REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] Natalie Cajic and Georgina Bruinsma-Cajic (together, the “applicants”) are the daughters of the late Nikola Cajic, who died on April 24, 2019, and their mother, Irmgard Cajic (“Irma”), who died on May 13, 2024. I shall be referring to all those involved in this case by their first names with no disrespect intended.

[2] The applicants are each named in Irma’s Will as trustees of her estate. They are also the residual beneficiaries of Irma’s estate, which includes a half interest in a piece of commercial property at 3513 Dundas Street West in Toronto (the “property”) that Nikola owned jointly with the respondent Jerry Zadyko. Irma inherited Nikola’s half interest in the property when he died in 2019.

[3] Natalie and Georgina filed an Application for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee with a Will for Irma’s estate (the “CAET”). The estates office in Brampton has not issued the CAET to the applicants because Jerry had filed a notice of objection with respect to the Application for a CAET under Rule 75.03(1).

[4] The applicants commenced this Application for Directions in Brampton to remove Jerry’s notice of objection to allow the estates office to proceed with issuing the CAET. The applicants are particularly interested in having the CAET issue to them as they would then have authority as the estate trustees of Irma’s estate to continue a prior Application they had commenced in Toronto for the partition and sale of the property.

[5] Title to the property is now held in the names of Irma Cajic and Jerry Zadyko as tenants in common.

[6] Jerry opposes this Application to remove his notice of objection. He submits the applicants are seeking directions for this order without grounds. He submits that he has the legal basis to file his notice of objection because he has a financial interest in Irma’s estate. Jerry makes this claim based on the argument that he and Nikola were partners in the ownership of the property, and that Nikola owed him money for covering his share of the partnership expenses at the time of his death. He asks the court to set a timetable for the exchange of affidavits, the conduct of cross-examinations on the issues, and to schedule a hearing to determine the validity of his notice of objection, and the liability of Irma’s estate for Nikola’s debt on the merits.

Contextual background

[7] Nikola and Jerry purchased the property in Toronto in 1979 as an investment. They took title to the property as tenants in common, each as to a 50% interest. Jerry states that the two men verbally agreed to the following terms with respect to the property (the “initial agreement”):

a. They would contribute equally to the carrying costs associated with the property as they became due;

b. They would split any profits generated from the property equally during the period of ownership; and

c. The property would only be sold upon the consent of both owners.

[8] According to Jerry, the parties agreed to amend the initial agreement to provide that, in the event of unequal contributions made by either of the owners toward the carrying costs, the parties would be made whole upon a sale of the property (the “amending agreement”).

[9] Shortly after they purchased the property, Nikola arranged for a series of renovations. He made these renovations with a view to opening a Yugoslavian credit union at the property (the “Credit Union renovations”). At the time, Jerry agreed to reimburse Nikola for 50% of the Credit Union renovations, plus 10% interest that Nikola demanded on that amount, all of which totalled $45,000.

[10] Nikola would ultimately abandon his dream of converting the property for use as a credit union.

[11] Since 1982, the property has been leased to tenants to operate a restaurant and bar. The profits from renting the property over the years were split equally between the Jerry and Nikola pursuant to the initial agreement during Nikola’s lifetime.

[12] In 1988, Jerry and Nikola refinanced the property. They granted a new mortgage on the property to Community Trust Co. Ltd. for a loan of $650,000.00 on December 15, 1988. The parties agreed that they would pay the principal and interest on the Community Trust mortgage equally each month in accordance with their agreements.

[13] There was no encumbrance or other debt against the property when the Community Trust mortgage was granted. Jerry and Nikola received the mortgage proceeds which they were to split equally between them. However, Jerry ultimately received $45,000 less from the proceeds after Nikola demanded that he reimburse him $45,000 for the Credit Union renovations. Jerry states that this demand was made even though he had nothing to do with the renovations when they were made.

[14] Jerry states that, starting in January of 1993, Nikola was struggling financially and asked Jerry to cover various parts of his share of the mortgage payments. Jerry agreed to this request, partly because he trusted Nikola to honour the agreements between them, and because any mortgage shortfall would negatively impact his credit rating and the standing of the mortgage with Community Trust. Jerry states that the two owners agreed that he would be made whole for all debts owed to him for covering Nikola’s share, with interest, upon the eventual sale of the property (the “1993 agreement”).

