Mary T. Ainslie

The Crown appealed after the British Columbia Court of Appeal set aside a second degree murder conviction, holding that hearsay testimony from the accused's brother regarding an overheard phone call in which the accused admitted to killing the victim was inadmissible.

The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge did not err in admitting the brother's testimony as a party admission: the evidence was capable of non-speculative meaning and thus relevant, it fell within the party admission exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule, and the trial judge did not err in the discretionary balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The Court also held there was no error in the trial judge's answer to the jury's mid-deliberation question regarding the definition of bodily harm.

The dissenters agreed with the majority's analytical framework but concluded that, on the facts, assessing the relevance of the overheard statements was an exercise in pure speculation and the evidence should not have been admitted.

The Crown appealed a majority decision of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia that ordered a new trial for an accused convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal majority found the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the indictment, in responding to the jury's question during deliberations, and in failing to provide further credibility instructions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge, finding the trial judge's charge and response to the jury's question were adequate.

Three additional issues raised by the respondent for the first time at the Supreme Court — character evidence limiting instruction, prior consistent statements, and interpretation of 'single transaction' under s. 581(1) of the Criminal Code — were addressed but did not require a new trial.

Convictions for sexual assault restored and judicial stay on sexual interference count maintained.

In a manslaughter sentencing appeal, the Court addressed when a trial judge may reject a joint submission following a guilty plea.

It held that departure is permitted only where the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, rejecting a simple fitness approach.

Applying that standard, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by substituting a modestly longer custodial term and adding probation despite the negotiated resolution and systemic interests in certainty.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to match the joint submission of additional custody without probation.

On a criminal appeal concerning refusal to provide a breath sample, the Court addressed the burden applicable to proving a reasonable excuse under s. 794(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court confirmed that the provision imposes a persuasive burden on the accused to establish an exception, exemption, proviso, excuse, or qualification prescribed by law.

The Court declined to address new issues advanced by interveners.

The appeal was dismissed, leaving the conviction in place.

The court addressed sentencing for breaches of long-term supervision orders by Indigenous long-term offenders and reaffirmed the mandatory application of Gladue principles in every such case.

It held that sentencing judges must consider systemic and background factors and craft proportionate, individualized sanctions even for serious breaches tied to risk management.

In the first appeal, errors in principle required intervention and the custodial term was reduced to one year.

In the second appeal, the one-year sentence imposed by the appellate court was upheld.

The appellant was arrested for multiple assaults and asserted his right to counsel.

After failing to reach his lawyer of choice, he consulted with duty counsel and expressed satisfaction with the advice.

During the subsequent police interrogation, he repeatedly requested to speak with a lawyer and have one present, but the police denied these requests and continued questioning until he confessed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 10(b) of the Charter does not require the presence of counsel during an interrogation, nor does it require police to provide further opportunities to consult counsel absent a change in circumstances.

The appellant challenged his sexual assault convictions on the basis that provisions permitting child witnesses to testify behind a screen and presuming the testimonial competence of witnesses under 14 infringed ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The appeal arose from convictions involving two child complainants who testified under protective measures.

The Court, in a brief oral judgment, adopted the reasons of the court below and dismissed the appeal.

The constitutional challenge failed and the convictions were upheld.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder following a third trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of prior consistent statements admitted during the re-examination of a key Crown witness.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that while the prior consistent statements were improperly admitted, the error was harmless and the curative proviso applied.

Furthermore, because the statements had no probative value and did not bolster the witness's reliability, no limiting instruction was required.

The appellant and three accomplices broke into a residence.

During the break and enter, the intruders repeatedly referred to having a gun.

A loaded handgun was later found in their getaway car.

The appellant was convicted of using a firearm while committing an indictable offence under s. 85(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that an offender 'uses' a firearm when they reveal its actual presence or immediate availability by words or conduct to facilitate an offence, and the weapon is in their physical possession or readily at hand.

The Crown obtained an ex parte order for a judicial investigative hearing under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code in relation to the Air India bombings.

The application judge ordered the hearing to be held in camera and kept secret.

A newspaper reporter discovered the proceedings and sought access.

The hearing judge dismissed the application for access.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the newspaper's appeal in part, holding that the open court principle applies to s. 83.28 hearings.

While the initial ex parte application was properly held in camera, the existence of the order and the constitutional challenge should have been public.

The investigative hearing itself must be presumptively open, subject to the Dagenais/Mentuck test for publication bans or in camera orders.

The Crown sought an ex parte order under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code to compel a Named Person to attend a judicial investigative hearing and answer questions regarding the Air India bombings.

The Named Person challenged the constitutionality of s. 83.28, arguing it violated the right against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter and compromised judicial independence.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the provision, finding it procedural in nature, thus applicable retrospectively.

The Court held that s. 83.28 includes adequate safeguards, such as derivative use immunity, which must be extended to extradition and deportation hearings to comply with s. 7.

The Court also found that the provision does not compromise judicial independence, as judges retain their role in protecting the witness's constitutional rights.