The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Andrew Zock, who was convicted of sexual assault after a judge-alone trial.

The court found that Zock received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer elected the mode of trial (judge-alone) without Zock’s informed instructions or advice about his right to a jury trial.

The court set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial before a judge and jury, finding that the loss of the right to elect the mode of trial constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the verdict was unreasonable, holding that the trial judge’s finding of incapacity to consent was supported by the evidence.

This decision addresses a post-verdict application by Patrick Delisle seeking to set aside his conviction and declare a mistrial on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The core issue was whether trial counsel failed to properly advise Delisle of his right to elect the mode of trial, a fundamental procedural right under s. 536 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that trial counsel did not adequately inform Delisle of this right, particularly after significant additional charges were laid, which increased Delisle’s jeopardy.

The court held that this failure constituted a denial of Delisle’s right to make an informed election, undermining the fairness of the trial process.

The only appropriate remedy was to grant a mistrial and vacate the conviction, ordering a new trial.

The court ordered a mistrial in a sexual assault case after finding that the accused, RE, did not receive effective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge found that defence counsel's lack of competence in questioning, knowledge of law, and submissions resulted in an unfair trial and compromised the reliability of the verdict.

The decision details the evidence, procedural history, and legal principles regarding the right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, ultimately concluding that no remedy short of a new trial could address the prejudice to the accused.

The appellants, Fredrick and Patricia Kentner, appealed the summary dismissal of their first appeal to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court, which concerned convictions and a sentence for environmental offences related to unlawful fill operations.

The appeal was based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by their paralegal and errors in the original conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no ineffective assistance as the appellants' failure to pay fines (a mandatory condition for appeal) was a deliberate choice unrelated to the paralegal's conduct, and a waiver application would have had no prospect of success.

The court also found no merit in the conviction appeal, affirming the trial judge's reliance on regulatory maps for jurisdiction, and no basis to interfere with the sentence, which included a $25,000 fine and a property rehabilitation order.

The applicant, Craig M., sought bail release pending appeal of his conviction for sexual offences.

His appeal was based on ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging inadequate advice regarding his right to testify and mode of trial, and general inadequate performance.

The court found the claims regarding mode of trial and general performance frivolous.

While the claim about advice on testifying was not frivolous, it did not clearly surpass the "not frivolous" threshold due to a lack of supporting evidence, absence of a waiver of privilege, and problematic, evolving affidavits.

Given the seriousness of the offences and the weakness of the proposed appeal, the application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of sexual offences, appealed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing he was deprived of his right to re-elect a judge-alone trial.

Counsel missed a statutory deadline for re-election, and the Crown subsequently withdrew consent.

The Court of Appeal found counsel's performance fell below the professional standard by missing the deadline and providing erroneous advice regarding options to rectify the situation.

This resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as the appellant genuinely desired a judge-alone trial and felt he had no choice but to proceed with a jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered before a judge alone.

The appellant, a youth, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, erroneous dismissal of a s. 278.3 Criminal Code application for production of the complainant's therapeutic records, and improper curtailment of cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish a miscarriage of justice due to counsel's performance, that the trial judge correctly dismissed the s. 278.3 application as the records were not shown to be "likely relevant" with case-specific information, and that cross-examination was not improperly curtailed.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding of non-consensual sexual contact and the inapplicability of the honest but mistaken belief in consent defence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and uttering a threat to cause death.

The appeal centered on the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, specifically the unauthorized disclosure of the appellant's statement to the Crown and its subsequent use in cross-examination, which impacted the trial judge's assessment of his credibility.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and found that trial counsel's conduct fell below the standard of a reasonable professional, leading to a miscarriage of justice due to both trial unfairness (unilateral waiver of the right to silence) and an unreliable verdict.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Sean Gibbs, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and uninformed due to mental illness exacerbated by segregation, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's plea was voluntary and informed, as he understood the nature and consequences of the plea.

The court also found that trial counsel's assistance was not ineffective, as the alleged deficiencies did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, M.N., appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari and mandamus by the Superior Court of Justice.

M.N. sought to quash a trial judge's decision denying a mistrial and re-election of his mode of trial in a sexual assault case, arguing jurisdictional error due to delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy tightly limited to jurisdictional errors in criminal matters, and the trial judge's decision regarding disclosure and re-election was not a jurisdictional error but an error on the merits, properly reviewable only after trial.

The appeal was dismissed.