This decision addresses the burden of proof for the statutory defence of "reasonable excuse" under s.320.16 of the Criminal Code, following a jury conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failure to stop after an accident.

The Crown argued the accused bore the persuasive burden, while the defence contended it was merely an evidential burden, with the Crown bearing the ultimate persuasive burden.

The court ruled that the Crown bears the ultimate persuasive burden of disproving the existence of a reasonable excuse beyond a reasonable doubt, finding that Parliament intended to remove the reverse onus with the repeal of s.794(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant, Rijah Martin, was charged with failing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 320.15 of the Criminal Code and a Highway Traffic Act offence.

She pleaded guilty to the HTA charge and not guilty to the Criminal Code charge, asserting a reasonable excuse due to an anxiety attack.

The court rejected her defence, finding her testimony untruthful and her failure to provide a breath sample deliberate.

The court also clarified the burden of proof for a reasonable excuse defence, holding that following the repeal of s. 794(2) of the Criminal Code, the accused only bears an evidentiary burden to establish an 'air of reality,' after which the Crown must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt, consistent with Charter values.

The appellant, Mr. Berhe, sought leave to appeal from three orders made by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge (SCACJ) relating to four summary conviction appeals.

Two applications (C63256, M49551) concerned his awareness of immigration consequences when entering guilty pleas, and one (M49552) challenged a conviction for harassing communications.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal for the harassing communications conviction (M49552), finding no error of law in the SCACJ's decision to dismiss the appeal as abandoned and no merit to the proposed grounds, including the interpretation of "person" under s. 372(3) of the Criminal Code.

For the immigration-related appeals (C63256, M49551), leave was granted, but the appeals were dismissed.

The court found that the appellant had sufficient knowledge of the negative immigration implications of his guilty pleas, given his extensive history with the immigration system, and that his claim of subjective prejudice was not supported by objective circumstances, as the Crown's case was overwhelming.

The defendant, Vinusan Arudselvam, was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a breath demand under s. 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code following a motor vehicle accident.

The defence argued that due to chest pain from the accident, he had a reasonable excuse for not providing a suitable sample and challenged the mens rea requirement for the offence.

The court ruled that the breath demand was lawful and that the mens rea for the offence is knowledge that a demand has been made, not specific intent to refuse.

However, the court found the defendant's testimony credible regarding his chest pain and accepted that his injury constituted a reasonable medical excuse, making compliance extremely difficult or painful.

The police investigation was deemed rushed and poorly conducted, particularly regarding the officer's failure to ascertain the defendant's language difficulties or medical distress.

Consequently, the charge was dismissed.

The appellant, unrepresented at trial, was convicted of impaired care or control and refusing a breath sample.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to adequately assist the unrepresented accused by not explaining the essential elements of the offences, particularly regarding the evidentiary shortcut for care or control and the reverse onus for reasonable excuse in refusing a breath sample.

This failure resulted in an unfair trial, constituting a miscarriage of justice.

The curative proviso was deemed inapplicable.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered on both counts.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample at trial.

Both the Crown and the accused appealed.

The accused argued the verdicts were inconsistent and the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding the synergistic effects of Ativan and alcohol.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by finding the accused lacked the mens rea for impaired driving due to the unanticipated effects of combining alcohol and prescription medication.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals, finding no inconsistency in the verdicts, no material misapprehension of evidence, and holding that the presumption of voluntariness for impaired driving can be rebutted where impairment results from the unforeseeable combined effect of alcohol and drugs.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand after being pulled over for speeding and suspected impaired driving.

Despite multiple opportunities and instructions, the defendant was unable to produce an adequate breath sample, resulting in arrest.

The Crown sought conviction under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court acquitted the defendant, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally failed to comply with the demand.

The court adopted the Lewko/Soucy formulation of mens rea, requiring proof of intentional non-compliance rather than mere knowledge or recklessness.