Mark Gallagher

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking their claim against an individual respondent, Linda Ross, for piercing the corporate veil and oppression remedy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the piercing the corporate veil claim, finding no direct link between the alleged wrongful conduct and the liabilities.

However, it found that the allegations of value stripping by Ms. Ross, knowing of corporate liabilities, arguably supported a claim under the oppression remedy, as it constituted unlawful corporate manoeuvres against which creditors could not protect themselves.

The appeal was allowed in part, granting leave to amend the statement of claim for the oppression remedy.

The plaintiffs sued for breach of a non-residential lease.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 to stay proceedings based on an arbitration clause and to strike claims against the individual defendant, Linda Ross, for interference with contractual relations and oppression under the Business Corporations Act.

The plaintiffs cross-moved for a discovery plan.

The court dismissed the motion to stay, interpreting the arbitration clause as applying only to rent for extended terms, not collection of unpaid rent.

The court struck the claim for interference with contractual relations against Linda Ross based on the Said v. Butt doctrine.

The court also struck the oppression remedy claim and personal liability claim against Linda Ross, finding that the pleadings did not establish a basis for piercing the corporate veil or an actionable tort beyond a breach of contract by the corporation.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for a discovery plan was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking payment for roofing work.

The defendant alleged deficiencies in the work and withheld payment, citing contractual provisions allowing for such holdbacks.

The court found that despite some credibility issues with the defendant's assertions, there remained a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the existence and cost of the alleged deficiencies.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The defendant subcontractor brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the third-party general contractor for defence costs.

The general contractor had breached its contractual obligation to obtain a wrap-up insurance policy for the construction project.

The court found that had the policy been obtained, there was a mere possibility that the claims against the subcontractor for property damage would have been covered, triggering a duty to defend.

The court ordered the general contractor to reimburse past defence costs and to retain an independent lawyer to act as an adjuster to approve future defence costs.

The applicant subcontractor sought an order requiring the respondent general contractor to arbitrate a delay claim separately from the general contractor's delay claim against the owner.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the subcontract explicitly required disputes relating to the owner to be consolidated and disposed of in the same proceedings.

The court also found that the general contractor had used 'best efforts' to advance the global delay claim against the owner in accordance with the prime contract.

The applicants brought a motion to extend an interim receivership, replace the interim receiver (Raymond Chabot Inc. - RCI) with another firm (Doyle Salewski Inc. - DSI), and later amended their motion to appoint a sales agent (MBG Finance Limited - MBG) and adjourn the appointment of a full receiver.

The respondent Caisse Populaire Rideau-Vision D’Ottawa Inc. and RCI opposed, advocating for RCI to be confirmed as the full receiver.

The court dismissed the applicants' requests, finding no evidence to support removing RCI or appointing MBG as a sales agent, and confirmed RCI as the receiver to provide certainty for the business and facilitate a sales process.

The applicant, a third mortgagee, brought an urgent application for an injunction to prevent the first mortgagee from selling a commercial property under a power of sale, and for an order permitting it to redeem the mortgage.

The court found that the applicant's right to redeem was extinguished when the first mortgagee accepted an offer to purchase the property, as the applicant had failed to tender the required funds when it had the opportunity to do so.

The court also held that the applicant failed to meet the three-part test for an interlocutory injunction, finding no serious issue to be tried regarding alleged bad faith, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal was previously dismissed with costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $4,424.70 plus disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff argued each party should bear their own costs or, alternatively, costs should be fixed between $3,500 and $4,500.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court fixed the defendant's costs at $4,915.23 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable by the plaintiff in any event of the cause.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order that denied her leave to amend her statement of claim and disclosure of Technical Standards and Safety Authority (TSSA) investigation files.

The proposed amendments included additional negligence particulars, references to post-incident charges and convictions, and allegations of patterns of behaviour.

The motion judge had found these amendments irrelevant to proving prior negligence and emphasized that punitive damages must be expressly pleaded.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order and no conflicting decisions on matters of principle.

