Jason Patrick Dutrizac

Two applications were brought regarding the validity of a $689,000 mortgage registered against two properties owned by the applicant.

The estate of the deceased chargee claimed the mortgage was valid and secured funds allegedly stolen by the applicant's parents, while the applicant claimed she never authorized or knew about the mortgage and that her signature was forged.

The court found that material facts surrounding the execution of the mortgage were in dispute, requiring findings of credibility and potentially expert evidence.

Consequently, the court adjourned the applications and directed that the issues proceed to trial pursuant to Rule 38.10(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Two applications were brought regarding the validity of a $689,000 mortgage registered against two properties owned by the applicant.

The estate of the deceased chargee claimed the mortgage was valid and secured funds allegedly stolen by the applicant's parents, while the applicant claimed she never authorized or knew about the mortgage and that her signature was forged.

The court found that material facts surrounding the execution of the mortgage were in dispute, requiring findings of credibility and potentially expert evidence.

Consequently, the court adjourned the applications and directed that the issues proceed to trial pursuant to Rule 38.10(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants moved to set aside an order granting a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against the LaSalle Property and to discharge the CPL.

The plaintiff had obtained the CPL without notice, claiming a plausible interest in the property via constructive or resulting trust and proprietary estoppel.

The defendants argued no triable interest and material non-disclosure.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding a triable issue existed and no material non-disclosure that would have altered the original CPL grant.

The court also dismissed a third party's motion to intervene.

The applicants brought an application seeking an accounting of their late mother's estate, alleging that significant funds were unaccounted for due to questionable transfers by the respondents, who acted as powers of attorney and estate trustees.

The respondents argued the application was barred by a prior consent judgment on a passing of accounts that concluded the estate litigation.

The court agreed with the respondents, finding that the applicants had commissioned a forensic accounting report prior to consenting to the judgment and that allowing the application to proceed would render the consent judgment pointless.

The application was dismissed as an abuse of process and foreclosed by the prior judgment.

The parties were unable to agree on costs following a motion and cross-motion in an estate litigation matter.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $26,625.06, while the defendant sought substantial indemnity costs of $25,038.54 or partial indemnity costs of $18,567.56.

The court found that the defendant was the more successful party, having prevailed on the appointment of an estate trustee during litigation and reimbursement of expenses.

The court rejected the plaintiff's request to reserve costs to the trial judge and fixed costs at $10,000 payable by the plaintiff to the defendant.

The plaintiff challenged his late mother's will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by the defendant.

The plaintiff moved to appoint his ex-wife as the Estate Trustee During Litigation (ETDL) with powers to sell the deceased's property, while the defendant cross-moved to remove the plaintiff's notices of objection and for reimbursement of estate expenses.

The court maintained the primary notice of objection, appointed a neutral retired lawyer as ETDL with limited powers to preserve the property pending the will challenge, and ordered the estate to reimburse the defendant for expenses incurred.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) was successful in its motion for summary judgment to enforce guarantees against the defendants.

This endorsement addresses RBC's request for costs of both the motion and the action on a substantial indemnity basis, as provided for in the guarantees.

The defendants argued for partial indemnity costs due to alleged unfair conduct by RBC.

The court found no reason to depart from the contractual provision for substantial indemnity costs, as the defendants' allegations of inequitable conduct were not substantiated.

The court also found the requested amount of $84,490.38, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, to be fair and reasonable.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce personal guarantees signed by the defendants for loans made to a now-bankrupt corporate borrower.

Three of the defendants brought competing summary judgment motions seeking to discharge their guarantees, arguing they lacked independent legal advice and that the bank acted in a commercially unreasonable manner.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion and dismissed the defendants' motions, finding the guarantees valid and enforceable.

The court held that the lack of independent legal advice did not invalidate the guarantees absent unconscionability or misrepresentation, and the express terms of the guarantees precluded the commercially unreasonable realization defence.

The defendants' counterclaims were also dismissed.

The applicants brought a motion to extend an interim receivership, replace the interim receiver (Raymond Chabot Inc. - RCI) with another firm (Doyle Salewski Inc. - DSI), and later amended their motion to appoint a sales agent (MBG Finance Limited - MBG) and adjourn the appointment of a full receiver.

The respondent Caisse Populaire Rideau-Vision D’Ottawa Inc. and RCI opposed, advocating for RCI to be confirmed as the full receiver.

The court dismissed the applicants' requests, finding no evidence to support removing RCI or appointing MBG as a sales agent, and confirmed RCI as the receiver to provide certainty for the business and facilitate a sales process.

The appellant trustee in bankruptcy appealed the dismissal of its motions for summary judgment and to strike portions of the respondent's claim.

The respondent, an interim receiver, sued the appellant for breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellant argued the claim was statute-barred and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the limitation period did not begin until the respondent received withheld reports containing material facts, and found no error in the dismissal of the abuse of process motion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Proposed Intervenors brought a motion for leave to intervene in an application to set aside an arbitration award arising from the receivership of a Ponzi scheme.

