Sharon Stewart Guthrie

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion to defer filing its statement of defence until after the certification motion in a proposed class proceeding regarding immigration detention.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the presumption that a defendant must file a statement of defence before certification unless special circumstances justify a deferral.

The court found that the legal issues were well-defined and the defendant's concerns about the complexity and resources required to prepare the defence conflated pleading preparation with discovery or trial preparation.

The applicants challenged the federal government's COVID-19 border measures for returning international air travellers, including the requirement to quarantine in a government-approved accommodation (GAA) or designated quarantine facility (DQF) while awaiting a Day 1 COVID-19 test result.

The applicants argued the measures violated their Charter rights, were ultra vires the Quarantine Act, and encroached on provincial jurisdiction.

The Federal Court dismissed the applications, finding no Charter violations except for two specific instances involving one applicant whose section 9 and 10(b) rights were breached during her transfer to a DQF.

The Court held the measures were a reasonable exercise of delegated authority under the Quarantine Act and within the federal government's jurisdiction over quarantine.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend the operation of an Order-in-Council requiring air travellers entering Canada to undergo mandatory quarantine at a government-authorized accommodation or designated quarantine facility while awaiting COVID-19 test results.

The applicants challenged the measures under sections 7 and 9 of the Charter, arguing they constituted arbitrary detention and were not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice since travellers arriving by land or who tested positive were permitted to quarantine at home.

The Federal Court dismissed the motion, finding that while the applicants raised a serious issue regarding arbitrariness, they failed to establish irreparable harm and the balance of convenience heavily favored maintaining the public health measures, which were based on the precautionary principle and aimed to prevent the spread of new, highly transmissible COVID-19 variants.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff sued for torts and Charter breaches arising from his seven-year immigration detention.

The court struck the claims against the Adjudicators of the Immigration Division, finding they were barred by statutory and common law immunity.

However, the court declined to strike the claims of malicious prosecution against the CBSA for the plaintiff's detention in Canada, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm, and the section 15 Charter claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that these novel claims would fail.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed two decisions granting habeas corpus relief to an individual detained on account of an outstanding deportation order.

The applicant had been detained for approximately 25 months on immigration grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision to release the applicant on habeas corpus, finding that the detention was lengthy and of uncertain duration and could no longer be justified as furthering the machinery of immigration control.

However, the Court found that the application judge erred by assuming jurisdiction to supervise any subsequent re-incarceration by immigration authorities.

The Court struck the problematic supervisory clause and provided guidance on appropriate conditions for release in immigration detention cases.

The applicant, Godday Dadzie, sought release via habeas corpus from immigration detention under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

He had been detained since 2014, primarily due to being a flight risk and issues with establishing his identity and country of origin, exacerbated by his lack of cooperation.

The court considered whether his detention was "very lengthy" and of "uncertain duration" factoring in the nature of the detention facility and the applicant's non-cooperation.

The court found that the applicant's detention was not exceptionally lengthy when accounting for his lack of cooperation, nor was its duration uncertain due to his own obstructionist tactics.

The application was dismissed, as the court concluded that the detention was for a valid immigration purpose, not arbitrary, and consistent with fundamental justice principles.

The applicants, an immigration detainee and a remand detainee housed in a maximum security provincial correctional facility, brought an application for habeas corpus and a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

They alleged that frequent and unpredictable lockdowns, primarily caused by staff shortages, violated their Charter rights.

During lockdowns, inmates were confined to their double-bunked cells for 24 hours a day with limited access to showers, phones, and programs.

The court found that the conditions during the lockdowns, which occurred approximately 50% of the time, constituted cruel and unusual treatment in violation of s. 12 of the Charter.

The court declined to order a systemic remedy or a transfer, but awarded Charter damages of $60,000 to the immigration detainee (payable jointly by Ontario and Canada) and $25,000 to the remand detainee (payable by Ontario).

The appellant filed two notices of appeal regarding interlocutory orders made during his ongoing habeas corpus application in the Superior Court of Justice, which challenged his immigration detention.

The appellant sought directions for the Superior Court judge to issue certain orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders in a habeas corpus application until a final determination is made by the Superior Court.

A self‑represented immigration detainee brought a habeas corpus application challenging the legality of his ongoing detention under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and alleging restricted access to legal resources while held in a provincial correctional institution.

The respondents argued the matter was res judicata and that the Superior Court should decline jurisdiction because the Federal Court provides a comprehensive statutory review scheme for immigration detention decisions.

The court held the res judicata argument was not established on the record.

However, it found the evidentiary record insufficient to determine whether the applicant had a meaningful remedy available through Federal Court judicial review.

The court therefore reserved its decision on jurisdiction and the merits and adjourned the application to allow the applicant to attempt to pursue remedies in Federal Court and obtain legal resources.

Permanent resident applicants challenged the citizenship oath requirement to swear allegiance to the Queen, alleging infringements of freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and religion, and equality rights under the Charter.

The court held that, purposively interpreted, the oath is not allegiance to the Queen in her personal capacity but a symbolic commitment to Canada's form of government and the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.

Applying the Irwin Toy framework, the court concluded there was no infringement of s. 2(b), and in the alternative any infringement would be justified under s. 1.

The court also held that the oath is secular and does not violate s. 2(a), and that the equality claim failed because it was premised on a mistaken understanding of the oath's meaning.

Appeal dismissed and cross-appeal allowed.

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Canadian citizenship oath under s. 24 of the Citizenship Act, alleging it infringed rights under ss. 2 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by compelling allegiance to the monarch.

After certification of the proposed class proceeding was denied and appeals were dismissed, the plaintiffs sought an order under s. 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to continue the matter as an individual proceeding.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The court held that although the litigation had progressed slowly, the delay was not intentional, contumelious, or such as to create a substantial risk that a fair trial would no longer be possible.

The motion to dismiss for delay was denied and the plaintiffs were permitted to continue the action individually seeking declaratory relief.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellants were awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale for both the appeal and the proceeding below.

The costs were fixed at $45,000 for one group of appellants, $20,000 for another group, and $60,000 for a single appellant, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

Appeal from dismissal of an application challenging the enforcement of immigration sponsorship undertakings after sponsored relatives received Ontario social assistance.

The court held that the federal and provincial governments have a case-by-case discretion whether to enforce sponsorship debt, and that Ontario unlawfully fettered that discretion by applying policies inconsistent with the family class immigration scheme.

The court further held that sponsors are owed procedural fairness before enforcement, including a meaningful opportunity to explain relevant personal and financial circumstances, consideration of those submissions, and notice of the decision made.

The court rejected the argument that undertakings signed under the former immigration statute became unenforceable under the new regime.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision denying a stay of proceedings under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The court agreed that the underlying application was a straightforward Charter-based constitutional challenge of a federal law regarding citizenship, rather than a matter involving the administrative handling of citizenship files.