[15] Jerry periodically covered payments for Nikola on the mortgage from 1993 to 2002, for which he kept detailed records of all payments made on Nikola’s behalf. He claims he paid $43,002.50 to Nikola to make up this shortfall, not including interest, and half the cost of repairs he claims that Nikola never paid. These amounts were to be paid back upon the sale of the property under the 1993 agreement. Consistent with these terms, Jerry expected he would receive 10% interest on the money he covered for Nikola’s mortgage obligations over the years just as Nikola had charged him 10% interest for his share of the Credit Union renovations.

[16] As the property had not been sold to pay out Nikola’s debt to him before his death in 2019, Jerry claims that Nikola’s debt remains outstanding. Jerry submits that Irma assumed this debt when Nikola died, and that her estate owes him approximately $49,000 as a result.

[17] After Nikola’s death, Jerry states that he began directing 50% of the profits from the rental of the property to Irma. Jerry says that he did so in good faith and without requiring confirmation from Irma that Nikola’s interest in the property had been left to her in his Will. Jerry subsequently learned that Nikola’s 50% interest in the property had been transferred to Irma by Nikola’s estate in or around 2022.

[18] Jerry continued to collect rent from the tenant operating the restaurant and bar at the property and would remit $3,000 each month to Irma for her share of the net rent up to October 31, 2022. Jerry has not remitted any share of the rent to Irma since November 1, 2022, or to the applicants after Irma’s death.

[19] Before Irma died in 2024, she and the applicants had indicated their willingness to sell her 50% interest in the property to Jerry. At the time, Jerry was receptive to this proposal but wanted to make sure that he would be made whole for the loans he had made to Nicola from 1993 to 2002 under the 1993 agreement. Jerry was therefore surprised when Irma and the applicants subsequently denied any responsibility for Nikola’s debt and told Jerry that he was entitled to nothing.

[20] When Irma died in May 2024, the 50% interest in the property that had been transferred into her name in 2022 became an asset of her estate.

[21] Jerry takes the position that Irma assumed all the obligations to repay him for Nikola’s indebtedness when she inherited his interest and took title to the property as a tenant in common. By virtue of this assumption of debt, Jerry claims that Irma’s estate is responsible for all liabilities arising from funds he had advanced on Nikola’s behalf under the agreements between them and because the property was partnership property.

[22] Since Irma’s death, the applicants have ignored Jerry’s claims as a creditor of their mother’s estate. The applicants have also refused to provide Jerry with a proposed price for which they would sell Irma’s 50% interest in the property to him.

The Partition Application

[23] The applicants have brought this Application for Directions against the backdrop of an Application they had commenced in Toronto on June 21, 2024 under the Partition Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.4. (the “Partition Application”). In the Partition Application, the applicants ask the court to order the sale of the property. They also seeks an order that they be paid 50% of the net sale proceeds, an order that any encumbrances on the property that arise solely from Jerry’s obligations be paid solely out his share of the sale proceeds, an order that Jerry account for and remit 50% of all rental amounts collected from tenants of the property from and after November 1, 2022, and an order directing a reference to inquire into and determine all other issues relating to the conduct of the sale and the taking of accounts.

[24] On August 2, 2024, counsel for the applicants scheduled a 60-minute appearance before Centa J. even though counsel for Jerry had advised them that the matters at issue could not be resolved on a short appearance. The hearing of the Partition Application was subsequently scheduled to take place on December 9, 2024.

[25] Between the months of August and December 2024, the applicants did not attend any cross-examination.

[26] On December 9, 2024, the parties appeared before Papageorgiou J. when the Partition Application was next before the court. Jerry requested an adjournment at the outset of the hearing, which request was refused by Her Honour. However, Papageorgiou J. adjourned the hearing when she determined that the applicants lacked standing to ask for the partition and sale of the property because the court office in Brampton had not yet issued a CAET appointing them as estate trustees. When Justice Papageorgiou adjourned the Partition Application “until after probate”, she endorsed the record that she had seized herself of the matter.

[27] Despite the adjournment of the Partition Application until “after probate”, Jerry’s counsel asked the applicants on January 16, 2025 to schedule cross-examinations in that matter.

[28] On January 20, 2025, counsel for the applicants advised that the applicants “won’t be submitting to cross-examinations unless otherwise ordered to do so”.

