SCC 2015

These joined constitutional appeals challenged British Columbia’s automatic roadside driving prohibition regime for alcohol-related roadside screening results.

The Court held the scheme was within provincial jurisdiction over licensing and highway safety and did not create an offence engaging section 11(d).

The Court also held that roadside breath demands under the scheme engaged section 8 and that the former fail branch was unreasonable because serious immediate consequences were imposed without meaningful review of test reliability.

The section 8 breach for the fail branch was not justified under section 1.

Both appeals were dismissed, with partial dissent on section 8.

In a utilities rate-setting appeal, the Court considered whether Alberta statutes requiring prudent costs imposed a mandatory no-hindsight methodology.

The Court held the regulator retained discretion to choose its analytical approach, provided resulting rates were just and reasonable to both consumers and utilities.

On the record, the disallowed pension cost-of-living adjustment component was reasonably treated as forecast rather than committed cost.

Limiting recoverable COLA to 50 percent of CPI, capped at 3 percent, for specified pension calculations was therefore reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ontario Energy Board appealed a decision that had required it to apply a mandatory prudence framework when assessing Ontario Power Generation compensation costs in rate-setting.

The majority held tribunal participation in defending its own decision was proper in this regulatory context and found no impermissible bootstrapping on appeal.

The Court held the governing statute did not require a single prudence methodology and permitted the Board to use a mixed approach for costs that were partly committed and partly subject to managerial discretion.

The Board’s disallowance of $145 million in compensation costs was found reasonable, and its original decision was reinstated.

The Court held that under Manitoba’s Builders’ Liens Act, statutory trust and lien remedies are independent and may proceed concurrently.

Filing a lien bond to vacate a lien does not satisfy or extinguish trust obligations.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

In a foreign judgment recognition and enforcement appeal, the Court held that an enforcing forum need not establish a real and substantial connection between itself and either the dispute or the judgment debtor.

The only jurisdictional prerequisite is that the foreign court issuing the judgment had proper jurisdiction under the real and substantial connection framework or traditional grounds.

The Court also held that traditional presence-based jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is established where the corporation carries on business in the province and is served there.

Questions about ultimate enforceability against related corporate entities were left for later procedural stages.

The appeal concerned whether monetary penalties imposed under section 163.2 of the Income Tax Act engage section 11 Charter protections as criminal proceedings or true penal consequences.

The Court addressed whether it should exercise discretion to hear a constitutional issue despite missing notice in the lower courts once notice had been given in this Court.

The majority held the regime is administrative, aimed at compliance and deterrence, and does not impose true penal consequences.

The appellant was therefore not a person charged with an offence for section 11 purposes.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

In a Crown appeal from acquittals on breaking and entering, assault, and drug offences, the Court held that the trial judge erred in the air-of-reality analysis for colour of right by relying on non-evidentiary propositions raised in cross-examination.

The error was material because it could have affected the acquittals on the February 1 breaking and entering counts and also tainted related self-defence and Charter s. 8 determinations.

The Court emphasized that subjective belief evidence must meet evidentiary rules, and that a possible colour-of-right inference does not itself establish a reasonable expectation of privacy on a balance of probabilities.

Although the February 18 counts were analytically distinct, the Court ordered one remedy across all counts.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was directed on all charges.

The Court clarified the two-step framework for proving discrimination under s. 10 of the Quebec Charter and held that prima facie discrimination must be proven on a balance of probabilities.

It found insufficient evidence connecting the U.S. security-clearance refusal to Mr. Latif’s ethnic or national origin, making the tribunal’s finding unreasonable.

Both appeals were dismissed, with costs as ordered.

The Court dismissed the Crown appeal and upheld an order for a new trial on second degree murder, holding that the jury charge contained reversible errors on the use of post-offence conduct evidence for intent and that the curative proviso did not apply.

The appellants challenged the legality of the Federal Child Support Guidelines through judicial review in the Federal Court.

