Mitchell Kent Kitagawa

A personal injury claim arising from a slip and fall on January 3, 2019 on the premises of St. Lawrence College of Applied Arts and Technology in Cornwall, Ontario.

The plaintiff suffered a significant fracture injury when he slipped on a sidewalk leading to a medical office building.

Damages were agreed; the trial concerned liability only.

The defendants were the College and its winter snow and ice removal contractor.

The court found that the defendants breached their duty of care under the Occupiers Liability Act by using pure salt on sidewalks in extremely cold temperatures (-10°C or colder) when salt is chemically ineffective, and by failing to use sand or ice melt as required by contract or recommended by best practices.

The court found the defendants liable and found no contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part.

The plaintiff tenant sued her landlord for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on ice on the front step of her leased row house.

The landlord counterclaimed, arguing the tenant was responsible for winter maintenance of the exclusive use area.

Both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue of responsibility for clearing the ice.

The court held that the front step was an exclusive use area, not a common area, and that the lease provision requiring the tenant to remove snow was not void under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The tenant's motion to dismiss the counterclaim was dismissed, and the landlord's motion was granted in part, declaring the tenant responsible for winter maintenance of the area.

The plaintiffs in three related lawsuits arising from a fatal head-on automobile accident brought summary judgment motions to determine liability.

All parties agreed that liability could be determined by summary judgment but held diametrically opposed positions on who was liable.

The court found that the existence of competing expert accident reconstruction reports, particularly those based on computer simulations with unknown reliability, created genuine issues of material fact regarding causation.

The court also noted an "air of reality" to the contention that the deceased plaintiff's distracted driving might have contributed to the collision, despite a prior Highway Traffic Act conviction against one of the defendants.

Consequently, the motions for summary judgment were dismissed, as a full trial with oral testimony and cross-examination was deemed necessary to resolve the complex factual disputes and competing expert opinions.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the defendant driver ran a red light and t-boned the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger.

The court found the defendants 100% liable.

The plaintiff, a self-employed jewelry designer, suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, chronic pain, PTSD, and post-concussion syndrome.

The court awarded $1,101,568.55 in total damages, including $225,000 for general damages, $328,402.20 for past and future economic loss, and $489,300 for future care costs, plus a management fee and tax gross-up.

At the outset of a motor vehicle accident trial, the parties sought a ruling on whether section 12 of the Evidence Act, which limits a party to calling three expert witnesses without leave, applies to participant experts and non-party experts.

The plaintiff intended to call four litigation experts and two participating experts, and file numerous medical reports under section 52.

After reviewing the jurisprudence, including Westerhof v. Gee Estate, and the Osborne Report, the court ruled that section 12 applies only to litigation experts retained for the purpose of the proceeding, and not to participant or non-party experts.

The applicants, the brother and father of the respondent, applied for a declaration that the respondent is a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent, who has a schizophrenia diagnosis, had commenced five unsuccessful Small Claims Court actions against the applicants and his former psychiatrist, and initiated complaints against the deputy judges and the applicants' lawyers.

The court found that the respondent's conduct in commencing claims without any prospect of success, initiating unmeritorious complaints, and threatening further legal action was persistent, without reasonable grounds, and vexatious.

The application was granted, and the respondent was prohibited from instituting further proceedings without leave.

The defendants appealed and the plaintiffs cross-appealed a Master's decision dismissing a motion for summary judgment regarding the expiry of a limitation period in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The defendants argued the action was statute-barred, while the plaintiffs argued the limitation period had not expired due to discoverability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the Master's conclusion that the evidence on discoverability was unclear and intertwined with issues of severity, causation, and damages.

The court held that the limitation period issue could not be justly decided on a summary judgment motion and should be determined on a full evidentiary record at trial.

The defendant subcontractor brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the third-party general contractor for defence costs.

The general contractor had breached its contractual obligation to obtain a wrap-up insurance policy for the construction project.

The court found that had the policy been obtained, there was a mere possibility that the claims against the subcontractor for property damage would have been covered, triggering a duty to defend.

The court ordered the general contractor to reimburse past defence costs and to retain an independent lawyer to act as an adjuster to approve future defence costs.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff in a defamation action, relying on Rule 56.01(a) due to the plaintiff's ordinary residence outside Ontario.

The court found the plaintiff to be impecunious, demonstrating his financial inability to post security, and that his claim was not plainly devoid of merit.

Consequently, the motion for security for costs was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendant, Robert Gates, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action brought by the plaintiff, Melanie Gates, on the grounds that it was commenced after the expiration of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the discoverability of the claim, specifically when Melanie Gates knew or ought to have known that Robert Gates was a potential party at fault.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the limitation defence was left for adjudication at trial.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff mortgagee's action for negligent distribution of insurance proceeds, arguing the claim was barred by a one-year limitation period in the policy and that the plaintiff suffered no damages.

