Alexi N. Wood

The applicants sought to schedule an expedited application for judicial review of an emergency order made under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The order permitted specified persons to obtain personal health information about the COVID status of individuals.

The court declined to set an expedited schedule because the applicants had not yet served their expert evidence, there was no direct evidence of urgency, and the order was set to expire shortly.

A regular hearing date was set, with further case conferences scheduled to address potential mootness or timetabling.

The Ryerson Students' Union (RSU) moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent Ryerson University from terminating an operating agreement and to compel the release of withheld student fees.

The University had terminated the agreement citing financial mismanagement by a previous RSU executive.

The court found that the RSU had taken prompt corrective actions, establishing a strong prima facie case that it had not repudiated the agreement.

The withholding of fees constituted irreparable harm, as it would force the RSU to cease operations.

The balance of convenience favored the RSU, as the University's proposed new governance process was initiated after the RSU's claim and its arguments regarding financial control were not substantiated.

The motion was allowed, ordering the University to comply with the agreement and release the funds.

This costs endorsement followed a prior decision where the plaintiffs' action for breach of contract was dismissed due to a lack of proven damages, despite a finding of breach.

The court determined that the defendant, Grant Thornton LLP (GT), was the more successful party, notwithstanding some mixed success, as the plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty and defamation were dismissed outright, and no remedy flowed from any of the plaintiffs' findings.

The defendant's offer to settle did not meet the requirements of Rule 49.10(2)(b), thus no costs consequences flowed from its non-acceptance.

Applying the "fair and reasonable" principle for fixing costs and considering Rule 57.01 factors, including the moderate complexity and the $10 million claim, the court awarded GT partial indemnity costs in the all-inclusive amount of $175,000.00.

The court determined costs following a reference decision on priority of claims.

The applicant, Joe Guerrieri, was awarded reduced substantial indemnity costs ($40,000) in priority to all parties except the first mortgagee, Frances Gower.

Gower was awarded significantly reduced substantial indemnity costs ($20,000) with first priority.

Rob Rolston Building Materials Ltd. was awarded $5,000 in costs.

Jerry Schmanda and Dawna Catharine Fairbairn (the Schmandas), whose unsuccessful equitable mortgage claim caused the reference, were made liable for any unrecoverable costs awarded to Guerrieri, Gower, and Rolston.

The court considered Rule 57 factors, proportionality, and settlement offers, noting that while offers were made, none were accepted in a way that avoided the reference hearing costs.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario imposing a seven-month suspension and a 30-day preparatory period for breaching previous practice restrictions.

The appellant admitted to prescribing prohibited substances and seeing a female patient contrary to a 2011 order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Discipline Committee's penalty was reasonable, fell within the range of acceptable outcomes, and was owed deference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) which found that its natural gas gathering pipelines were properly assessed as 'pipe lines' under s. 25(1) of the Assessment Act for municipal tax purposes.

The appellant argued the pipelines were gathering lines, not transmission lines, and that the OEB should have applied the technical industry meaning.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the OEB's decision, finding it was reasonable for the OEB to apply the ordinary meaning of the words 'transportation or transmission' and to infer from assessment roll numbers that the pipelines had been previously designated as transmission pipelines.

The intervener, Ontario Petroleum Institute, brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence in the form of an affidavit on an appeal.

The respondent, Ontario Energy Board, brought a cross-motion to vary a previous order granting leave to file the evidence.

The Divisional Court treated the motions as a single issue of whether to admit the affidavit.

Applying the Palmer test, the court admitted the affidavit but ordered redactions of irrelevant facts and inadmissible opinion evidence.

The Ontario Petroleum Institute (OPI) brought a motion for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the property tax assessment of gas gathering lines.

The underlying appeal challenged the Ontario Energy Board's decision that the lines were 'pipe lines' under the Assessment Act.

The court granted OPI leave to intervene on terms, finding that OPI had an interest in the subject matter and could provide a useful and distinct perspective on the technical meaning of 'transmission' and 'transportation' in the gas industry.

The applicant sought judicial review of a letter from the Pharmacy Examining Board of Canada denying his request to write the pharmacist qualification examination for a fifth time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the letter was not a reviewable decision but merely a statement of the existing rule limiting attempts.

The court also rejected the applicant's arguments that the Act creating the Board and the rule limiting examination attempts were ultra vires, noting that the Board does not regulate the profession but merely administers an examination that provincial licensing bodies may use.

The appellant purchased a commercial property that was contaminated by hydrocarbons that had migrated from an adjacent former gas station property.

The respondents moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the contamination more than two years before commencing the action.