Natalie and Georgina bring the Application for a CAET

[29] In November 2024, the applicants filed the Application for a CAET to be appointed estate trustees for Irma’s estate.

[30] On December 30, 2024, Jerry filed a Form 75.1 notice of objection under Rule 75.03(1). In the notice of objection, Jerry pleaded the agreements between himself and Nikola with respect to the property and claims that Nikola’s indebtedness that had accrued under those agreements was assumed by Irma as his beneficiary and successor in title of his interest in the property. He asserted a claim that the property was partnership property and that Nikola’s indebtedness should be paid to him from the proceeds of sale when the property is sold.

[31] On January 31, 2025, the applicants served a Form 75.3 notice to objector on Jerry’s counsel. Under Rule 75.03 (5), Jerry was required to serve and file a notice of appearance within 20 days.

[32] On April 14, 2025, the applicants’ Notice of Application for Directions was issued by the court office in Brampton to start this proceeding against Jerry as the respondent. This Application was brought pursuant to Rules 14.05(3)(a) and 75.06(1). The Notice of Application asks the court for directions with respect to an order striking out and remove the notice of objection served by Jerry on December 30, 2024 as the sole order, and costs. The applicants list grounds in this Application alleging that Jerry has no financial interest in the estate, that the notice of objection does not allege that the respondent is a beneficiary of the estate, that he would not be entitled to any part of the estate on an intestacy or any allegation that the testator lacked testamentary capacity. The applicants therefore pleaded in the Notice of Application that Jerry does not have standing to object to the issuance of the CAET to them.

[33] The applicants also state as a ground that Jerry has filed the notice of objection for a collateral purpose, namely, to delay adjudication of an ongoing partition and sale application.

Positions of the parties

The applicants position

[34] The applicants seek an order disposing of Jerry’s notice of objection based on the application record before the court. They submit that Jerry can establish that he is no more than a creditor of Irma’s estate at best, and that he has no financial interest in Irma’s estate at law. They take the position that, on all the evidence, Jerry has no standing to file or maintain a notice of objection to their Application for a CAET.

[35] The applicants submit the record is sufficient for the court to determine the standing issue without setting up the infrastructure of a timetable and a later hearing date. The parties have filed the affidavits given in the Partition Application and Natalie has filed a further affidavit dated April 24, 2025 in this proceeding to make the submission that Jerry has no standing. Natalie has now been cross-examined under the order made by Shaw J. on June 17, 2025. All evidence that is needed to decide the sole issue in this Application is before the court.

[36] The applicants also submit that the Partition Application is the appropriate proceeding in which the indebtedness as between Nikola and Jerry should be determined. Issues with respect to the terms of any agreements, amounts advanced and repaid, partnership issues and money collected for both parties requiring an accounting are among the issues that are already before the court in that proceeding. The applicants believe that Jerry may owe more money to Irma’s estate than the estate may owe to him as a set-off. Findings of fact to decide these issues are necessary for the court to make when allocating the net proceeds of sale within the Partition Application.

The position of the respondent Jerry Zadyko

[37] Jerry claims that Nikola owed him significant amounts for covering his share of the carrying costs for the property from 1993 to 2002. He takes the position that he and Nikola were partners in the business of owning and leasing the property. Jerry claims that this indebtedness attached to the property as partnership property and that the property retained this character when Irma inherited Nikola’s interest.

[38] Jerry submits that Nikola’s interest in the property remains partnership property as an asset of Irma’s estate. He takes the position that the total indebtedness owed by Nikola, including interest, is now a debt of Irma’s estate that gives him a financial interest in the estate.

[39] Jerry seeks directions for a hearing of this Application on the merits of his claims. He requests that the court set a timetable to develop the record to hear all aspects of this matter at the same time. Ultimately, he is asking the court in this Application to find his notice of objection is valid, and to schedule a hearing for an order directing payment of what is owed to him by Irma’s estate.

Analysis

[40] The main issues for determination in this Application are as follows:

a. Does the claim of Jerry Zadyko give him standing to file a notice of objection?

b. If so, does the court have the power to extend the time for Jerry to file a notice of appearance under Rule 75.03(5)?

c. Should the court grant judgment at this time or set a timetable for steps to follow in this Application?

[41] In my view, this Application can be determined on the current record as it turns on a point of law under either issue (a) or (b).

