Monmi Goswami

The Applicant, a citizen of El Salvador, sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) finding she is not a person in need of protection under section 97 of the IRPA.

The Applicant claimed she was specifically targeted for extortion by the MS-13 gang.

The RPD dismissed the claim, finding her fear was a generalized risk faced by everyone in El Salvador.

The Federal Court held the RPD's decision was unreasonable because it failed to explain why the Applicant's unchallenged evidence of escalating threats and being specifically targeted did not establish a personalized risk.

The application was granted and the matter remitted to the RPD for reconsideration.

The applicant, a citizen of Nigeria, sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Appeal Division dismissing her appeal.

The applicant claimed refugee protection based on a fear of her partner's family because she refused female genital mutilation.

The RAD found the applicant lacked credibility due to inconsistencies, her return to Nigeria after travel, and her delay in fleeing.

The Federal Court held that the RAD's credibility findings and assessment of evidence were reasonable, dismissing the application for judicial review.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) confirming the Refugee Protection Division's (RPD) rejection of his refugee claim on credibility grounds.

The Federal Court granted the application, finding that the RAD erred by unreasonably assessing medical evidence regarding the applicant's cognitive limitations and by improperly refusing to admit new evidence on the basis of circular reasoning.

The applicant sought judicial review of an immigration officer's decision denying her application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

The applicant argued the officer erred in assessing her ties to Canada, establishment, country conditions in Jamaica, and applied the wrong legal test.

The Federal Court reviewed the decision on a standard of reasonableness.

The Court found the officer reasonably concluded there was insufficient evidence of interdependency or reliance in her relationships, and that her level of establishment was not exceptional enough to warrant relief.

The Court also upheld the officer's findings regarding country conditions and determined the correct legal framework was applied.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, who has significant mental health challenges, sought an urgent stay of her scheduled removal to Nigeria pending her application for judicial review of a decision refusing a 60-day deferral of removal.

The applicant had failed to appear for her removal previously, raising the clean hands doctrine.

The Court held that the clean hands doctrine should be considered within the balance of convenience portion of the stay test.

The Court found a serious question existed regarding whether the officer's reliance on unspecified reception arrangements being made in Nigeria was reasonable or fair.

Irreparable harm was established due to the risk of psychological damage and the loss of a meaningful remedy if the applicant were removed.

The balance of convenience favoured the applicant, mitigating her prior non-compliance due to her mental health.

The motion for a stay of removal was granted.

The Minister applied for judicial review of a RAD decision setting aside the RPD's rejection of a refugee claim based on identity, and substituting a determination that the respondents were Convention refugees sur place.

The Federal Court held that the RAD's identity findings were reasonable and that it had jurisdiction to determine the sur place claim.

However, the Court granted the application for judicial review because the RAD breached procedural fairness by deciding the appeal on the new sur place ground without giving the Minister notice and an opportunity to be heard, even though the Minister had not intervened in the RAD appeal.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) decision upholding the Refugee Protection Division's (RPD) rejection of their refugee claims.

The applicants argued the RPD breached natural justice by rendering an oral decision after a very short break, suggesting bias.

The Court found the RAD's determination that a 50-minute break would have been sufficient was unintelligible, as the break was actually much shorter.

Additionally, the Court found the absence of the principal applicant's Basis of Claim narrative from the RPD record transmitted to the RAD was a significant breach of procedural fairness.

The application for judicial review was granted.

The applicants sought judicial review of a RAD decision dismissing their appeal and confirming they were not Convention refugees.

They alleged the RAD breached procedural fairness and made unreasonable credibility findings regarding their conversion to Christianity.

The Federal Court found the RAD did not err in refusing new evidence or breach procedural fairness.

However, the Court held the RAD unreasonably misconstrued the applicants' testimony regarding baptism and house church procedures, and failed to adequately assess corroborative evidence from a pastor.

The application for judicial review was granted.

The applicant, a citizen of Liberia living in a refugee camp in Ghana, applied for permanent residence in Canada as a Convention refugee abroad.

The migration officer rejected the application.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Federal Court held the officer's decision was unreasonable because it lacked justification and transparency, particularly regarding the applicant's HIV status and the officer's reliance on internet research not put to the applicant.

The Court granted the judicial review and remitted the matter to a different officer.

The applicant sought a stay of his deportation to Colombia pending his application for leave and judicial review of a decision rejecting his pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA).

The Federal Court found that the applicant did not come to the Court with "clean hands" because his affidavit in support of the motion was misleading.

Specifically, he failed to disclose his history of entering Canada with a fraudulent passport and the details of his criminal history, and gave an incredible explanation for his guilty plea to a robbery charge.

The Court concluded that the serious omissions in his affidavit undermined the integrity of the proceeding, disentitling him to the equitable relief of a stay.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Visa Officer's decision refusing his application for a study permit extension and finding him inadmissible for misrepresentation under s. 40(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

An educational consultant retained by the applicant had submitted a false high school transcript to York University, but this transcript was not submitted to IRCC.