The Supreme Court held that provincial superior courts can address the validity of the Guidelines when necessary in proceedings properly before them, and that the Federal Court reasonably exercised its discretion to decline judicial review because that route was not appropriate in the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed, with concurring reasons cautioning against treating the case as a definitive ruling on exclusive federal jurisdiction to invalidate all federal regulations on administrative grounds.

The Court held that no unconditional agreement to sell had been concluded under the brokerage contract because the buyer triggered the resolutory condition and submitted a new conditional offer that was never accepted.

The sellers also committed no fault and did not voluntarily prevent the free performance of the brokerage contract by refusing to decontaminate the property at their own expense.

The broker was therefore not entitled to its commission, and the appeal was allowed with costs.

This appeal addressed federal Crown civil liability for the Minister of Justice's handling of mercy applications after a wrongful conviction.

The Court held that the mercy power was a core policy function protected by qualified immunity, and liability required bad faith or serious recklessness rather than simple fault.

The appellant did not prove that ministers acted in bad faith or that any alleged review failures caused compensable loss.

The Court also rejected additional damages, punitive damages, and claimed extrajudicial fees tied to alleged abuse of process.

The Court dismissed the Crown's appeal and held that restricting lawful medical marihuana possession to dried form unjustifiably violates section 7 of the Charter.

The prohibition was arbitrary because it undermined health and safety by forcing some patients toward riskier or less effective treatment methods.

The remedy declared sections 4 and 5 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to be of no force and effect only to the extent they prohibit authorized persons from possessing cannabis derivatives for medical purposes, without suspension.

The Court held that arson under s. 434 of the Criminal Code is a general intent offence, so self-induced intoxication short of automatism is unavailable as a defence.

The trial judge’s reliance on intoxication materially affected the acquittal, so the acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appeal concerned judicial review of a surrender order under extradition legislation in relation to historic U.S. murder charges revived after modern DNA testing.

The appellant argued delay, evidentiary weakness, and prejudice rendered surrender contrary to fundamental justice and unjust or oppressive.

The Court held the Minister reasonably concluded those concerns should generally be addressed by the foreign trial court, consistent with comity and established extradition principles.

The Court found no reviewable error in the assessment of section 7 Charter concerns or section 44(1) of the Extradition Act.

The surrender order was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the Minister of Justice’s surrender order in an extradition matter.

The Court held the Minister’s decision was reasonable, that a possible fourth trial in New Hampshire did not meet the threshold of shocking the conscience or being unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1) of the Extradition Act, and that comity and international cooperation strongly favored surrender.

The Court allowed the appeal and restored the Federal Court decision dismissing the constitutional challenge to a First Nation election rule requiring Grade 12 education for candidates.

The claimant failed to show that the requirement had a disproportionate discriminatory impact on an enumerated or analogous ground, including age or residence on reserve, because the evidentiary record was insufficient.

The Court held that the private use exception in child pornography prosecutions has three elements: lawful sexual activity, consent to recording, and strict private use.

Exploitation is assessed within the lawfulness inquiry, not as a separate extra requirement.

Because the trial judge failed to assess exploitation holistically under s. 153, legal error materially affected the acquittals and a new trial was ordered.

The Court allowed the Crown’s appeal in a jury-representativeness challenge arising from the underrepresentation of Aboriginal on-reserve residents on the Kenora jury roll.

The majority held the constitutional obligation is to provide a fair opportunity for participation through reasonable efforts in source-list selection and notice delivery, not to guarantee a proportionate jury-roll composition.

The order for a new trial was set aside and the manslaughter conviction was reinstated.

The Court allowed the Crown appeal and restored a detention order under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

It held that the public-confidence ground is a distinct and non-residual basis for pre-trial detention, not confined to exceptional cases or unexplained crimes.

The Court also held that review under ss. 520 and 521 is a hybrid remedy available only for significant new evidence, legal error, or a clearly inappropriate decision, and found no proper basis for the reviewing judge to overturn detention on these facts.