Kristine Staats

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the defendant following his conviction on four offences: assault with a weapon (predicate offence), uttering death threats, mischief under $5,000, and breach of probation.

The defendant had a 15-year history of violent outbursts, including three serious knife assaults on family members.

The court found the defendant met all criteria for dangerous offender designation based on a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour and persistent aggressive behaviour showing substantial indifference to consequences.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding that no lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

The accused, who suffers from schizophrenia and cognitive impairment, was charged with the second-degree murder of his mother.

The Crown brought a motion to admit the accused's videotaped statement to police and an initial statement made upon arrest.

The court applied the confessions rule and the operating mind doctrine, finding that while the police treated the accused respectfully, his cognitive limitations raised a reasonable doubt as to whether he understood that his statements could be used against him in criminal proceedings.

The application to admit the statements was dismissed.

The applicant, Christopher Nigro, brought a Charter application under ss. 8 and 24(2) to challenge the validity of search warrants issued for his residence, vehicle, and electronic devices following a carjacking incident.

The defence argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds and that a second warrant application to a different Justice of the Peace after an initial partial refusal constituted "judge-shopping." The court reviewed the ITO under Garofoli principles, finding that the affiant provided full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court affirmed that a second warrant application is permissible and does not constitute "judge-shopping" if the subsequent Justice of the Peace is aware of the prior application and considers the matter de novo.

The court concluded that there were credibly-based probable grounds to issue the warrants, including for electronic devices, based on the totality of the evidence and reasonable inferences regarding post-offence conduct.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Christopher Nigro, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 1153 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court calculated defence-caused delay (412 days) due to counsel changes, JPT scheduling, resolution discussions, and late filing of the s. 11(b) application.

It also recognized the COVID-19 pandemic (225 days) as an exceptional circumstance causing systemic delay.

After deducting these periods, the remaining delay was 516 days, which is below the 18-month ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

This is a sentencing decision for an offender convicted of aggravated assault and breach of undertaking, stemming from a violent domestic incident.

The victim sustained severe facial injuries requiring multiple surgeries.

The Crown sought a 24-month penitentiary sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence, highlighting the offender's rehabilitation efforts.

The court considered the principles of denunciation and deterrence, particularly in the context of intimate partner violence, and aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability and the offender's prior domestic assault conviction.

Balancing these with the offender's rehabilitation, the court imposed a lengthy conditional sentence, emphasizing that such a sentence can still achieve punitive and denunciatory objectives.

This is a sentencing decision for Charlston Lewis, who pleaded guilty to charges arising from a prolonged and multi-faceted incident of intimate partner violence against Ms. Marshall, his partner of 11 years, who suffered from a known brain disorder.

The assault, which included choking and striking her head, occurred in the presence of their children and was partially recorded on an in-house security camera.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability, the presence of children, the history of abuse, and the controlling nature of the offender's actions.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, extensive counselling undertaken by the offender, and his remorse.

The Crown sought 12-24 months of 'real jail', while the defence proposed a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles, particularly in cases of intimate partner violence and abuse of vulnerable persons.

Considering the impact of COVID-19 on incarceration conditions, the court imposed a sentence of 180 days custody for assault and a concurrent 90 days custody for choking, followed by a 24-month probation term with strict conditions, a 10-year weapons prohibition, DNA orders, and forfeiture of weapons.

The defendant pleaded guilty to child luring and possession of child pornography.

He communicated with an 11-year-old girl over online gaming platforms, progressively escalating to sexually explicit messages and images over a nine-day period.

He also possessed child pornography on his computer.

The defendant has significant cognitive and developmental delays, a history of sexually inappropriate behaviour since age 8, and was on waitlists for treatment programs.

The Crown sought the mandatory minimum sentences; the defence challenged the mandatory minimum for child luring as a violation of section 12 of the Charter.

The court found the mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate for a reasonable hypothetical offender with developmental delays and struck it down.

However, the court imposed a custodial sentence despite the defendant's cognitive challenges, finding that a conditional sentence was inappropriate due to the high risk of reoffending and the defendant's demonstrated grooming behaviour.

James Garthwaite pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the shooting death of Dana Camber during a planned drug robbery.

The court considered aggravating factors including the use of a loaded sawed-off shotgun, the planned ruse, the pursuit of the victim, the invasion of a home, the fact that the victim was an innocent bystander, and the offender's extensive criminal record, parole status, and firearms prohibition.

Mitigating factors included the early guilty plea, expression of remorse, relatively young age, difficult childhood, and efforts to further education in prison.

The court sentenced Garthwaite to 10 years in penitentiary, less 495 days for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 8 years, 7 months, and 15 days remaining.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime firearms prohibition (s. 109), a non-communication order, and forfeiture of the firearm.

The accused, Adam Kramshoj, was charged with making available and possessing child pornography.

The matter proceeded as a blended s. 8 Charter motion and trial.

The court found multiple s. 8 Charter breaches by the authorities, including a "Branton error" in the search warrant, an unauthorized pre-Spencer request for ISP subscriber information, failure to file a timely report to justice, and unreasonable search conduct (seizure of a personal notebook and loss of evidence regarding a Rogers letter's location).

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that the seriousness and multiplicity of the breaches, coupled with the impact on the accused's Charter rights and compromised defence, warranted the exclusion of all evidence.

Consequently, an acquittal was entered.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and failure to provide a suitable breath sample.

The Crown's case rested on evidence that the accused was found impaired in the driver's seat of his vehicle with keys accessible nearby, and that he deliberately failed to provide a breath sample.

The defence challenged the charges on substantive grounds and also brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 9, and 10(a).

The court found that while the Crown had proven both offences beyond a reasonable doubt on the merits, the accused's rights were violated during an unjustified investigative detention that involved excessive force, including handcuffing, forced confinement in a police cruiser, and physical violence.

The court stayed both charges pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter and the common law doctrine of abuse of process, finding that proceeding with the prosecution would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.