The Federal Court found that the misrepresentation provisions could not reasonably be applied because no misrepresentation was made directly or indirectly to IRCC.

The application was granted and the finding of misrepresentation was quashed.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed two decisions granting habeas corpus relief to an individual detained on account of an outstanding deportation order.

The applicant had been detained for approximately 25 months on immigration grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision to release the applicant on habeas corpus, finding that the detention was lengthy and of uncertain duration and could no longer be justified as furthering the machinery of immigration control.

However, the Court found that the application judge erred by assuming jurisdiction to supervise any subsequent re-incarceration by immigration authorities.

The Court struck the problematic supervisory clause and provided guidance on appropriate conditions for release in immigration detention cases.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, initiated a civil claim alleging trespass, unlawful seizure of his vehicle and its contents, and infringements of his Charter rights.

The Attorney General of Canada and Canada Border Services Agency officers, as moving parties, brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss and strike various aspects of the plaintiff's claim.

The court dismissed claims related to vehicle loss, trespass to property, and Section 8 Charter rights due to the plaintiff's lack of legal standing, finding no ownership or possessory interest in the vehicle or properties.

Claims under Sections 7, 9, and 15 of the Charter were struck without leave to amend for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and lacking a sufficient factual basis.

However, claims for the loss of personal and business inventory found within the seized vehicle were struck with leave to amend, allowing the plaintiff to address pleading deficiencies.

The complainant, who uses a motorized scooter for mobility, alleged discrimination in services on the basis of disability after the owner of a laundromat demanded she move her scooter outside and subsequently told her to take her business elsewhere.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario found that the respondent owner failed to accommodate the complainant's disability-related needs in a manner that respected her dignity when he insisted she place her scooter outside, despite her concerns about theft and cold weather.

The Tribunal also found that the subsequent request for her to take her business elsewhere flowed directly from this discriminatory conduct.

The corporate respondent and the owner were held jointly and severally liable and ordered to pay $2,500 in general damages, read the Commission's policy on the duty to accommodate, and post a Code card.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss or limit a human rights complaint alleging racial profiling and assault by police officers, arguing that the complainant's prior unsuccessful civil action for assault and battery precluded relitigation of the facts.

The Tribunal applied the doctrine of abuse of process, holding that the complainant could not lead evidence conflicting with the civil court's factual findings that the alleged assaults did not occur.

However, the Tribunal found that the civil court had not decided whether race was a factor in the arrest or charges, and allowed those allegations, as well as allegations regarding the initial vehicle stop, to proceed.

During a hearing, a witness who was a union local president refused to identify teachers who had shared information with him, claiming privilege over communications between union members and a union representative.

The Tribunal applied the Wigmore criteria and found that the communications did not originate in a confidence that they would not be disclosed, as the witness had already shared general information about the communications with a Board investigator.

The Tribunal ordered the witness to re-attend and answer questions regarding the identity of the members and the content of their communications.

In an interim decision regarding a human rights complaint alleging racial discrimination in a school transfer and suspension, the adjudicator ruled on the admissibility of expert evidence and student records.

The respondents sought to introduce expert evidence from a forensic document examiner regarding alleged erasures on the complainant's chemistry exam.

Applying the Mohan test, the adjudicator found the expert evidence inadmissible as it was not necessary to assist the trier of fact.

The adjudicator also directed that written permission must be provided for the admission of documents forming part of any student's Ontario Student Record, pursuant to section 266(2) of the Education Act, failing which the documents would be struck from the record.

The respondents brought preliminary motions seeking to defer the human rights complaint to the union grievance process, to remove the personal respondent as a party, and to compel production of a medical note.

The Tribunal dismissed the request to defer, finding that because no grievance had been initiated, there was no proceeding to defer to.

The Tribunal granted the request to remove the personal respondent, as he was acting within the scope of his duties as plant supervisor and no prejudice would result from his removal.

The request to compel production of the medical note or strike references to it was dismissed, as the Commission could not locate the note and the issue could be addressed at the hearing.

In an interim decision regarding a human rights complaint, the Tribunal determined the class of persons entitled to access youth records released by a Youth Court Judge's order.

The Tribunal defined the class broadly to include the Tribunal, parties, counsel, and necessary witnesses or experts, rejecting requests to restrict access further.

The Tribunal also ordered the Peel Regional Police Services Board and the Chief of Police to make full production and disclosure of all arguably relevant documents to facilitate mediation.

In an interim decision during a human rights hearing, the Tribunal ruled on several evidentiary issues.

The Tribunal excluded documents relating to the pre-VRA period and the Commission's investigation report.

The Tribunal refused to admit the expert evidence of Dr. Frances Henry on anti-Black racism, finding it irrelevant because the complainant identified as 'brown' rather than 'Black', and unnecessary to assist the trier of fact.

The Tribunal allowed the respondents to call two police officers to testify about questioning the complainant's brother, finding that the brother's own testimony authorized disclosure under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Finally, the Tribunal denied the respondents' request for a sweeping publication ban regarding other students' academic records, noting that the Education Act privilege applies only to Ontario Student Records.