Jared Ashby Will

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike two paragraphs from the Statement of Claim which sought wide-ranging non-monetary relief under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Attorney General argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief as it would intrude on the executive branch's powers.

The plaintiff, Ebrahim Toure, contended the motion was procedurally incorrect and that his claims for Charter relief were not plain and obvious to fail.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that Rule 21.01(1)(b) applies only to "causes of action" and not to "claims for relief" or "remedies." The court also granted the Attorney General an extension of time to file a statement of defence.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) decision dismissing their appeal on credibility grounds, finding insufficient evidence that the principal applicant was a genuine convert to Christianity.

The Federal Court held that the RAD unreasonably rejected new evidence regarding a man the principal applicant had converted (Group B evidence) and unreasonably dismissed other corroborating evidence based on misapprehensions of the RPD testimony.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the matter remitted to a different RAD member for reconsideration.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff sued for torts and Charter breaches arising from his seven-year immigration detention.

The court struck the claims against the Adjudicators of the Immigration Division, finding they were barred by statutory and common law immunity.

However, the court declined to strike the claims of malicious prosecution against the CBSA for the plaintiff's detention in Canada, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm, and the section 15 Charter claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that these novel claims would fail.

The appellant sought habeas corpus relief and Charter remedies regarding his immigration detention.

The application judge dismissed the habeas corpus application but granted section 24(1) relief for a section 12 Charter breach, ordering the appellant's transfer from a maximum security provincial facility to an immigration detention centre.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal and allowed the respondent's cross-appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish a section 12 breach and that the application judge erred in his analysis of the legal test and evidentiary foundation required for such a claim.

The appellant, a Jamaican citizen and former permanent resident of Canada, was detained for five years by the Canada Border Services Agency pending removal to Jamaica following a removal order based on serious criminality.

The appellant brought a habeas corpus application and sought Charter damages under sections 7, 9, and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his detention was arbitrary, indefinite, and constituted cruel and unusual treatment.

The application judge dismissed the Charter damages claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no breach of the Charter rights and clarifying that Charter damages claims cannot be joined to habeas corpus applications.

The applicant, a foreign national subject to a removal order, applied for habeas corpus after being detained in a maximum security provincial jail for over four years pending removal.

The court found that while the length of detention was exceptional, its duration was not uncertain because the applicant's recent cooperation provided a reasonable prospect for removal, thus not violating sections 7 and 9 of the Charter.

However, the court held that detaining the applicant in a maximum security facility with frequent lockdowns, rather than an immigration holding centre, was grossly disproportionate to his flight risk and constituted cruel and unusual treatment under section 12 of the Charter.

The court ordered his immediate transfer to an immigration holding centre.

The applicant, subject to a deportation order since 1995 due to serious criminality, had been held in immigration detention for over seven years because authorities could not determine his country of citizenship.

Despite numerous detention reviews maintaining his detention, the applicant sought habeas corpus, challenging his continued detention as unlawful.

The Superior Court allowed the application, finding the detention unduly lengthy and its duration uncertain, thereby violating the applicant's rights under sections 7 and 9 of the Charter.

The court concluded that the applicant was not actively thwarting removal efforts and posed a limited public risk, and that the Minister failed to justify continued detention for immigration purposes.

The applicant was ordered released on specific terms and conditions.

The applicant brought a habeas corpus application seeking release from a five-year immigration detention pending deportation, along with a claim for Charter damages under s. 24(1) for alleged violations of his ss. 7, 9, 10, and 12 rights.

During the hearing, the applicant was deported to Jamaica, rendering the habeas corpus application moot.

The court proceeded to hear the Charter damages claim, finding it had jurisdiction to do so without requiring bifurcated proceedings.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the Charter claims, concluding that the lengthy detention was lawful, subject to regular review, and not grossly disproportionate or cruel and unusual, as the delay was primarily caused by Jamaican authorities' failure to issue a travel document.

The appeal addressed exclusion from refugee protection under art. 1F(a) for alleged complicity in crimes against humanity by a state official.

The Court rejected guilt by association and held that exclusion requires serious reasons for considering the claimant voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the group’s crime or criminal purpose.

It clarified that passive acquiescence or mere rank is insufficient, and that analysis must remain individualized and contextual.

The matter was remitted to a new panel for redetermination under the refined contribution-based test.