Sharon Stewart Guthrie

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion to defer filing its statement of defence until after the certification motion in a proposed class proceeding regarding immigration detention.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the presumption that a defendant must file a statement of defence before certification unless special circumstances justify a deferral.

The court found that the legal issues were well-defined and the defendant's concerns about the complexity and resources required to prepare the defence conflated pleading preparation with discovery or trial preparation.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff sued for torts and Charter breaches arising from his seven-year immigration detention.

The court struck the claims against the Adjudicators of the Immigration Division, finding they were barred by statutory and common law immunity.

However, the court declined to strike the claims of malicious prosecution against the CBSA for the plaintiff's detention in Canada, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm, and the section 15 Charter claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that these novel claims would fail.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed two decisions granting habeas corpus relief to an individual detained on account of an outstanding deportation order.

The applicant had been detained for approximately 25 months on immigration grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision to release the applicant on habeas corpus, finding that the detention was lengthy and of uncertain duration and could no longer be justified as furthering the machinery of immigration control.

However, the Court found that the application judge erred by assuming jurisdiction to supervise any subsequent re-incarceration by immigration authorities.

The Court struck the problematic supervisory clause and provided guidance on appropriate conditions for release in immigration detention cases.

The applicant, Godday Dadzie, sought release via habeas corpus from immigration detention under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

He had been detained since 2014, primarily due to being a flight risk and issues with establishing his identity and country of origin, exacerbated by his lack of cooperation.

The court considered whether his detention was "very lengthy" and of "uncertain duration," factoring in the nature of the detention facility and the applicant's non-cooperation.

The court found that the applicant's detention was not exceptionally lengthy when accounting for his lack of cooperation, nor was its duration uncertain due to his own obstructionist tactics.

The application was dismissed, as the court concluded that the detention was for a valid immigration purpose, not arbitrary, and consistent with fundamental justice principles.

The applicants, an immigration detainee and a remand detainee housed in a maximum security provincial correctional facility, brought an application for habeas corpus and a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

They alleged that frequent and unpredictable lockdowns, primarily caused by staff shortages, violated their Charter rights.

During lockdowns, inmates were confined to their double-bunked cells for 24 hours a day with limited access to showers, phones, and programs.

The court found that the conditions during the lockdowns, which occurred approximately 50% of the time, constituted cruel and unusual treatment in violation of s. 12 of the Charter.

The court declined to order a systemic remedy or a transfer, but awarded Charter damages of $60,000 to the immigration detainee (payable jointly by Ontario and Canada) and $25,000 to the remand detainee (payable by Ontario).

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Canadian citizenship oath under s. 24 of the Citizenship Act, alleging it infringed rights under ss. 2 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by compelling allegiance to the monarch.

After certification of the proposed class proceeding was denied and appeals were dismissed, the plaintiffs sought an order under s. 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to continue the matter as an individual proceeding.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The court held that although the litigation had progressed slowly, the delay was not intentional, contumelious, or such as to create a substantial risk that a fair trial would no longer be possible.

The motion to dismiss for delay was denied and the plaintiffs were permitted to continue the action individually seeking declaratory relief.