6 total
Unreasonable delay is not a threshold for a s. 525 detention review.
The appellant was detained in pre-trial custody on firearm offences and sought a review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.
The reviewing judge applied a two-step test requiring the accused to first establish either unreasonable prosecutorial delay or a material impact of time on the initial basis for detention before the court could assess whether continued detention was justified under s. 515(10).
The Supreme Court allowed the moot appeal to resolve a systemic national divergence, holding that unreasonable delay is not a threshold condition for a s. 525 detention review — the sole overarching question is whether continued detention is justified under s. 515(10).
The Court also clarified the procedural obligations of the jailer to apply forthwith, the judge to schedule the hearing at the earliest opportunity, and the discretion under ss. 525(9) and 526 to give directions expediting the trial.
Sentence appeal allowed; conditional discharge granted to youthful offender pursuing medical career.
The appellant, a 20-year-old at the time of the offence, appealed his sentence.
The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding a question of law regarding whether the sentencing judge considered if a conditional discharge would serve the public interest.
Noting the appellant's positive post-offence conduct, including compensating the victim, complying with probation, and successfully completing two years of medical school, the Court allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to a conditional discharge.
Crown appeal allowed; denial of severance did not cause injustice.
The Crown appealed a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision that had set aside the respondent's convictions for forcible confinement, overcoming resistance to commission of an offence, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and assault causing bodily harm, and ordered a new trial.
The Court of Appeal majority had held that the trial judge's denial of the respondent's severance application resulted in injustice.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not act unjudicially in denying the severance application and that no injustice resulted from the denial.
Gladue principles apply to the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders for breaches of long-term supervision orders.
The court addressed sentencing for breaches of long-term supervision orders by Indigenous long-term offenders and reaffirmed the mandatory application of Gladue principles in every such case.
It held that sentencing judges must consider systemic and background factors and craft proportionate, individualized sanctions even for serious breaches tied to risk management.
In the first appeal, errors in principle required intervention and the custodial term was reduced to one year.
In the second appeal, the one-year sentence imposed by the appellate court was upheld.
Appeal from first degree murder conviction dismissed substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal.
The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Court dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge did not err in refusing further adjournment to unrepresented accused.
The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering and possession of stolen property after a trial by judge and jury.
He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in proceeding while he was unrepresented and in not offering sufficient assistance.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the further appeal, holding that the trial judge's refusal to grant a further adjournment was a discretionary decision and no error of law was established.