The Proposed Intervenors argued they had an interest in the subject matter, would be adversely affected, and shared common questions of law or fact, as they faced similar claims in separate proceedings.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the Proposed Intervenors had no direct interest in the subject matter, would not be adversely affected by the judgment, and would not make a useful contribution without causing injustice or delay to the immediate parties.

The appellant, a court-appointed interim receiver, filed a proof of claim with the respondent trustee in bankruptcy for its fees and disbursements.

The trustee disallowed the claim, and the application judge dismissed the appellant's appeal of that disallowance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an interim receiver cannot bypass the procedural requirement of passing its accounts by submitting unliquidated and non-approved fees to a trustee in the form of a proof of claim.

Following the dismissal of the Estate's appeal of the Receiver's disallowance of its proof of claim, the successful parties sought costs.

The court awarded costs to the Receiver on a substantial indemnity scale and to the Applicants on a partial indemnity scale.

The court also held the trustee of the Estate personally liable for the costs award, jointly and severally with the Estate, as the trustee initiated the unsuccessful appeal and there was no evidence of estate assets to satisfy the award.

In the context of ongoing inspection, receivership, and bankruptcy proceedings involving multiple corporations and a charitable foundation, counsel for the foundation sought a suspension of all proceedings pending determination of a contempt motion brought by the receiver against the foundation’s lawyer.

The moving party argued that the contempt allegation created a professional conflict of interest that would impair counsel’s ability to continue representing the client.

The receiver amended its motion to remove the requested contempt remedy against counsel, while reserving the right to bring such a motion in the future.

The court held that because the contempt relief against counsel had been removed, there was no present basis to suspend the proceedings.

Potential future contempt proceedings were insufficient to justify delaying the matters.

In complex receivership and bankruptcy-related proceedings involving a charitable foundation and associated corporations, the court addressed scheduling and procedural issues arising after prior bankruptcy orders.

Motions concerning the removal of directors and issues involving a third-party entity were adjourned on consent to dates to be set by the trial coordinator.

Examinations of certain responding parties were cancelled due to immigration concerns relating to re-entry into the United States.

The court directed that the examinations proceed in Buffalo, New York under Ontario procedural law, ordered the responding parties to seek necessary U.S. visa permissions, and required advance funding of travel costs for opposing counsel and the receiver.

The endorsement also addressed potential venue issues in a related promissory note action.

Investors and related applicants brought proceedings seeking receivership and related relief against several corporations and individuals connected to a charitable foundation.

Evidence showed the foundation transferred a Florida property to its directors shortly after learning of a pending motion seeking to restrain asset dissipation and appoint a receiver.

The court continued interim restraining and receivership orders and granted a full receivership order against certain corporate respondents other than the foundation.

The issue of whether the property transfer constituted a void transfer under s. 95(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act was adjourned to the scheduled bankruptcy trial.

The court also prohibited the release of funds held in a lawyer’s trust account and approved the receiver’s reports.

Investors brought an ex parte motion to amend a prior receivership order and expand the powers of an Interim Receiver in proceedings concerning corporations involved in Ontario real estate development projects.

Evidence from an appointed inspector indicated that investment funds raised for development projects had been diverted, including funds used to renovate a Florida property and transferred through corporate accounts controlled by the directing individual.

Additional evidence suggested asset transfers, movement of funds to foreign accounts, and restructuring of corporate holdings while insolvency proceedings were pending.

Relying on statutory authority under the Courts of Justice Act, the Ontario Business Corporations Act, the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act, and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the court amended the pleadings to add additional respondents and expanded the interim receiver’s authority to protect assets pending further proceedings.

The plaintiffs brought a Rule 21.01(a) motion seeking determination of legal questions raised in the pleadings relating to a negligence claim arising from a workplace vehicle incident and employment-related claims.

The defendant argued the negligence claim was barred by s. 28 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act and that employment-related claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the grievance arbitration process under the collective agreement and the Labour Relations Act.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that the negligence claim was barred, given that the workplace safety authority had previously denied benefits on the basis that the injury did not arise in the course of employment.

However, the plaintiffs conceded that the employment-related claims could not proceed in court due to the collective agreement and ongoing labour arbitration.

Those portions of the statement of claim were struck and the plaintiffs were ordered to deliver an amended pleading.

Following the defendant’s successful motion to strike the statement of claim and the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful motion to amend, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs totaling more than $32,000, arguing the action resembled a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) intended to silence complaints made to the Office of the Superintendent in Bankruptcy.

The court accepted that the defendant was entirely successful but held that the defendant’s original costs outlines represented a reasonable expectation of costs payable by an unsuccessful party.

Costs were therefore fixed partly on a partial indemnity basis and partly on a substantial indemnity basis, with additional costs for the action.

The court declined to add additional amounts for Quebec counsel or expanded claims beyond the original outlines.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim for defamation, arguing the impugned statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The statements were made in letters of complaint to the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy regarding the conduct of the plaintiffs in their capacity as bankruptcy trustee and associate.

The court found that the Superintendent of Bankruptcy is a quasi-judicial body and that the complaints were protected by absolute privilege.

The court struck the statement of claim and denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend, finding the proposed amendments were legally untenable.