Standing

[42] Natalie and Georgina bring this Application to remove the notice of objection Jerry has filed under Rule 75.03(1), which reads as follows:

(1) At any time before a certificate of appointment of estate trustee has been issued, any person who appears to have a financial interest in the estate may give notice of an objection by filing with the court a notice of objection (Form 75.1), signed by the person or the person’s lawyer, stating the nature of the interest and of the objection.

[43] The nature of Jerry’s interest and the basis of his objection is set out in the notice of objection he filed on December 30, 2024 and expanded upon in the materials he has filed in this Application. Jerry has obtained no judgment against Nikola, Irma or their respective estates to recover the debt he claims. Nor has he ever brought an action on the agreements with Nikola on which he alleges that indebtedness arose. He is not a beneficiary of the Irma’s estate and asserts no entitlement under the Will or under an intestacy should the Will be set aside. He does not allege that Irma lacked capacity to make the Will or otherwise challenge the Will in any way. These facts are not contested.

[44] The applicants submit that Jerry’s claim is, at its highest, that of a potential judgment creditor, not of Irma or her estate, but of Nikola’s estate.

[45] The courts have defined what it is for a person to appear to have a “financial interest” in an estate. To appear to have a financial interest in an estate has been interpreted narrowly as a matter of law. It has been held in the most recent line of cases to mean that judgment creditors do not have a financial interest in an estate within the meaning of Rule 75. Several of those cases illustrate the point.

[46] In Jolicouer v. Scheibler, 2024 ONSC 5896, Pierce J. reviewed the law on the standing of an applicant to remove and replace an estate trustee under the Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.T.23 as a preliminary matter to deciding the issues before her. Pierce J. held that this question must be determined on the evidentiary record before the court: Moses v. Moses, 2021 ONSC 587 at para. 35. After an extensive review of the recent authorities on what it means to have a financial interest in an estate to attract standing, she concluded that:

The reasoning of the Superior Court over the last 24 years has been consistent in applying a narrow interpretation of who has “financial interest” in an estate, and who may apply to remove a trustee. This is for good reason. The courts have recognized that mixing claims of judgment creditors, or potential judgment creditors, with estate administration would produce chaos.

[47] Pierce J. denied standing to the applicants in Jolicouer to bring the application as they were judgment creditors, or potential judgment creditors against the estate or its trustee rather than beneficiaries. The application was dismissed without precluding the applicants from pursuing alternate remedies already pleaded in the materials before her.

[48] In a case where the court found it was not reasonable for a creditor to oppose a probate application, Dietrich J. confirmed in Magnotta v. Magnotta, 2020 ONSC 316, paragraphs 39 and 41 that:

The courts have narrowly construed what constitutes a financial interest in an estate. In Weidenfield v. Weidenfield Estate, 2016 ONSC 7330, 273 A.C.W.S. (3d) 897, the court stated, at para. 20, citing Hull and Popovic-Montag in MacDonell Sheard and Hull Probate Practice, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2016):

It would seem that unless the court otherwise directs, “persons having a financial interest in the estate” would be those persons named as beneficiaries in the will in question and all previous wills and those entitled on an intestacy.

Rule 75 is not intended to be used by creditors to secure recovery of assets within an estate: Weidenfield, at para. 19. Granting creditors, who have a variety of means to enforce their rights against the estate of a deceased person, standing pursuant to Rule 75 introduces unnecessary complexity into estate procedures....

[49] Dietrich J. discussed these principles in the context of determining a question of costs where the objector had withdrawn the notice of objection at the hearing. She considered it necessary to first determine whether it was reasonable for the objector to file the notice of objection with the expectation of impeding a CAET to the estate trustee. However, her review of the authorities has been quoted with approval in Jolicouer and by Myers J. in McKee v Vlasiu, 2023 ONSC 3942.

[50] In McKee v Vlasiu, the court applied the same principles on standing where a notice of objection had been filed to prevent a CAET from issuing in the first place. On an application to vacate a notice of objection filed by a party who had alleged various claims against an estate, Myers J. held as follows:

Anyone who has a cause of action or a right to make a claim against another person is a creditor whether voluntarily or involuntarily so. For the purposes of Rule 75, the important distinction is that Ms. Vlasiu is not claiming as a person who has any rights under the will of the deceased or to share in the distribution of the estate according to the will. Ms. Vlasiu’s rights, if any, are as someone who might make claims against the estate whether for title to land that the estate claims to own or for money. That her claims have arisen involuntarily, even if true, is quite beside the point for the purposes of this proceeding and the assessment of a “financial interest” under Rule 75.01. [emphasis added]

[51] Just like the objector in McKee, Jerry “is not claiming as a person who has any rights under the will of the deceased or to share in the distribution of the estate according to the will.” Instead, like the objector in McKee, he has “claims against the estate...for money”.

