Mitchell Kent Kitagawa

A personal injury claim arising from a slip and fall on January 3, 2019 on the premises of St. Lawrence College of Applied Arts and Technology in Cornwall, Ontario.

The plaintiff suffered a significant fracture injury when he slipped on a sidewalk leading to a medical office building.

Damages were agreed; the trial concerned liability only.

The defendants were the College and its winter snow and ice removal contractor.

The court found that the defendants breached their duty of care under the Occupiers Liability Act by using pure salt on sidewalks in extremely cold temperatures (-10°C or colder) when salt is chemically ineffective, and by failing to use sand or ice melt as required by contract or recommended by best practices.

The court found the defendants liable and found no contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part.

The plaintiffs in three related lawsuits arising from a fatal head-on automobile accident brought summary judgment motions to determine liability.

All parties agreed that liability could be determined by summary judgment but held diametrically opposed positions on who was liable.

The court found that the existence of competing expert accident reconstruction reports, particularly those based on computer simulations with unknown reliability, created genuine issues of material fact regarding causation.

The court also noted an "air of reality" to the contention that the deceased plaintiff's distracted driving might have contributed to the collision, despite a prior Highway Traffic Act conviction against one of the defendants.

Consequently, the motions for summary judgment were dismissed, as a full trial with oral testimony and cross-examination was deemed necessary to resolve the complex factual disputes and competing expert opinions.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff in a defamation action, relying on Rule 56.01(a) due to the plaintiff's ordinary residence outside Ontario.

The court found the plaintiff to be impecunious, demonstrating his financial inability to post security, and that his claim was not plainly devoid of merit.

Consequently, the motion for security for costs was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendant, Robert Gates, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action brought by the plaintiff, Melanie Gates, on the grounds that it was commenced after the expiration of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the discoverability of the claim, specifically when Melanie Gates knew or ought to have known that Robert Gates was a potential party at fault.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the limitation defence was left for adjudication at trial.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

At the hearing, the plaintiff sought leave under Rule 39.02 to introduce a late-filed affidavit, after having cross-examined the defendants' witnesses.

The court found the plaintiff's explanation for the delay unsatisfactory and criticized the litigation tactic of tailoring evidence.

However, applying a flexible approach, the court granted leave to file the affidavit, finding that any prejudice to the defendants could be compensated by costs or an adjournment, and that the plaintiff should not be deprived of a trial due to counsel's oversight.

The court remained seized of the matter for the defendants to decide whether to proceed with their summary judgment motion and cross-examine the plaintiff.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an action arising from denial of insurance coverage following an alleged vandalism incident at the plaintiffs’ retail business.

The insurer argued the claim was barred by a one-year contractual limitation period derived from fire insurance statutory conditions under the Insurance Act.

The court held that the policy was a multi-peril policy in which fire was only an incidental peril and therefore the fire insurance statutory conditions did not apply.

The court further found that the policy language did not clearly or validly contract out of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and the action was allowed to proceed.