The defendant was successful on its appeal from a Master's decision regarding the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her pleading and for documentary discovery.

The defendant sought costs of $25,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable forthwith.

The court fixed the defendant's costs for both the motion and the appeal at $20,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

Balancing the importance of the appeal's success with the plaintiff's litigation strategy, the court deviated from the general rule that costs are payable within 30 days, ordering instead that the costs be paid within 60 days of the decision at trial.

The defendant appealed a Master's order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her statement of claim and ordering the disclosure of a TSSA investigation file.

The plaintiff's action arose from an injury at the defendant's waterpark.

The proposed amendments included allegations regarding post-incident occurrences and a regulatory proceeding.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Master made a palpable and overriding error.

The post-incident similar fact allegations were neither material nor relevant to the plaintiff's claim in negligence, and there was no basis to order production of the TSSA file relating solely to post-incident events.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend her Statement of Claim and for disclosure of the Technical Standards and Safety Authority (TSSA) investigation file concerning the defendant's waterpark.

The defendant opposed, arguing the amendments were irrelevant, would broaden the litigation, and cause prejudice.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to amend her Statement of Claim and ordered the TSSA to deliver its investigation file, finding that any potential prejudice to the defendant could be compensated by costs or an adjournment, consistent with Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In a criminal appeal from a provincial court of appeal, the Crown challenged the setting aside of a second degree murder conviction and the order for a new trial.

The central issues were errors in the jury charge, including failure to identify the unlawful act and failure to properly instruct on the elements of manslaughter.

The Court held that these legal errors prevented reliance on the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was dismissed and the new trial order remained in place.

The accused was acquitted of trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay evidence under the Carter test.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, confirming that the trial judge made two clear misdirections in formulating the Carter test.

The Court held that the Crown met the heavy burden of establishing with reasonable certainty that, had the jury been properly charged, the verdict would not necessarily have been the same.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown did not call the victim of the assault to testify, relying instead on other witnesses and forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that the Crown had a duty to call the victim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, ruling that the Crown has broad discretion in deciding which witnesses to call, including the victim, and is not required to call all material witnesses absent an abuse of process.

The applicant union referred a grievance to the Board under section 126 of the Labour Relations Act.

The responding employer sought to lead evidence that the union had abandoned its bargaining rights.

The union raised preliminary objections, arguing that the issue of abandonment was res judicata based on a prior Board decision and that abandonment cannot occur during the initial term of a collective agreement.

The Board dismissed the preliminary objections, finding that the prior decision did not determine the abandonment issue and that abandonment could theoretically occur during an initial term.

The hearing was directed to proceed on the merits of the abandonment issue.

The respondent, a journalist, sought access to search warrants and supporting informations issued by a justice of the peace.

The appellants denied access, arguing the documents were not available for public inspection.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that after a search warrant has been executed, and objects found are brought before a justice, members of the public are entitled to inspect the warrant and the information upon which it was issued.

The Court affirmed the open court principle, ruling that curtailment of public accessibility is justified only where necessary to protect social values of superordinate importance, such as protecting the innocent when a search yields nothing.

The appellant, a probationary civil servant, was dismissed by the Crown.

He grieved the dismissal under a collective agreement, and an arbitration board ordered his confirmation as a permanent employee.

The Crown subsequently terminated his employment by Order in Council, relying on its statutory power to dismiss at pleasure under the Civil Service Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions for collective bargaining in the Civil Service Joint Council Act and the collective agreement displaced the Crown's unilateral power to dismiss at pleasure.

The appeal was allowed, and the grievance was directed to arbitration.

The Crown applied for certiorari to quash decisions made by a County Court Judge after his resignation.

The judge had heard several summary conviction appeals before retiring, and rendered decisions within eight weeks after his resignation pursuant to provincial legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial legislation validly applied to summary conviction appeals, as it related to the constitution and organization of provincial courts under s. 92(14) of the BNA Act.

However, for one accused whose case the judge had not heard prior to retirement, the judge lacked jurisdiction to impose sentence.