[52] Jerry relies on the case of Smith v. Vance, [1997] O.J. No. 6534 for a judicial interpretation of the phrase “financial interest”. Even though it is an appellate decision, I do not recall seeing any reference to Smith in the more recent authorities. However, that is not surprising as the Divisional Court in Smith was dealing with the question of what it means to have a “financial interest” in an estate under Rule 75.03 (1) in the context of s. 23 of the Estates Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.21 where a claimant “pretends to have an interest”.

[53] Smith was quoted by Price J. in McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 2015 ONSC 3491 where the court was asked to determine which of four Wills superceded any other, or whether the estate would pass on intestacy. Price J. was called upon to answer the preliminary question whether one of the respondents had standing to maintain his notice of objection to probate one of the Wills. His reference to Smith as an authority was considered in the context that it is a “potential beneficiary” case where the Court ruled on the standing of an objector or party in connection with the exercise of potential rights under s. 23 of the Estates Act.

[54] The threshold for determining whether an objector has a financial interest in an estate may be a low one when the nature of the claim otherwise meets the basic requirements for standing: W.W. v. Y.Y., 2016 ONSC 2387. In that case, there was sufficient evidence adduced for the motions judge to draw the inference of a possibility that the applicant could be a beneficiary on an intestacy. However, in Weidenfeld v. Parikn-Shah, 2016 ONSC 7330, Charney J. held that the phrase “appears to have a financial interest” must have as high a threshold as the phrase “pretending to have an interest” in para. 23 of the Estates Act after reviewing authorities such as Smith v. Vance, stating that a claimant must present a strong prima facie case that he has an interest.

[55] It is not necessary for me to determine the which of the thresholds discussed in W.W. or Weidenfeld v. Parikn-Shah that Jerry must meet to show he has a financial interest in Irma’s estate. In those cases, the standing of the claimant was determined on the nature of the claim with respect to his or her entitlement as a beneficiary or contingent beneficiary, and not just a creditor. In each case, the court referred to Smith v. Vance where the Divisional Court wrote that a claimant must do more than simply assert an interest in the estate, and that a claimant must provide sufficient evidence of a genuine interest in an estate to meet the threshold for inclusion as a party. The evidence need not be conclusive, but capable of supporting an inference that the claim is one that should be heard.

[56] None of these circumstances applies to Jerry or his claim. Jerry has provided no evidence that he has a financial interest in Irma’s estate. Those issues Jerry has stated in his notice of objection have already been identified by the applicants and placed before the court in the Partnership Application. It should not make a difference to Jerry whether the applicants are appointed as the estate trustees for Irma’s estate. Any estate trustee will have the same duties to the beneficiaries under Irma’s Will and Jerry will have same burden of proof to make out his claim against her estate.

[57] Reduced to its basics, Jerry does not challenge the Will with respect to Irma’s appointment of Natalie and Georgina as her estate trustees except for their rejection of his claim against Irma. The true nature of Jerry’s claim is for the collection of money from Irma’s interest in the property, and not a financial interest in her estate.

[58] On the evidentiary record before this court, I find that Jerry is a creditor or potential creditor. As he is only a creditor at best, I conclude that he has no financial interest in the estate and therefore no standing to maintain the notice of objection as a matter of law.

Late filing of the notice of appearance

[59] In the event I am in error on finding that Jerry has no standing to object, I must determine if Jerry’s notice of appearance dated February 26, 2025 was served and filed out of time.

[60] The evidence in the applicants’ record shows that their counsel served the Form 75.3 notice to objector dated January 31, 2025 under Rule 75.03 (4) at 4:48 p.m. that day. Receipt of that document after 4 p.m. on the day it was sent was deemed to be service on the next day that was not a holiday under Rule 3.01(1)(d). As January 31, 2025 was a Friday, the Form 75.3 was deemed to be served on Jerry’s lawyer on Monday, February 3, 2025.

