Jason Edwards

The accused was convicted of several offences resulting from altercations with two complainants.

The accused appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in admitting an out-of-court statement made by a complainant who died of unrelated causes before trial, for the truth of its contents.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge applied an incorrect principle of law in assessing threshold reliability and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada, allowing the Crown's appeal, found that the trial judge properly applied the principled approach to hearsay evidence and did not relax the minimum threshold of reliability, agreeing with the dissent in the Court of Appeal.

The convictions were restored.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against his granddaughter, who was between 7 and 10 years old at the time of the alleged offences.

The Crown appealed on the basis that the trial judge engaged in impermissible stereotypical reasoning in assessing the complainant's credibility, specifically by inferring that because the complainant had a 'strong and normal' relationship with the accused, the offences could not have occurred.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the majority of the Court of Appeal that this inference was rooted in stereotypical reasoning rather than the totality of the evidence, and constituted an error of law that had a material effect on the verdict.

The appeal was dismissed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent was convicted of assault, aggravated assault, and mischief following a trial in Provincial Court.

He appealed on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his trial counsel had failed to advise him of his right to elect his mode of trial.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada reversed, holding that ineffective assistance of counsel requires both a performance component and a prejudice component, and that the loss of the right to elect the mode of trial alone does not constitute a miscarriage of justice where the accused fails to demonstrate a reasonable possibility he would have elected differently.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remanded to the Court of Appeal to address the remaining grounds of appeal.

In a criminal appeal involving Charter search and seizure and arbitrary detention issues, the appellant challenged convictions arising from a traffic stop, seizure of a knife, and a search incidental to arrest that revealed cocaine.

The majority accepted the lower appellate reasoning that the visual inspection did not amount to an unlawful search, that seizure of the knife was justified, and that arrest and subsequent search were lawful.

A dissent would have allowed the appeal on the alternative appellate reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed and the convictions were upheld.