SCC 2015

In a criminal appeal as of right, the Court considered whether the trial judge properly answered a jury question about the distinction between intent to kill and intent required for murder.

The Court held that the jury’s question raised a live intent issue that required clarification, and that merely referring jurors back to prior written instructions was insufficient.

Reviewing the record as a whole, the Court found a realistic possibility the jury misunderstood what had to be proved for murder and attempted murder.

The Court also noted the prosecution concession that the decision tree provided to the jury was erroneous on provocation.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on both charges.

In a criminal appeal from a sexual assault conviction, the appellant challenged the reasonableness of the trial verdict.

The Court accepted the majority reasons of the intermediate appellate court that the verdict was reasonable and grounded in the evidentiary record.

A dissent would have allowed the appeal substantially on the dissenting appellate reasons below.

The appeal was dismissed, leaving the conviction affirmed.

On a reference by the Registrar, the Court held that two documents submitted by S.H. did not comply with the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The judge found that the purported notice of appeal as of right did not identify valid provisions granting an appeal and that the request for an oral hearing, with an annexed leave notice, lacked required information.

The Registrar was directed to return the materials.

The accused appealed convictions for fraud and an order for a new trial on cheating-related counts arising from attempts to rig horse races by drugging horses.

The Court held there was evidence a horse race can involve mixed chance and skill through randomized post positions, supporting a new trial on cheating counts.

It further held the drugging scheme constituted dishonest conduct creating a non-remote risk of deprivation to bettors, and upheld entered fraud convictions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentencing appeal, restored the trial sentence of six years and six months for two counts of impaired driving causing death, and reduced the driving prohibition to two years and four months after accounting for the presentence no-driving period.

In a criminal appeal from a provincial court of appeal, the Crown challenged the setting aside of a second degree murder conviction and the order for a new trial.

The central issues were errors in the jury charge, including failure to identify the unlawful act and failure to properly instruct on the elements of manslaughter.

The Court held that these legal errors prevented reliance on the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was dismissed and the new trial order remained in place.

The Court dismissed the appeal from both the committal order and the surrender order in an extradition case involving child-abduction charges sought by the United States.

The majority held the extradition judge exceeded her limited committal role by weighing defence and exculpatory evidence instead of applying the prima facie committal test and the presumption of reliability of the record of the case.

At surrender, the Minister reasonably considered both the possible defence issue and the children’s best interests and reasonably concluded surrender was not unjust or oppressive under the Extradition Act.

The appellant challenged the refusal of humanitarian and compassionate relief under s. 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act after unsuccessful refugee and risk-assessment proceedings.

The majority held that the officer unreasonably constrained discretion by treating 'unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship' as rigid legal thresholds rather than descriptive guidance.

The reasons emphasized holistic assessment, including mental health evidence, discrimination risk evidence, and the best interests of a directly affected child.

The appeal was allowed, the officer’s decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration.

A dissent would have upheld the refusal as reasonable under a stringent but flexible exceptional-relief framework.

The Court addressed three securities class action appeals on whether limitation periods for statutory secondary-market misrepresentation claims are suspended before leave is granted, and on related nunc pro tunc, special circumstances, leave-threshold, and certification issues.

The CIBC and IMAX appeals were dismissed, while the Celestica appeal was allowed.

The Court allowed the appeals and held that former section 117 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act was overbroad under section 7 of the Charter.

It captured humanitarian aid, mutual aid among asylum-seekers, and assistance to family members, which fell outside Parliament’s objective of targeting organized people smuggling.

Attorney General consent to prosecute did not cure the constitutional defect.

The Court read down the former provision to exclude those protected categories and remitted the charges for trial.

Consolidated immigration appeals considered whether inadmissibility for people smuggling under s. 37(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act captures all assistance to undocumented migrants or is limited by organized transnational criminality and material benefit.

The Court held the provision applies only where conduct furthers illegal entry for direct or indirect financial or other material benefit in the context of transnational organized crime.