[61] By computing the time between the date of service and February 26, 2025, not including February 3, 2025 itself, Jerry served and filed his notice of appearance on the 22^nd day after service. In that eventuality, Rule 75.03 (5) provides as follows:

(5) Where the objector does not serve and file a notice of appearance (Form 75.4) within 20 days after service of the notice to objector, the application shall proceed as if the notice of objection had not been filed.

[62] On February 26, 2025, Jerry purported to serve a Form 73.4 notice of appearance, which the court accepted for filing even though it was filed out of time.

[63] Jerry submits that he will suffer extreme prejudice if his notice of objection is struck or removed because of a two-day delay in serving Form 75.4 on the applicants. On their part, he submits that the applicants have suffered no prejudice by that delay. He states that his Form 75.4 was ultimately accepted for filing by this Court along with an affidavit of service detailing the service of documents in any event.

[64] On a plain reading of Rule 75.03(5), the application for a CAET ought to have proceeded without regard to the notice of objection once the 20 days had expired since the notice to objector was served. The fact that the court office accepted the notice of appearance beyond the 20 days does not raise an estoppel or waiver of time as the applicants were not involved in that process. The court office was required to proceed with the Application for a CAET of Irma’s estate after that time had passed as if the notice of objection had not been filed.

[65] I also consider there to be no equitable basis to extend the time for Jerry to serve and file a notice of appearance for two reasons. First, Rule 75.03 (5) uses the mandatory language that “the application shall proceed…” customarily found in legislation or rules that do not allow for discretion.

[66] Second, there is no provision that the court may order otherwise. Rule 75.03 contains a complete code setting out the procedure from an objector filing an objection to the ability of either the objector or the estate to bring a motion for directions under subrule (6). The rule provides no basis for the court to consider whether one party or the other will suffer prejudice for a failure to comply with its terms, which in this case was caused by Jerry’s own delay.

Basis to decide the Application without directions

[67] This Application is brought by Natalie and Georgina pursuant to Rules 14.05(3)(a) and (h) as well as 75.06. Rule 14.05 (3) reads as follows:

14.05(3) A proceeding may be brought by application where these rules authorize the commencement of a proceeding by application or where the relief claimed is,

(a) the opinion, advice or direction of the court on a question affecting the rights of a person in respect of the administration of the estate of a deceased person or the execution of a trust;

(h) in respect of any matter where it is unlikely that there will be any material facts in dispute requiring a trial.

[68] The relief requested by the applicants seek an order for the removal of the notice of objection as the sole relief. It is an order that falls within the “opinion, advice or direction” of the Court. Based on the grounds set out by Jerry in his notice of objection, the facts to determine that Jerry’s standing at its highest is that he is just a creditor are not in dispute. Apart from those grounds, Jerry’s claim on the debt he alleges against Irma’s estate may necessitate a hearing on issues relevant to the Partition Application. However, Jerry has not brought his own application for directions or motion for directions in the Partition Application under Rule 75.06 as a “person who appears to have a financial interest” in Irma’s estate to raise those issues or obtain directions from the court in this Application.

[69] Jerry’s supplementary factum contains the submission that Baltman J. agreed with his counsel’s submission on the first return date for this Application on June 10, 2025 that his notice of objection was valid and timely. He submits that Her Honour accepted that the issues raised concerning the “partnership loan” to Nikola required a full hearing.

[70] I disagree with that characterization. Baltman J. may have heard submissions of counsel on that appearance, but her endorsement only provides the procedural direction that, based on the materials and the issues identified, the matter should proceed as a long motion. Her Honour then confirmed the parties had been instructed to attend Triage Court to have a date set. Baltman J. clearly left all determinations of a substantive nature to the judge that would hear this Application without accepting the validity or timeliness of any document.

[71] There are facts that cannot be ignored when deciding whether Jerry’s notice of objection should be removed at this time.

[72] The first and most obvious fact is that Irma’s Will appointed her daughters Natalie and Georgina as the trustees of her estate. The second is that Irma left specific legacies to her three grandchildren and the residue of her estate to Natalie and Georgina equally. These are facts that Jerry does not contest. In fact, Jerry does not challenge the Will at all.

