Lloyd M. Strickland

The appellant was charged with child luring after sending sexually explicit online communications to an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl.

The police used screen capture software to record the communications without prior judicial authorization.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, though for different reasons: the majority (Brown J., Abella and Gascon JJ. concurring) held that the appellant had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because he communicated with someone he believed to be a child who was a stranger; Karakatsanis J. (Wagner C.J. concurring) held there was no search or seizure because the police simply received messages directed to them; Moldaver J. concurred in the result; and Martin J. dissented in part, finding a s. 8 breach but agreeing that exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) was not warranted.

In this criminal appeal, multiple accused sought to uphold a stay of proceedings granted for alleged pre-charge delay said to infringe security of the person under the Charter.

The trial judge had stayed the charges, and a majority in the provincial appellate court upheld that remedy.

The Supreme Court majority allowed the Crown’s appeal substantially for the dissenting appellate reasons, concluding a stay was not warranted on the record.

A dissenting justice at the Supreme Court would have dismissed the appeal substantially for the appellate majority’s reasons.

In a criminal appeal involving Charter search and seizure and arbitrary detention issues, the appellant challenged convictions arising from a traffic stop, seizure of a knife, and a search incidental to arrest that revealed cocaine.

The majority accepted the lower appellate reasoning that the visual inspection did not amount to an unlawful search, that seizure of the knife was justified, and that arrest and subsequent search were lawful.

A dissent would have allowed the appeal on the alternative appellate reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed and the convictions were upheld.

In a criminal appeal as of right, the Court considered whether the trial judge properly answered a jury question about the distinction between intent to kill and intent required for murder.

The Court held that the jury’s question raised a live intent issue that required clarification, and that merely referring jurors back to prior written instructions was insufficient.

Reviewing the record as a whole, the Court found a realistic possibility the jury misunderstood what had to be proved for murder and attempted murder.

The Court also noted the prosecution concession that the decision tree provided to the jury was erroneous on provocation.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on both charges.