Christian J. Guerette

The parties sought a consent order under Rule 48.14(4) directing the Registrar not to dismiss the action for delay, arising from a 2010 motor vehicle accident.

The court granted the order and issued a brief endorsement interpreting Rule 48.14 ahead of the January 1, 2017 administrative dismissals.

The court clarified that actions dismissed for delay by the Registrar should not contain a costs order, Rule 48.14 does not apply to case-managed actions or applications, and it does not apply to actions that have been stayed.

The appellant sought to add the respondent as a defendant to an action for unpaid benefits.

The motion judge declined to add the respondent as a party.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that any liability the respondent might have for the unpaid benefits stems from a collective agreement and would be arbitrable, meaning the respondent is not a proper party to the action.

An employer appealed a Master's order granting a motion to amend a statement of claim to add the employer as a defendant in an action against an insurer for termination of long‑term disability benefits.

The employee, a unionized worker, sought to claim that the employer was liable for disability benefits after the insurer stopped payments.

The court held that the employee’s entitlement to disability benefits against the employer arose from the collective bargaining agreement and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration.

Because the employer was not an insurer under the policy and could not be sued in court for obligations arising under the collective agreement, the amendment adding the employer as a party was improper.

The appeal was allowed and the Master's order set aside.

Two applications sought interpretation of an insurance policy issued to a Children’s Aid Society concerning legal expense coverage for foster parents charged with Criminal Code offences.

The applicants argued that the $500,000 aggregate limit applied per policy year, allowing stacking across successive policy periods in which defence costs were incurred.

The insurer argued that the legal expense rider was a claims‑made policy triggered only in the policy period when the criminal proceedings commenced and that coverage was limited to a single $500,000 aggregate limit.

The court held that the wording of the rider allowed aggregate limits to accumulate across policy periods but concluded that the foster parents ceased to qualify as “insureds” after their termination.

As a result, recovery remained limited to the $500,000 aggregate available under the 2008–2009 policy.

The appellants appealed a judgment dismissing their claim against the respondent insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the limitation period expired in 2005.

The court rejected the appellants' argument that equitable doctrines, such as unjust enrichment, could override the express terms of the insurance contract, the Limitations Act, 2002, and the Insurance Act, particularly since the claim did not fall within the policy terms as it was not an accident.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.