Randolph J. Piercey

A police officer was acquitted by jury of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, which provides that no consent is obtained where an accused, by abusing a position of trust, power, or authority, induces a complainant to engage in sexual activity.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an instruction under s. 273.1(2)(c) was warranted on the facts, as it was open to the jury to conclude the accused used his position of trust and the complainant's intoxicated and vulnerable state to secure her apparent consent to sexual activity.

In this criminal appeal, multiple accused sought to uphold a stay of proceedings granted for alleged pre-charge delay said to infringe security of the person under the Charter.

The trial judge had stayed the charges, and a majority in the provincial appellate court upheld that remedy.

The Supreme Court majority allowed the Crown’s appeal substantially for the dissenting appellate reasons, concluding a stay was not warranted on the record.

A dissenting justice at the Supreme Court would have dismissed the appeal substantially for the appellate majority’s reasons.