Kristina Selma Dragaitis

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Appeal Division dismissing her appeal of a refused spousal sponsorship application.

The IAD found her marriage was not genuine and was entered into primarily for immigration purposes.

The applicant argued a breach of procedural fairness occurred because the IAD relied on an anonymous tip about her husband's relationship with another woman.

The Federal Court held the de novo nature of the IAD hearing meant no procedural fairness breach occurred, as the IAD considered the tip but did not find it determinative.

The Court also found the IAD's conclusion on the genuineness of the marriage was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment, which sought to dismiss the respondent's action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and Charter breaches as statute-barred.

The respondent had been detained by the CBSA for 467 days before being deported, but only discovered evidence of alleged CBSA misconduct years later when internal notes were disclosed in separate litigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the presumptive limitation period starting on the date of arrest was rebutted, as the respondent did not have sufficient material facts to discover his claim until the internal notes were disclosed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, a permanent resident, was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Immigration Division deemed him inadmissible for serious criminality and organized criminality under the IRPA, issuing two deportation orders.

On judicial review of the organized criminality inadmissibility, the Federal Court held that the Immigration Division reasonably concluded the applicant engaged in organized transnational crime by participating in the importation of cocaine from Jamaica with at least two others.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis or, alternatively, on a partial indemnity basis, following the dismissal of the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The court declined substantial indemnity due to a lack of "reprehensible conduct" but awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the amount reasonable given the complexity and importance of the motion, proportionality, and access to justice.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and Charter breaches, arguing it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff was arrested by the CBSA in June 2013 and detained until October 2014, but only commenced the action in October 2016.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the claim was not discoverable until June 2015, when the plaintiff received disclosure indicating the CBSA had relied on an interpreter for a key witness statement, casting doubt on the grounds for his detention.

The court also found genuine issues for trial regarding the merits of the claim.

Permanent resident applicants challenged the citizenship oath requirement to swear allegiance to the Queen, alleging infringements of freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and religion, and equality rights under the Charter.

The court held that, purposively interpreted, the oath is not allegiance to the Queen in her personal capacity but a symbolic commitment to Canada's form of government and the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.

Applying the Irwin Toy framework, the court concluded there was no infringement of s. 2(b), and in the alternative any infringement would be justified under s. 1.

The court also held that the oath is secular and does not violate s. 2(a), and that the equality claim failed because it was premised on a mistaken understanding of the oath's meaning.

Appeal dismissed and cross-appeal allowed.

Permanent residents seeking Canadian citizenship challenged the constitutionality of the statutory citizenship oath requiring allegiance to the Queen under the Citizenship Act.

The applicants alleged that the oath infringed freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and equality rights under ss. 2(a), 2(b), and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court held that the oath constitutes compelled expression and therefore prima facie infringes s. 2(b), but concluded the infringement is justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit because the oath symbolizes commitment to Canada’s constitutional structure and rule of law.

The court further held that the oath does not violate freedom of religion or equality rights, emphasizing its secular and universal nature and the absence of discriminatory purpose or effect.

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Canadian citizenship oath under s. 24 of the Citizenship Act, alleging it infringed rights under ss. 2 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by compelling allegiance to the monarch.

After certification of the proposed class proceeding was denied and appeals were dismissed, the plaintiffs sought an order under s. 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to continue the matter as an individual proceeding.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The court held that although the litigation had progressed slowly, the delay was not intentional, contumelious, or such as to create a substantial risk that a fair trial would no longer be possible.

The motion to dismiss for delay was denied and the plaintiffs were permitted to continue the action individually seeking declaratory relief.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision denying a stay of proceedings under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The court agreed that the underlying application was a straightforward Charter-based constitutional challenge of a federal law regarding citizenship, rather than a matter involving the administrative handling of citizenship files.

Following the dismissal of the respondent's motion for leave to appeal, the applicant sought costs of $7,603.25 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued the amount was excessive and suggested $2,850.

The court disallowed costs for the applicant's own time as he acted as the client, not counsel, but allowed fees for his counsel's preparation and attendance.

Costs were fixed at $3,150 on a partial indemnity basis.