Humanitarian and mutual aid, including assistance among asylum-seekers in collective flight to safety, does not itself constitute people smuggling under this provision.

The prior inadmissibility determinations were based on an unreasonable statutory interpretation and were remitted for reconsideration on the proper legal test.

The Court held that broadcast-incidental copies engage the reproduction right and that no implied licence covered those copies, but allowed the appeal because the Copyright Board’s royalty valuation failed to apply technological neutrality and balance.

The 2008-2012 licence and related interim licence were set aside and remitted for reconsideration.

Two traffic-offence appellants argued Alberta had a constitutional obligation to enact, print, and publish legislation in both French and English based on the 1867 Address and 1870 constitutional instruments.

A majority held no entrenched constitutional guarantee of legislative bilingualism applied to Alberta through those texts, rejected related fiduciary-duty arguments, and dismissed both appeals.

The Court answered the constitutional questions in Alberta's favour while awarding the appellants party-and-party costs in this Court and below.

These appeals challenged the constitutional validity of National Defence Act provisions that permit service prosecution of underlying federal offences and fraudulent acts for persons subject to the Code of Service Discipline.

The appellants argued the provisions were overbroad under section 7 of the Charter because they extended military jurisdiction beyond conduct directly tied to military operations.

The Court held the provisions pursue maintenance of discipline, efficiency, and morale, and that prosecuting off-duty or non-base criminal conduct remains rationally connected to that objective.

The overbreadth challenge failed and all appeals were dismissed.

This criminal appeal considered the mens rea element for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death.

The trial judge had entered acquittals after concluding the required fault standard was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellate court set aside those acquittals and ordered a new trial.

The Court held that the trial reasoning failed to assess the accused's driving conduct against the full evidentiary record to determine marked departure from the objective standard of care.

The appeal was dismissed, with two justices dissenting.

In an insolvency appeal, the Court considered whether provincial farm-protection preconditions conflicted with the national receivership regime under the federal bankruptcy statute.

The majority held there was no operational conflict and no frustration of federal purpose, emphasizing a restrained paramountcy analysis and cooperative federalism.

The purpose of the federal receivership provision was read narrowly as creating a national appointment mechanism, not guaranteeing a uniformly rapid timeline free from provincial conditions.

The provincial 150-day process and mediation framework therefore remained operative when a secured creditor sought appointment of a receiver over farm-related assets.

A dissent would have found the provincial scheme frustrated federal objectives of timeliness, flexibility, and emergency responsiveness.

The Court dismissed the appeal and held that Ontario’s permit-suspension enforcement mechanism is constitutionally inoperative to the extent it enforces a bankruptcy-provable toll debt discharged under s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, because it creates an operational conflict and frustrates Parliament’s financial rehabilitation purpose.

The appeal considered whether a provincial driver-licensing suspension mechanism could continue to compel payment of a debt released by bankruptcy discharge.

The Court held that the provincial scheme, insofar as it enforced a provable claim discharged under the federal insolvency statute, was constitutionally inoperative under federal paramountcy.

The majority found both operational conflict and frustration of the federal rehabilitation purpose, while concurring reasons relied on frustration of purpose alone.

The appeal was dismissed and the debtor could not be denied driving privileges solely for non-payment of the discharged judgment debt.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial because errors in assessing the defence and credibility caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant challenged a roadside driving prohibition imposed under a provincial automatic roadside prohibition regime, arguing that a screening-device result could not alone establish reasonable grounds to believe driving ability was affected by alcohol.

The Court held that the governing provision was unambiguous and that an officer may rely on a valid screening-device result without separate confirmatory evidence, provided the officer honestly accepts the result’s reliability.

It rejected the submission that constitutional values could be used to manufacture ambiguity where the statutory text, context, and objectives point to one reading.

The Court further confirmed that the provincial regulatory regime is independent from the federal criminal regime, even though it is triggered by a roadside demand under criminal legislation.

The appeal was dismissed and the prohibition upheld.