Micah B. Rankin

The Crown appealed the Court of Appeal for British Columbia's decision setting aside voyeurism convictions and ordering a new trial.

The accused, a hockey coach, had surreptitiously photographed two adolescent boys aged 12 to 14 in their underwear in hockey arena dressing rooms.

The central issue was whether s. 162(1)(a) of the Criminal Code contains an implicit temporal component requiring the Crown to prove that nudity was reasonably expected at the specific time the photos were taken.

The Supreme Court held, through a textual, contextual, and purposive analysis, that s. 162(1)(a) has no implicit temporal component; dressing rooms qualify as protected 'safe places' regardless of whether nudity is expected at the precise moment of observation or recording.

The Court restored the convictions, and declined to address the respondent's constitutional overbreadth argument raised for the first time on appeal.

The appellant challenged a Court of Appeal decision that set aside his acquittals and ordered a new trial in a prosecution involving a telewarrant and Charter search-and-seizure issues.

The central issues were whether the issuing judicial justice's impartiality was compromised and whether the impracticability requirement for a telewarrant was met.

The Court agreed substantially with Justice Frankel's reasons in the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial stood.

In a manslaughter sentencing appeal, the Court addressed when a trial judge may reject a joint submission following a guilty plea.

It held that departure is permitted only where the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, rejecting a simple fitness approach.

Applying that standard, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by substituting a modestly longer custodial term and adding probation despite the negotiated resolution and systemic interests in certainty.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to match the joint submission of additional custody without probation.

The Court allowed the appeals and held that former section 117 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act was overbroad under section 7 of the Charter.

It captured humanitarian aid, mutual aid among asylum-seekers, and assistance to family members, which fell outside Parliament’s objective of targeting organized people smuggling.

Attorney General consent to prosecute did not cure the constitutional defect.

The Court read down the former provision to exclude those protected categories and remitted the charges for trial.