord's (264) conduct regarding document production.

Ultimately, the court awarded TRN $25,000 in partial indemnity costs from BBD, and no costs between BBD and 264, along with prejudgment interest on the damages awarded to TRN.

This was a motion brought by His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario for security for costs against William Adamson Skelly and Adamson Barbecue Limited.

The court applied the two-step analysis under Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

It found that Mr. Skelly was ordinarily resident outside Ontario and Adamson Barbecue Limited had insufficient assets in Ontario.

The applicants failed to establish impecuniosity or that the order would be unjust.

The court also noted the low likelihood of success for the applicants' underlying constitutional challenge to the Reopening Ontario Act and related regulations, which were spent or revoked.

The motion for security for costs was granted in the amount of $30,000, and motion costs of $2,000 were awarded to Ontario.

The plaintiff, Randy Burbidge, sought a declaration that the defendants, Pat Casullo and Denise Cardy, held a condominium in trust for him, or alternatively, an award of damages for unjust enrichment.

The condominium was transferred to the defendants in 2006 while the plaintiff was incarcerated, allegedly to protect it from creditors, with an oral agreement for reconveyance upon debt repayment.

The defendants claimed the transfer was a foreclosure and subsequent payments were rent.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence more credible, declared a resulting trust or constructive trust due to unjust enrichment, and ordered the condominium transferred to the plaintiff.

A reference was ordered to determine any remaining amounts owed by the plaintiff for the loan and carrying costs.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff due to the defendants' conduct, including strategic litigation at the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to set aside a Notice of Sale and stay a pending sale related to a vendor takeback mortgage default.

They argued the redemption amount was inflated due to an illegal interest rate and unjustified charges, prejudicing their ability to obtain financing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the issue moot as the property had been sold and no stay was sought pending appeal.

The court noted evidentiary problems and stated that the questions of amounts owing were better suited for adjudication in the outstanding mortgage action.

The applicants purchased a boat from the respondent, Roman Korytski, which was later discovered to be stolen.

The respondent Aviva Canada Inc. claimed ownership by right of salvage.

The applicants sought compensation from Korytski for breach of contract (nemo dat principle) and reimbursement of expenses from Aviva for the boat's upkeep.

The court found Korytski liable for the original purchase price of $33,200, rejecting the claim for current market value due to lack of expert evidence.

The claim against Aviva for expenses was dismissed, as the applicants had possession and use of the boat during the period the expenses were incurred.

The National Organized Workers Union appealed the denial of an interlocutory injunction to prevent Sinai Health System from enforcing a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The union argued that the policy compelled vaccination without informed consent, constituting irreparable harm not remediable by arbitration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in declining to exercise the Superior Court's residual jurisdiction in labour relations.

The court affirmed that the potential harm of unpaid leave or termination due to non-compliance with a workplace policy is fundamentally related to employment and is remediable by a labour arbitrator through reinstatement and compensation for lost wages, thus not creating a 'remedial gap' that would warrant Superior Court intervention.

The plaintiffs brought a defamation action against the defendants regarding statements made during a union organizing drive where the plaintiffs sought to displace the incumbent union.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 21.01(3)(a), arguing the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) had exclusive jurisdiction.

Applying the Weber analysis, the court determined the essential character of the dispute concerned alleged misrepresentations during a displacement campaign, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the OLRB under the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant mortgagors sought to set aside a Notice of Sale issued by the respondent mortgagee, arguing that the notice and a subsequent mortgage statement claimed unlawful interest rates and fees.

The court found that while the 18% interest rate charged on arrears likely violated section 8 of the Interest Act, the original Notice of Sale was valid as the disputed amounts were not sufficient to invalidate it.

Furthermore, the applicants were unable to obtain sufficient financing to redeem the mortgage even if the disputed charges were removed.

The application to stay the sale was dismissed, with disputed funds from the sale ordered to be paid into court.

Following the dismissal of the union's application for an interim injunction against the employer's mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy, the employer sought partial indemnity costs of $34,146.11.

The union argued no costs should be awarded as the matter was of public interest and novel concern, or alternatively that costs should be capped at $10,000.

The court rejected the novelty argument, finding existing case law was adequate to resolve the issue.

After considering the factors under Rule 57.01, including the importance of the issues, the urgent timeline, and reasonable expectations, the court fixed costs at $27,000 payable by the union.

The applicant unions sought interim injunctions to restrain the respondent employers from enforcing mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policies pending the outcome of labour arbitrations.

The court dismissed the Sinai application on the basis that the labour arbitration process provided an adequate alternative remedy, precluding the exercise of the court's residual jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the TTC application on the merits of the injunction test, finding that the loss of employment or income did not constitute irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience strongly favoured the employer's obligation to protect public health and workplace safety.

The plaintiffs, a group of unionized and non-unionized hospital employees, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant employer from enforcing a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy that threatened termination of employment.

The court dissolved a previously granted interim injunction.

For the unionized employees, the court held that the essential character of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour arbitration process under the collective agreements, and declined to exercise its residual jurisdiction to grant interim relief where the unions had carriage of the grievances and had not sought such relief.

For the non-unionized employees, the court found no irreparable harm, as monetary damages would be an adequate remedy if their employment was wrongfully terminated.

The plaintiffs, employees of the University Health Network, brought an urgent motion for an interim injunction to prevent their termination for refusing the COVID-19 vaccine.

The defendants raised significant jurisdictional issues, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction over unionized employees.

The court granted a short-term interim order preserving the status quo for the named plaintiffs and specific individuals until a proper hearing on the jurisdictional issues could take place, noting the potential for irreparable harm if the employees were compelled to take the vaccine against their will.

Karen Deer initiated an action against RBC Dominion Securities Inc. and others, alleging unauthorized margin account activity.

She issued a Notice of Action but failed to file a Statement of Claim within the prescribed 30 days, leading to the presumptive expiry of a limitation period under the Securities Act.

Deer moved to extend the time for filing her Statement of Claim and validate its service.

RBC opposed, arguing non-compensable prejudice due to the loss of a limitations defence.

The court granted Deer's motion, finding a reasonable explanation for the delay and no actual prejudice to RBC, emphasizing the policy of adjudicating cases on their merits over strict adherence to procedural rules when no substantive prejudice exists.

The applicant sought an injunction to restrain the respondents from operating a parking lot, alleging a violation of a zoning by-law.

The respondents claimed a valid appeal against the Citywide By-law with the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal, which would allow them to continue operating under the previous zoning.

The court found that the validity of the appeal and the respondents' standing were matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal, not the Superior Court.

Consequently, the court declined to grant the injunction and adjourned the application sine die, allowing the applicant to pursue remedies before the Tribunal.

The defendant vendor brought a motion to stay an action commenced by the plaintiff purchasers, arguing that the dispute, concerning the termination of an agreement of purchase and sale due to the alleged incomplete state of a new home, fell under a mandatory arbitration clause.

The plaintiffs opposed, contending that the defendant had waived its right to arbitration by pleading to the action, unduly delayed bringing the motion, and that the matter was suitable for summary judgment.

The court found that the dispute fell within the arbitration clause, the defendant had not unduly delayed, and the matter was not appropriate for summary judgment due to significant factual disputes.

Consequently, the defendant's motion to stay the action was granted, and the plaintiffs' cross-motion for an adjournment to bring a summary judgment motion was implicitly dismissed.