François Joyal

The Quebec Court of Appeal was asked by reference whether the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, was ultra vires Parliament's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held the Act was valid except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which it found impermissibly altered Canada's constitutional architecture.

Both the Attorney General of Quebec and the Attorney General of Canada appealed.

The Supreme Court upheld the entire Act as constitutionally valid under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, finding that its pith and substance — protecting the well-being of Indigenous children, youth and families by promoting culturally appropriate child and family services and advancing reconciliation — falls squarely within Parliament's jurisdiction over Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians.

The Court also held that ss. 21 and 22(3) do not alter the constitutional architecture: s. 21 is a valid anticipatory incorporation by reference provision, and s. 22(3) is a permissible legislative restatement of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellant First Nation government sought advance costs to fund treaty rights litigation against the Crown, arguing that despite having access to financial resources, those resources were required to address pressing community needs including housing deficits, lack of infrastructure, and high unemployment.

The Supreme Court clarified the impecuniosity requirement for advance costs: a First Nation government with access to financial resources may satisfy the requirement by demonstrating that those resources are genuinely needed to meet pressing needs, which are not limited to bare necessities but extend to matters within the broad mandate of First Nation governance.

The Court found the case management judge erred in failing to make sufficiently particularized findings on the cost of pressing needs and available surplus resources.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta for reconsideration on a more complete record, with solicitor-client costs awarded to the appellant in all courts.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed a ministerial referral for an admissibility hearing under s. 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

It held that a conditional sentence is not a 'term of imprisonment' for the serious criminality threshold based on an imposed sentence.

It also held that the 'maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years' must be assessed based on the law at the time the offence was committed, not at the time of the admissibility determination.

The matter was remitted to a different delegate for redetermination on a correct legal interpretation.

Consolidated immigration appeals considered whether inadmissibility for people smuggling under s. 37(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act captures all assistance to undocumented migrants or is limited by organized transnational criminality and material benefit.

The Court held the provision applies only where conduct furthers illegal entry for direct or indirect financial or other material benefit in the context of transnational organized crime.

Humanitarian and mutual aid, including assistance among asylum-seekers in collective flight to safety, does not itself constitute people smuggling under this provision.

The prior inadmissibility determinations were based on an unreasonable statutory interpretation and were remitted for reconsideration on the proper legal test.

The appeal addressed exclusion from refugee protection under art. 1F(a) for alleged complicity in crimes against humanity by a state official.

The Court rejected guilt by association and held that exclusion requires serious reasons for considering the claimant voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the group’s crime or criminal purpose.

It clarified that passive acquiescence or mere rank is insufficient, and that analysis must remain individualized and contextual.

The matter was remitted to a new panel for redetermination under the refined contribution-based test.

This administrative law appeal concerned judicial review of a staffing tribunal decision rejecting an abuse-of-authority complaint under federal public service staffing legislation.

The Court held that the tribunal reasonably concluded there was no legal requirement to use a particular appointment process based on whether a position was new or reclassified.

It further held the reviewing court improperly assessed a different theory than the one advanced in the complaint and impermissibly reweighed the record on judicial review.

The appeal was allowed, with the tribunal decision restored.