Gabrielle Cyr

This is an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that granted judicial review, quashing an administrative decision and a request for bids related to the procurement of identification cards.

The Ministry of Transportation (MTO) required card stock to be produced in Canada, which Thales DIS Canada Inc. (Thales) challenged as discriminatory under the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).

The Divisional Court found the MTO's decision and request for bids unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court misapplied the reasonableness standard of review by conducting a de novo assessment instead of focusing on the administrative decision-maker's reasons.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the Director's decision was reasonable and that the request for bids was not separately subject to judicial review given the existence of an adequate internal dispute resolution process.

The Regional Municipality of York brought a motion for a limited permanent sealing order on consent over proprietary information submitted by two bidders during a competitive procurement process for public transportation services.

The court applied the three-part test from Sherman Estate and found that court openness posed a serious risk to the important public interest of maintaining the integrity of future procurement processes.

The court granted the sealing order, concluding that the benefits of protecting the commercially sensitive information outweighed the negative effects on court openness.

The appellant, Garfield Anthony Hibbert, appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice that struck out his statement of claim and dismissed his action.

This was the fourth action he had commenced regarding a dispute over a $9,500 deposit into a tax-free savings account (TFSA) in 2012, after a Small Claims Court action was dismissed (and not appealed), a second Small Claims Court action was commenced, and two subsequent Superior Court actions were dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as vexatious.

The Court of Appeal found the current appeal to also be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1, as the appellant was repeatedly re-litigating the same issues.

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of an urgent injunction application.

The court considered three hearings: the initial injunction application, a hearing regarding the respondent's breach of undertaking, and a hearing requested by the respondent to vary an interim order.

The injunction was dismissed due to the applicant's failure to provide an undertaking as to damages.

The court awarded costs to the respondent for the initial injunction hearing and for responding to the applicant's post-decision attempt to provide the undertaking, but denied costs for the hearings related to the undertaking breach and the failed attempt to vary the interim order, finding them unnecessary.

The court also assessed the reasonableness of the respondent's claimed legal hours and hourly rates.

The applicant, Cash Cloud Inc., sought an urgent interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondent, BitAccess Inc., from terminating a Master Purchase Agreement, deactivating cloud-based software used for cryptocurrency kiosks, and deleting customer data.

The court found it had jurisdiction to grant interim relief despite a mandatory arbitration clause.

The court granted a 60-day order preserving the customer data to allow the applicant to download it.

However, the court dismissed the injunction to restrain the software deactivation because the applicant failed to provide the mandatory undertaking as to damages required by Rule 40.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash a motion for leave to appeal.

The underlying dispute arose from a commercial arbitration where the arbitrator made a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction over a counterclaim.

The Superior Court reversed this ruling.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, holding that under section 17(9) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, there is no right of appeal from a court's decision reviewing an arbitrator's preliminary jurisdictional ruling, distinguishing it from an appeal of an award.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' claims for oppression.

The plaintiffs, former minority shareholders, alleged that the defendants misappropriated corporate assets and sold shares below true value.

The court struck the claims against the Murison Family Trust with leave to amend, as a trust is not a legal entity.

The claims against 2123388 Ontario Inc. and Exia Biomedical Inc. were struck without leave to amend, as 212 lacked the capacity to oppress and the claims against Exia belonged to the corporation and required a derivative action.

The claim against Obotics Inc. was struck with leave to amend, as no material facts of wrongful conduct were pleaded.

The plaintiff, a candidate for the leadership of the Conservative Party of Canada, was disqualified by the Dispute Resolution Appeals Committee (DRAC) following a complaint about his campaign materials.

He brought a summary judgment motion seeking to restore his candidacy, arguing breach of contract, procedural unfairness, and bad faith.

The court found that while the process was fair and there was no bad faith, the DRAC lacked the authority under the party's rules to disqualify a candidate.

The court set aside the disqualification and restored the Chief Returning Officer's original ruling, which imposed a penalty but not disqualification, without prejudice to the Leadership Election Organizing Committee's right to consider the matter.

The applicant, Dimitrious Karahalios, a disqualified leadership candidate for the Conservative Party of Canada, brought an application seeking reinstatement and release of campaign funds.

The respondents, including the Conservative Party and its Fund, brought a preliminary motion to strike the application, arguing it was barred by the Leadership Rules and disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and that individual committee members were not proper parties.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the application for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Leadership Rules contractually precluded the applicant's claims.

The individual respondents (members of the Dispute Resolution Appeals Committee and Chief Returning Officer) were removed as parties by agreement.

The court converted the application into an action and scheduled a summary judgment motion to efficiently determine the merits of the dispute, given the complex and novel legal issues regarding the judicial review of unincorporated associations.