Keith Lee-Whiting

The self-represented plaintiff moved for leave to deliver an Amended Statement of Claim, alleging the defendant settlement organization was a front for a terrorist group and seeking damages for assault and discrimination.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action.

The Master struck out the proposed amendments relying on the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, finding the defendant was not a listed entity.

However, applying the principle of proportionality, the Master granted the plaintiff leave to deliver a fresh as amended claim, provided the action remained within the Rule 76 Simplified Procedure.

The defendants' motion to dismiss was dismissed.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action sought repayment of approximately $58,000 in alleged loans, but little progress occurred after a failed summary judgment motion, leading to administrative dismissal.

Applying the Reid factors and relevant Court of Appeal jurisprudence, the court found that although the plaintiff failed to adequately explain the litigation delay, the dismissal resulted from inadvertence, the motion to set aside was brought promptly once discovered, and the defendants failed to establish prejudice.

Emphasizing the preference for deciding cases on their merits and the lack of demonstrable prejudice, the court exercised its discretion to set aside the dismissal order and allow the action to proceed subject to a timetable.

Two applications sought interpretation of an insurance policy issued to a Children’s Aid Society concerning legal expense coverage for foster parents charged with Criminal Code offences.

The applicants argued that the $500,000 aggregate limit applied per policy year, allowing stacking across successive policy periods in which defence costs were incurred.

The insurer argued that the legal expense rider was a claims‑made policy triggered only in the policy period when the criminal proceedings commenced and that coverage was limited to a single $500,000 aggregate limit.

The court held that the wording of the rider allowed aggregate limits to accumulate across policy periods but concluded that the foster parents ceased to qualify as “insureds” after their termination.

As a result, recovery remained limited to the $500,000 aggregate available under the 2008–2009 policy.