Fergus J. (Chip) O’Connor

David Morrisson, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder, applied under s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period.

The application required judicial screening to determine if there was a substantial likelihood a jury would unanimously agree to reduce the period.

The applicant argued the old "reasonable prospect" test should apply, citing Charter ss. 11(h) and (i), but the court applied the new "substantial likelihood" test, consistent with prior rulings.

Despite Morrisson's positive institutional conduct and low risk of re-offending, the court found his repeated untruthful statements and evolving accounts of the offence, including admitted perjury, severely undermined his credibility and character.

The court concluded there was no substantial likelihood a jury would unanimously reduce his parole ineligibility, dismissing the application.

The applicant brought a habeas corpus application challenging decisions by correctional authorities to reclassify him from medium to maximum security and to transfer him to a maximum security institution in Saskatchewan.

He argued the evidence relied upon by correctional authorities was insufficient, that disclosure was inadequate, and that Gladue principles and community connections weighed against the decisions.

The court reviewed both public and sealed affidavit evidence pursuant to Mission Institution v. Khela and found the correctional authorities lawfully withheld certain information under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act while providing sufficient summaries for procedural fairness.

The court held that the decisions to reclassify and transfer the inmate were reasonable, transparent, and supported by reliable evidence.

The habeas corpus application was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial screening leave under s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code to empanel a jury to reduce his parole ineligibility period for first degree murder arising from a fatal bank robbery.

He argued that the post-2011 amendment changing the threshold from a 'reasonable prospect' to a 'substantial likelihood' of success violated ss. 11(h) and 11(i) of the Charter when applied retrospectively.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, holding the amendment was procedural and did not alter the applicant’s settled expectation of liberty or amount to additional punishment.

On the merits, the court found the applicant’s institutional record, only recent rehabilitative efforts, qualified remorse, failure to fully accept responsibility, and the brutal nature of the offence meant there was not a substantial likelihood that a jury would unanimously reduce parole ineligibility.

The application was dismissed, with leave to reapply in five years.

The applicant sought habeas corpus relief arguing that his custodial sentence had been fully satisfied due to an alleged ambiguity in the Warrant of Committal regarding whether one count was consecutive or concurrent.

Correctional Service Canada initially interpreted the sentence as four years but later corrected the calculation to six years after clarification from the sentencing judge.

The court held that the sentencing reasons clearly imposed a six‑year custodial sentence after credit for pre‑sentence custody and that the amended warrant merely clarified the intended sentence.

The correction did not amount to an impermissible reconsideration of sentence and did not violate the applicant’s Charter rights.

The application for habeas corpus was therefore dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the faint hope clause.

The court conducted an initial judicial screening to determine if there was a substantial likelihood of success before a jury, applying the new threshold introduced by Bill S-6.

Despite the brutal nature of the murder and the applicant's continued denial of guilt, the court found that his exemplary institutional behaviour, low risk to public safety, and advancing age provided sufficient substance to warrant a jury hearing.

The application was granted and a jury was ordered to be empanelled.

The court addressed sentencing for breaches of long-term supervision orders by Indigenous long-term offenders and reaffirmed the mandatory application of Gladue principles in every such case.

It held that sentencing judges must consider systemic and background factors and craft proportionate, individualized sanctions even for serious breaches tied to risk management.

In the first appeal, errors in principle required intervention and the custodial term was reduced to one year.

In the second appeal, the one-year sentence imposed by the appellate court was upheld.

The appellant appealed his sentence and sought to introduce fresh evidence in the form of his wife's affidavit suggesting provocation.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit the fresh evidence because it was available at trial, inconsistent with the defence advanced, and the appellant himself had not claimed provocation.

The court found the sentence imposed at trial was fit and dismissed the appeal.