[73] Instead, Jerry takes the position that Nikola’s indebtedness to him arose from their partnership and is properly repayable from the property as partnership property. He relies on the evidence adduced from his counsel’s cross-examination of Natalie on July 14, 2025 to submit that Natalie refused to recognize or investigate his claim, or to acknowledge Nikola’s debt to him. He complains that Natalie refused to even acknowledge that Jerry and her father carried on the business of owning and operating the property as a partnership.

[74] Jerry has filed evidence to illustrate his financial assistance towards Nikola’s mortgage obligations from 1993 to 2002, detailing bank records and correspondence substantiating all payments made, which allegedly remain outstanding. As the property was never sold during Nikola’s lifetime, neither the initial agreement nor the amending agreement has been fulfilled. Having these issues adjudicated to determine the proper allocation of the net proceeds of sale when the property is sold under the Partition Act would be consistent with the agreements between the original owners.

[75] I have concerns about the time it would take for the parties to work through a timetable to reach a hearing date where the same issue before the court today would be determined. I am troubled by the claim made the applicants have made that Jerry continues to collect rent from the tenant of the property and has not accounted for, let alone paid 50% of that income to Irma since November 1, 2022.

[76] Natalie has given evidence in her affidavit dated June 19, 2024 in the Partition Application that the tenant 2416446 Ontario Inc. (“241”) has leased the property since 2014 and operates a restaurant and bar. Natalie deposed that the lease was renewed in 2021 for another five years. She was advised by 241’s principal, Angelo Chomatas, that the rent for $9,100 plus HST per month was increased to $9,400 plus HST as of July 1, 2024. Natalie was also informed in an email from Mr. Chomatas that rent cheques have been written to Jerry Zadyko only since 2016. I accept this evidence not for the truth of the statements but for the fact that those statements were made or sent to Natalie.

[77] The relief requested by the applicants in the Partition Application includes an accounting and reimbursement to Irma’s estate of half the rent collected by Jerry from 241 as the commercial tenant. What part of the rents collected from 241 have been remitted or withheld by Jerry as a landlord since Nikola died is a very real issue. These issues are pleaded in the Partition Application and within the jurisdiction of Papageorgiou J. to determine under the Partition Act.

[78] Finally, Natalie describes in her affidavit how there are three tax liens on the property, all relating to Jerry’s tax obligations. Lien documents are attached as exhibits to her affidavit for the following dates and amounts Jerry owes or owed to Canada Revenue Agency:

a. December 19, 2005 - $132,267.16

b. January 31, 2006 - $1,088,356.38

c. May 10, 2007 - $356,556.60

[79] The existence of these tax liens against title to the property requires a CAET for Irma’s estate to issue immediately to protect the interests of the beneficiaries.

[80] Based on my finding that Jerry has no standing to maintain his notice of objection and given Natalie’s evidence of Jerry’s management of the property, the applicants are entitled to have this Application determined without further delay. Giving directions to timetable further cross-examinations and schedule a hearing of the same issues that are before the court in the Partition Application will only cause prejudice to the applicants and the beneficiaries of Irma’s estate. The sooner the Application for the CAET with a Will is issued, the sooner the litigation in Toronto may resume.

Conclusion

[81] The Application is granted. The notice of objection of the respondent Jerry Zadyko is removed under Rule 75.03 (2). A Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee with a Will for the Estate of Irmgard Cajic shall issue to Natalie Cajic and Georgina Bruinsma Cajic as estate trustees.

[82] The parties are encouraged to resolve the issue of costs between them. If they cannot, the party claiming costs may serve and file submissions on costs in writing by June 2, 2026 consisting of no more than two double-spaced pages, not including any bill of costs or offer to settle. The responding party shall then have until June 16 to file responding submissions, subject to the same page limits. No reply submissions shall be permitted without leave. All submissions may be filed by email to my attention at scj.csj.general.brampton@ontario.ca

_________________________

Emery J.

Released: May 19, 2026

CITATION: Cajic et al v. Zadyko, 2026 ONSC 2853

COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-00002013-0000

DATE: 2026 05 19

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

CAJIC, NATALIE

BRUINSMA CAJIC, GEORGINA

Applicants

and –

ZADYKO, JERRY

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

Emery J.

Released: May 19, 2026

Cajic et al v. Zadyko, 2026 ONSC 2853

Case Summary

REASONS FOR DECISION

Cajic et al v. Zadyko, 2026 ONSC 2853

Case Summary

REASONS FOR DECISION