The defendant alternatively sought to transfer the proceeding from Ottawa to Kingston.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the insurer's conduct created a separate cause of action subject to the discoverability rule and whether the plaintiff suffered damages due to loss of control over the proceeds.

The court also dismissed the transfer motion, as the defendant failed to show Kingston was a significantly better venue.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's slip and fall action.

The plaintiff failed to serve a responding affidavit until after cross-examining the defendants' affiants, contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and failed to serve a Reply that materially changed the alleged facts.

The defendants subsequently abandoned their motion and sought costs.

The court found the plaintiff's litigation tactics unjustified and awarded the defendants $15,000 in costs in any event of the cause.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

At the hearing, the plaintiff sought leave under Rule 39.02 to introduce a late-filed affidavit, after having cross-examined the defendants' witnesses.

The court found the plaintiff's explanation for the delay unsatisfactory and criticized the litigation tactic of tailoring evidence.

However, applying a flexible approach, the court granted leave to file the affidavit, finding that any prejudice to the defendants could be compensated by costs or an adjournment, and that the plaintiff should not be deprived of a trial due to counsel's oversight.

The court remained seized of the matter for the defendants to decide whether to proceed with their summary judgment motion and cross-examine the plaintiff.

The plaintiff moved to set aside an administrative dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident and to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The proceeding had been dismissed after repeated failures to meet trial‑setting deadlines under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Applying the established factors for setting aside an administrative dismissal—including explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice—the court found the delay largely attributable to counsel error and that the defendant had not demonstrated actual prejudice.

The complexity of parallel accident litigation and prior defence consents to extensions rebutted any presumption of prejudice.

The dismissal order was set aside, but costs of the motion were awarded to the defendant and made payable by the plaintiff’s counsel.

A farmer sued his insurance broker alleging negligence for failing to obtain insurance coverage for collapse of a tarp barn due to snow load.

Both parties brought competing motions for summary judgment.

The court held that the broker breached its duty of care by failing to adequately advise the client about coverage and foreseeable risks.

However, the plaintiff failed to prove causation because the evidence did not establish that the collapse was more likely than not caused by snow load rather than other possible causes such as wind, design flaws, or construction defects.

As a result, the plaintiff could not establish that the broker’s breach caused the loss.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing their motor vehicle accident action for delay.

At the hearing, the plaintiff requested a brief adjournment, which the defendant opposed.

The court granted the adjournment peremptorily, set a timetable for filing additional affidavit materials, and reserved the issue of costs to the judge hearing the substantive motion.

The insured sought summary judgment declaring that an all‑risk property and business interruption insurance policy covered losses arising from the preventive shutdown and repair of a hydroelectric penstock after a similar penstock failed due to defective welding.

The insurer had indemnified losses from the failed penstock but denied coverage for preventive repairs and business interruption relating to the second penstock.

The court held that the policy excluded the cost of rectifying defects in workmanship and that no insured loss had yet occurred because the second penstock had not suffered physical damage.

The court also rejected reliance on statutory mitigation obligations and the doctrine of imminent peril, finding the risk of failure was foreseeable but not inevitable.

The insurer’s cross‑motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiffs owned a fashion boutique insured by the defendant.

After a loss, the plaintiffs sued the defendant more than one year but less than two years after the incident.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by a one-year limitation period in the insurance contract.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the contractual provision did not override the two-year statutory limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that the contract was not a 'business agreement'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the policy clearly provided for a one-year limitation period, the provision effectively overrode the statutory period under s. 22 of the Limitations Act, 2002, and the insurance contract was a 'business agreement' because it was not for personal, family, or household purposes.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an action arising from denial of insurance coverage following an alleged vandalism incident at the plaintiffs’ retail business.

The insurer argued the claim was barred by a one-year contractual limitation period derived from fire insurance statutory conditions under the Insurance Act.

The court held that the policy was a multi-peril policy in which fire was only an incidental peril and therefore the fire insurance statutory conditions did not apply.

The court further found that the policy language did not clearly or validly contract out of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and the action was allowed to proceed.

The defendant moved for summary judgment seeking a declaration that his motor vehicle insurance policy with the third-party insurer was in full force and effect when he struck the plaintiff pedestrian.

The insurer brought a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing the policy was validly terminated for non-payment of premiums prior to the accident.

The court found that the defendant had implicitly agreed to the premium amount by paying it for three months before defaulting.

The court also accepted the insurer's calculation of the 30-day notice period required by the Statutory Conditions.

The insurer's cross-motion was granted, and the defendant's motion was dismissed.