John M. Gordon

In this criminal appeal, the Court considered challenges to the trial judge’s use of alibi and prior-vandalism evidence in upholding convictions for arson and mischief.

A majority dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of Willcock J.A. and declined to re-examine the governing jurisprudence in the circumstances.

The majority upheld the convictions, while one judge would have allowed the appeal based on the dissenting appellate reasons.

In this criminal appeal as of right, the Court considered whether the confinement element required for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) was made out where the accused blocked the victim from escaping before the killing.

The Court held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the forcible or unlawful confinement was distinct and independent from the act of killing.

The appellate intervention substituting second degree murder was therefore unwarranted.

The conviction for first degree murder was reinstated and the appeal was allowed.

In a criminal Charter appeal, the appellant argued that trial delay became unreasonable due to a five-month period associated with a direct indictment.

The majority held that even if that period were attributed to the Crown, the overall delay remained reasonable after balancing all delay factors.

The court found no reversible error in the majority reasons below on the s. 11(b) analysis.

A dissenting minority would have allowed the appeal on the appellate dissent below.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court considered whether an intervening assault by a bar bouncer could sever legal causation after the appellants had already violently assaulted the victim, who later died.

It held that legal causation remains governed by whether the accused's dangerous unlawful acts were a significant contributing cause of death, and that foreseeability and independence are analytical tools, not standalone legal tests.

On the trial judge's factual findings, it was open to conclude the bouncer's conduct was a reasonably foreseeable response in an escalating bar fight and not sufficiently independent to break the causal chain.

The Court therefore upheld the result that the appellants could legally be found to have caused death and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown argued he was the sole perpetrator, while the defence suggested others were involved.

The trial judge initially instructed the jury that they must acquit if they had a reasonable doubt the appellant was the actual shooter.

Following a jury question, the judge amended the instruction to include liability if the appellant was 'otherwise an active participant'.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and appealed, arguing the amended instruction undermined trial fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions adequately conveyed the alternate routes to liability and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder following a third trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of prior consistent statements admitted during the re-examination of a key Crown witness.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that while the prior consistent statements were improperly admitted, the error was harmless and the curative proviso applied.

Furthermore, because the statements had no probative value and did not bolster the witness's reliability, no limiting instruction was required.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for his role in luring the victim to a car lot where he was shot.

At trial, the Crown introduced double hearsay evidence from a co-conspirator and wiretap evidence of a three-way phone call.

The appellant appealed, arguing the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule should be revisited under the principled approach to hearsay, and that the wiretap evidence exceeded the authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Carter rule for co-conspirator hearsay meets the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled approach.

The Court also upheld the admission of the wiretap evidence, finding the named target never ceased to be a party to the conversation.

During a murder investigation, police used a 'crime boss' undercover scenario to elicit a confession from the accused.

At the voir dire, the trial judge granted a publication ban on the identity of the undercover officers and the investigative techniques used.

The appellant newspaper appealed the ban directly to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court allowed the appeal, applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

It held that a ban on the investigative techniques was not necessary and its deleterious effects on freedom of expression outweighed its salutary effects.

However, a ban on the officers' identities was necessary to protect ongoing operations, but was limited to a period of one year.

The Crown appealed as of right from a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which had set aside the accused's conviction for sexually assaulting the complainant and entered an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated his right to freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the prohibition on possession of child pornography infringes s. 2(b), it is largely justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect children from harm.

However, the Court found the law overbroad in two peripheral applications: self-created expressive material held exclusively for personal use, and private recordings of lawful sexual activity created by or depicting the accused for private use.

The Court read in exceptions for these two categories and upheld the law, allowing the Crown's appeal and remitting the matter for trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

The Court dismissed the appeal, expressing substantial agreement with the majority reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The respondent confessed to sexually touching young boys after being confronted by the father of one of the victims, who held a knife to his throat and threatened him.

The statements were admitted at trial without a voir dire and without objection from defence counsel.

The respondent was convicted, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the evidence of the parents' prior contact with the police and their plan to trick the respondent was sufficient to alert the trial judge to the need for a voir dire to determine if the father was a person in authority.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing there were errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding planning and deliberation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even assuming there were errors in the charge, the evidence of planning and deliberation was so overwhelming that the result would inevitably have been the same.

The Court applied the curative proviso under section 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences involving multiple counts and complainants.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal.

The Court held that the trial judge's charge to the jury was inadequate because it failed to properly instruct the jury that evidence on one count could not be used on other counts, and failed to warn about the dangers of the potential influence of evidence of numerous alleged criminal acts.