The motion judge granted the motion, finding that the appellant had knowledge of the claim by March 9, 2012, or alternatively by March 30, 2012.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by equating the appellant's suspicion of contamination with actual knowledge of contamination, and by failing to consider the relevant circumstances of the multi-property transaction and the waiver of conditions.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Independent Police Review Director and the Chief of Police classifying an unjustified strip search by a police officer as misconduct 'not of a serious nature' under the Police Services Act.

The applicant argued that an unjustified strip search must always be classified as serious misconduct and that the failure to hold a disciplinary hearing breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Director and Chief have statutory discretion to assess the seriousness of misconduct based on the specific circumstances.

The court found the decisions were reasonable given the facts, including that the search was conducted privately, without touching, and in accordance with policy, and that no hearing was required once the misconduct was reasonably deemed not serious.

The applicants, members of a pro-life student group, sought judicial review of the Ryerson Students’ Union’s decision to deny their group "Student Group status." The RSU denied status based on its pro-choice, pro-feminist policies.

The court addressed whether it had jurisdiction to review the RSU's decision and whether the decision attracted Charter scrutiny.

The court found the RSU to be a private entity, not subject to administrative law principles or Charter scrutiny in this context, and dismissed the application.

In a group of related civil proceedings involving multiple plaintiffs and the same defendants, the court considered a request concerning the deadline for filing third party claims.

Following a prior order, the parties jointly sought an extension of time to file all third party claims.

The court granted the request on consent and extended the deadline to September 25, 2015.

The endorsement reflects a procedural timetable adjustment rather than a substantive determination of the underlying claims.

The appellant sought to add the respondent as a defendant to an action for unpaid benefits.

The motion judge declined to add the respondent as a party.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that any liability the respondent might have for the unpaid benefits stems from a collective agreement and would be arbitrable, meaning the respondent is not a proper party to the action.

An employer appealed a Master's order granting a motion to amend a statement of claim to add the employer as a defendant in an action against an insurer for termination of long‑term disability benefits.

The employee, a unionized worker, sought to claim that the employer was liable for disability benefits after the insurer stopped payments.

The court held that the employee’s entitlement to disability benefits against the employer arose from the collective bargaining agreement and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration.

Because the employer was not an insurer under the policy and could not be sued in court for obligations arising under the collective agreement, the amendment adding the employer as a party was improper.

The appeal was allowed and the Master's order set aside.

Residents of a Toronto apartment building sought certification of a class action following a fire allegedly caused by negligent maintenance of electrical systems and smart meters.

The proposed class sued the building owner, property managers, superintendent, and the electricity distributor.

The electricity distributor opposed certification, arguing the claim failed to disclose a viable negligence cause of action and that the certification criteria were not met.

The court held that the pleadings disclosed a viable negligence claim against the distributor and that the statutory and regulatory framework governing electricity distribution did not negate the claim at the certification stage.

The court certified the action as a class proceeding with a modified class definition excluding residents operating marijuana grow‑ops in the building.

The appellant, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, appealed a Divisional Court order requiring it to produce a comprehensive record of proceedings under the Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA) after screening out the respondent's police complaints.

The Court of Appeal held that the Director's decision to screen out a complaint under the Police Services Act is the exercise of a statutory power of decision, as it decides a complainant's legal right to have their complaint pursued.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Divisional Court's order regarding the contents of the record was overly broad, and substituted a narrower requirement for the record of proceedings.

The applicant filed complaints against the Toronto Police Service and the Ontario Provincial Police.

The Independent Police Review Director (IPRD) refused to deal with the complaints under s. 60 of the Police Services Act.

The applicant sought judicial review and moved to compel the IPRD to deliver a record of proceedings.

The motion judge ordered the IPRD to file the record.

The IPRD applied to a full panel of the Divisional Court to set aside the order, arguing it was not exercising a statutory power of decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the IPRD's decision under s. 60 affects the complainant's rights and constitutes a statutory power of decision within the meaning of s. 10 of the Judicial Review Procedures Act, thereby requiring the IPRD to file a record of proceedings.

The applicant brought a motion for an order compelling the Independent Police Review Director to file a record of proceedings in an application for judicial review.

The respondent argued it had no obligation to provide a record because its decision to screen out the applicant's complaint was not a statutory power of decision.

The Divisional Court held that the statutory scheme of the Police Services Act creates a right for the public to complain and a duty on the Director to deal with the complaint unless specific criteria apply.

Therefore, the decision to screen out a complaint constitutes a statutory power of decision, and the motion to compel the filing of the record was granted.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability after his driver's license was suspended following a hospital admission.

The application was filed 18 months after the incident, six months past the one-year limitation period under the Human Rights Code.

The respondent hospital requested the application be dismissed for delay.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had reason to make inquiries about his rights but failed to do so, and therefore the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The application against the hospital was dismissed.